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RECENT CASES
Administration of Justice-Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure-District Court Has No Power To
Penalize Counsel for Delay Which Violates
Standing Orders of Court
In the course of a personal injury action, a United States district
judge imposed a fine of one hundred dollars upon the defendant's
'attorney for negligently failing to file a pretrial memorandum.
Pursuant to powers believed given it by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure,' the court had adopted two standing orders on pretrial
conferences. The first provided for mandatory filing of pretrial memo-
randa, defendant's counsel to file within thirty days after receiving
plaintiff's memorandum; the second order provided for "fines, costs
and counsel fees" for failure to prepare for or appear at the pretrial
conference. Defendant's counsel, through negligence, failed to file his
memorandum until the day before the conference and was ten
months late in so doing. The plaintiff's counsel then filed a written
motion to strike the untimely memorandum. The court, finding the
motion too drastic under the circumstances,2 issued an order which
(1) struck names of certain witnesses appearing on the memorandum,
(2) imposed a one hundred dollar fine on the defendant's attorney,
and (3) permitted the plaintiff to submit an order imposing costs
and counsel fees caused by defendant's delay.3 After the trial, which
resulted in verdict for the plaintiff with indemnity against a third
party, the defendant's attorney appealed, attacking that portion of
the order which provided for the imposition of a fine as carrying "the
criminal hallmark." On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit, held, reversed, two judges dissenting. The
Federal Rules give the district courts no power to discipline or penal-
ize counsel in civil litigation for violation of standing orders of the
court. Gamble v. Pope & Talbot, Inc., 307 F.2d 729 (3d Cir.) (en
banc), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 888 (1962).
The lawyer owes a duty of punctuality not only to his client, but
1. "In any action, the court may in its discretion direct the attorneys for the parties
to appear before it for a conference .... " FED. R. Civ. P. 16. "Each district court
...may from time to time make and amend rules governing its practice not incon-
sistent with these rules." FE. R. Crv. P. 83.
2. Noting that this was the first time a fine had been imposed and that the opposing
counsel had not reminded his adversary of the delay, the district court said that in
subsequent cases the fine would be more substantial. Gamble v. Pope & Talbot, Inc.,
307 F.2d 729, 731 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 888 (1962).
3. 307 F.2d at 730.
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also to the court.4 The judge may "hold counsel to a proper apprecia-
tion [of this duty] ... so as to enforce due diligence in the dispatch
of business before the court."5 The inherent power of all courts to
manage their affairs in such a way as to achieve the expeditious
disposition of cases is unquestioned,6 but the sanctions a court may
employ in dealing with a tardy or dilatory lawyer present a difficult
problem. There are two general methods that might be used: sanc-
tions directed at the litigant, and sanctions against the real party at
fault-the lawyer.
Ordinarily, the federal courts have penalized the litigant for his
counsel's misconduct in failing to appear or being tardy,7 while the
more personal measure, contempt, has been employed against the
attorney himself, if he is found to have intentionally obstructed
justice.8 In visiting the sanction upon the litigant, the courts have
used measures as extreme as dismissal or default judgment,9 in addi-
tion to preclusion orders such as striking witnesses or defenses. 10 To
dismiss the suit when the attorney is at fault is of questionable fairness
to the litigant, who is unaware of the proper steps to be taken in a
proceeding." Furthermore, a dilatory lawyer would usually prefer
to pay a reasonable fine for his negligence 12 rather than submit his
client to a loss of his action and incur the possibility of defending an
4. Canons of Professional Ethics, Canon 21.
5. Canons of Judicial Ethics, Canon 18.
6. See Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 & n.4 (1961).
7. The Federal Rules provide for involuntary dismissal for "failure of plaintiff to
prosecute or to comply with these rules or any order of court," Fa). R. Civ. P. 41(b),
and for default judgment against a defendant who 'as failed to plead or otherwise de-
fend," Fa. R. Civ. P. 55. See e.g., Levine v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 283 F.2d 532 (2d
Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 821 (1961); Weiss Noodle Co. v. Aprile, 272 F.2d 923
(6th Cir. 1959) (Rule 33). These are severe sanctions which are used with restraint
and are critically examined by appellate courts, who are sensitive to abuse of discretion.
Waterman, An Appellate judge's Approach When Reuiewing District Court Sanctions
Imposed for the Purpose of Insuring Compliance With Pretrial Orders, 29 F.R.D. 420,
424 (1962).
8. There is no such thing as negligent contempt; there must be a finding of wil-
fulness. United States ex el. Porter v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 163 F.2d 168
(7th Cir. 1947).
9. Note 7 supra.
10. See, e.g., the drastic preclusion orders in Padovani v. Bruchhausen, 293 F.2d
546 (2d Cir. 1961) (order vacated); Syracuse Broadcasting Corp. v. Newhouse, 271
F.2d 910 (2d Cir. 1959) (order modified); Matheny v. Porter, 158 F.2d 478 (10th
Cir. 1946) (reversing on other grounds but quoting from an unreported district court
decision).
11. "It would seem hardly likely . . . that the lay plaintiff could know or com-
prehend the doom about to be visited upon him, not his counsel, in time to avert it if,
indeed, that were in any way possible." Padovani v. Bruehhausen, supra note 10, at
548. For a judicial discussion of the respective rights and duties of the client and his
attorney in legal proceedings, see Bonnifield v. Thorp, 71 Fed. 924 (D. Alaska 1896).
12. Mcllvaine, A District Judge's Views as to the Means of Insuring Compliance
by Counsel With the Pretrial Procedures, 29 F.R.D. 408, 411 (1962). Judge Mc-
Ilvaine's court used money penalties to control pretrial procedure.
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action for negligence brought against him by his client.13
The federal contempt statute, 4 arising from the desire of Congress
to curb the contempt power of the federal courts, 5 specifically enu-
merates the conduct for which a court may impose a criminal fine.'6
In the instant case, the court of appeals, relying upon the purpose of
the contempt statute, accepted the appellant attorney's contention
that "the district court has not been given authority and possesses no
inherent power to fine an attorney who has not been held in contempt
nor given a hearing."17 While recognizing that the lower court did
not regard its punitive action as an exercise of the contempt power,
but rather as a disciplinary measure, this court found nothing in the
Federal Rules which would authorize such a sanction. The court
reasoned that any imposition of costs other than a contempt penalty
must come within the statute18 providing for compensatory costs pay-
able to the opposing party and could not, as in this case, be made
payable to the court. The dissenting judges expressed the opinion
that a small fine intended only as a sanction for the attorney's mis-
conduct did not constitute a contempt penalty but was only an
exercise of the inherent power of the court.19 Since all courts have the
power to control members of their bars by suspension and disbar-
ment,20 as well as by contempt proceedings, Judge Goodrich in his
dissent urged that the court could also impose a lesser sanction. The
majority's view that to uphold the action of the district judge in this
case would imply that a trial court could impose a fine of any amount
for whatever conduct the judge deemed subject to discipline is
answered by the action in the instant case itself: the attorney has the
13. See Wade, The Attorney's Liability for Negligence, 12 VAND. L. Rxv. 755, 766-
67 (1959).
14. 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1958).
15. See the excellent article by Frankfurter and Landis, Power of Congress over
Procedure in Criminal Contempts in "Inferior' Federal Courts-A Study in Separation
of Powers, 37 I-LHv. L. REv. 1010 (1924).
16. "A court of the United States shall have power to punish by fine or imprison-
ment, at its discretion, such contempt of its authority, and none other, as-(1) Mis-
behavior of any person in its presence or so near thereto as to obstruct the administra-
tion of justice; (2) Misbehavior of any of its officers in their official transactions; (3)
Disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ process, order, rule, decree or command."
18 U.S.C. § 401 (1958).
17. 307 F.2d at 731.
18. "Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the
United States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in any case
as to increase costs unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to
satisfy personally such excess costs." 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1958). Some courts have
interpreted "vexatiously" to mean wilfulness.
19. 307 F.2d at 735 (Biggs, J., dissenting), 737 (Goodrich, J., dissenting).
20. Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265 (1882); Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.)
505 (1873); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871); In the Matter of
Schlesinger, 404 Pa. 584, 172 A.2d 835 (1961); In re Rappoport, 256 App. Div. 823, 9




right to appellate review of unauthorized or excessive action.2'
The court's approach to this problem is unnecessarily narrow in
scope. Confining its inquiry to the Federal Rules, the contempt
statute, and the compensatory costs statute, the instant case limits a
district court's available sanctions against the lawyer, the real party at
fault, and requires all sanctions to be directed at the innocent client.
Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for in-
voluntary dismissal of a plaintiff's action if he fails "to prosecute or
to comply with these rules or any order of court."22 In a statement
which accompanied the recent amendments to the Federal Rules, 23
Justices Black and Douglas urged a major change in Rule 41(b).
Citing Link v. Wabash R.R.,24 where the Court affirmed a dismissal of
a plaintiff's action because of his lawyer's failure to appear at a pretrial
conference, the two Justices were of the opinion that "a fair system of
justice should not have penalized him because his lawyer, through
neglect or any other reason, failed to appear when ordered."21 Their
submitted alteration in Rule 41(b) would require actual notice com-
municated to the plaintiff of the failure of his attorney. While this
concept of actual notice to the plaintiff at first blush seems a reason-
able one, it neglects problems of administration, e.g., reaching an
unavailable plaintiff, or waiting for the plaintiff to retain another
lawyer. These troublesome aspects of actual notice would eventually
lead to further complications in the prompt disposition of civil cases.
However, the purpose underlying the Justices' suggestion, i.e., to
prevent injustice to the innocent litigant, is obviously a sound one.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court declined certiorari in the instant
case, leaving the district courts with a difficult problem: how to
control the court calendar and a careless lawyer without materially
prejudicing the unsuspecting litigant.
Banks & Banking-Clauses in Contract of Deposit
Which Relieve Bank of Liability for Paying
Over Stop Order and Which Require Depositor
To Give Prompt Notification of Error in
Statement Are Valid
The plaintiff-depositor and the defendant-bank entered into a
deposit contract under which the depositor was required to make
21. See Waterman, supra note 7.
22. FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b). (Emphasis added.)
23. Black and Douglas, JJ., Statement on the Rules of Civil Procedure and the
Proposed Amendments, 83 Sup. Ct., advance sheet no. 7, 31, 33 (special yellow section)
(1963).
24. 370 U.S. 626 (1962).
25. Black and Douglas, JJ., supra note 23, at 33.
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any request to stop payment of a check in writing and the bank was
to be exempted from liability for paying a check contrary to such
written request through accident or oversight.' A second provision
further exempted the bank from liability for any difference of account
of which the depositor failed to notify the bank within a ten-day
period from the date the bank mailed his bank statement and can-
celled checks to him.2 Subsequently the plaintiff telephoned instruc-
tions to a vice-president of the drawee bank to stop payment of a
$1000 check he had drawn. He was advised to make his request in
writing, which he did by letter the same day.3 Three days later, after
receipt of drawer's letter, the check was received by the drawee bank
and charged to his account. The bank informed the depositor of the
check's payment.4 Upon request for and receipt of the inclusive
month's cancelled checks and bank statement, the drawer failed to
submit within the ten-day period written notice of any difference in
account.5 In an action by the drawer against the drawee bank seek-
ing judgment in the amount of the check, the jury found for the
plaintiff. However, the trial judge granted defendant's motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, on the basis that the con-
tractual provision requiring notice within a ten-day period of any
difference of account was valid, "that the bank did not waive com-
pliance thereof, and that it was prejudiced by plaintiff's failure to do
1. The first exculpatory provision of the deposit contract was as follows: "Any
request for stop payment must be made in writing on a form prescribed by this bank,
and this bank will not be liable in any way for refusing payment of the item nor for
paying the item through accident or oversight." Brief for Appellant, p. 6, Brief for
Respondent, p. 5, Haman v. First Nat'l Bank, 115 N.W.2d 883 (S.D. 1962).
2. The second exculpatory provision of the deposit contract was as follows: "This
bank will not be liable for any amount paid on any forged or altered item including
forged indorsements, nor for any missing cancelled check, nor for any difference of
account, unless written notice thereof is delivered to this bank within 10 days after date
of mailing or delivering the depositor's statement; and if the depositor fails to give such
notice, or if any statement or cancelled checks are lost in transit, the bank's records
of the account shall be accepted as correct." Brief for Appellant, p. 6, Brief for
Respondent, p. 4, Haman v. First Nat'l Bank, 115 N.W.2d 883 (S.D. 1962).
3. The defendant-bank denied that prior to presentation and honor of the check on
November 17, 1956, it had received any notice in writing or otherwise of a desire of
plaintiff to "stop payment." However, the jury found that notice had been given to
the defendant-bank by the depositor, through a letter placed in the mail on November
14, 1956.
4. "This is to advise you that your check No. 333 dated November 14, 1956, payable
to the Calhoun Realty Company in the amount of $1,000 was paid November 17th.
The fact that the check was paid three days ago makes it impossible for us to return
it to you." Text of the letter of November 20th, 1956, addressed by the assistant vice-
president of the bank to the depositor. Brief for Respondent, p. 23, Haman v. First
Nat'l Bank, 115 N.W.2d 883 (S.D. 1962).
5. On December 18, 1956, the depositor wrote the bank requesting his November
1956 bank statement and additional information as to several December 1956 deposits
regarding a tenant's account. In a letter dated December 20, 1956, they were sent to




so."6 Upon appeal, held, affirmed. Terms of a contract of deposit
which purport to absolve the bank of any liability for the payment
through "accident, or oversight" of depositor's stop-payment request
and which require the depositor to report any difference of account
within ten days after receipt of his bank statement and cancelled
checks are within the contracting capacity of the parties and valid.
Haman v. First National Bank, 115 N.W.2d 883 (S.D. 1962).
The relationship between a bank and its depositor is that of debtor
and creditor.7 As a debtor, the drawee bank's obligation to the
depositor is to honor his checks when properly presented if his bank
balance justifies their payment.8 Since a check is simply an order or
an authorization for the bank to pay, the drawer has the right to
revoke such authority and countermand his check.9 At common law,
the bank that pays the check against which a stop-payment order is
in effect does so at its own peril.' This result has been adopted by
both the Negotiable Instruments Law" and the Uniform Commercial
Code.12 In order to avoid loss incurred through the inadvertence
of their employees, banks have attempted to restrict their common-
law liability by a release clause in the stop-payment form which is
executed by the depositor at the time of his request. The release
clause in the stop-payment form has been attacked as an agreement
6. 115 N.W.2d at 885.
7. Barbour v. First Citizens Natl Bank, 77 S.D. 106, 86 N.W.2d 526 (1957).
8. E.g., Baird v. Reinertson, 235 N.W. 159 (N.D. 1934); Flaherty v. Bank of
Kimbal, 75 S.D. 468,68 N.W.2d 105 (1955).
9. "The drawing and issuance of a check operates to create in the drawee a duty
and power of discharging, pro tanto, the drawees debt to the drawer by paying the
sum called for to the holder.... The duty and power thus created by the voluntary
act of the drawer necessarily is capable of destruction by the act of the party who
brought these relations into existence, provided such act of destruction precedes any
act of the drawee in reliance upon the power created which would constitute a change
of position by such drawee." BarroN, BILrs AND Nom's § 181, at 520 (1961).
10. "The bank is the drawer's agent. Its primary duty is to hold or to pay his
money as he directs. Primarily it owes no duty to the holder, except under and by
virtue of directions from the drawer. Until, by reason of these directions, it has
assumed voluntarily, or by action of law has involuntarily come under, secondary and
superseding obligations to the holder, the latest orders from the drawer govern its
right to act on his behalf." 1 MORSE, BANKs iAND BANcuG § 398 (6th ed. 1928).
See American Defense Soc'y v. Sherman Nat'l Bank, 225 N.Y. 506, 122 N.E. 695
(1919); Pease & Dwyer Co. v. State Nat'l Bank, 114 Tenn. 693, 88 S.W. 172 (1905);
Hewitt v. First Nat'l Bank, 113 Tex. 100, 252 S.W. 161 (Comm'n App. 1923). But see
Union Nat'l Bank v. Oceana County Bank, 80 111. 212 (1875).
11. According to § 189 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, a check is not an
assignment of the funds of the drawer until it is certified. Consequently, under this
provision payment may be stopped by the drawer of a check at any time before
certification, or payment. BiGELow, BmLs, Nom.Es AND CIEcxs §§ 208, 209 (3d ed.
1928).
12. "As under the original sections [N.I.L. §§ 127, 189], a check or other draft
does not of itself operate as an assignment in law or equity." UNWoxf CoMMEcrAi.
CoDE § 3-409, comment 1 (1962).
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without consideration 13 and as contrary to public policy.14  In
response, it has been extracted from the stop-payment order and
included within the initial contract of deposit. This satisfies the lack
of consideration argument, 5 but objections as to public policy still
remain. The ambiguity of the phrase "public policy" has caused the
courts little consternation; they have found it violated by the in-
equality of bargaining power,16 the snare of precatory words in the
printed contract or notice, 7 the inconspicuous placement of the
exculpatory clause,18 or simply the economic and social detriments
which would result from the enforcement of the clause.'9 And yet
the guardians of contractual freedom have attacked this ambiguity
as a means for masking unjustified infringement upon the contract
rights of the parties.20 Although statutes defining the phrase "public
policy" in its general application to the laws of the jurisdiction,
21
as well as past judicial decisions, have been the subject of extensive
construction and interpretation, a clear line of demarcation between
sound and unsound public policy has not emerged, and the facts and
circumstances of the particular case often dictate the result.22
13. Hiroshima v. Bank of Italy, 78 Cal. App. 362, 248 Pac. 947 (Dist. Ct. App.
1926); Calamita v. Tradesmens Nat'l Bank, 135 Conn. 326, 64 A.2d 46 (1949);
Reinhardt v. Passaic-Clifton Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 16 N.J. Super. 430, 84 A.2d 741
(App. Div. 1951); Speroff v. First-Cent. Trust Co., 149 Ohio St. 415, 79 N.E.2d 119
(1948); Thomas v. First Nat'l Bank, 316 Pa. 181, 101 A.2d 910 (1954).
14. See Hiroshima v. Bank of Italy, 78 Cal. App. 362, 248 Pac. 947 (Dist. Ct. App.
1926); Carnegie Trust Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 213 N.Y. 301, 107 N.E. 693 (1916);
Levine v. Bank of United States, 132 Misc. 130, 229 N.Y. Supp. 108 (N.Y. Munic. Ct.
1928); Speroff v. First-Cent. Trust Co., 149 Ohio St. 415, 79 N.E.2d 119 (1948);
Winchester Milling Co. v. Bank of Winchester, 120 Tenn. 225, 111 S.W. 248 (1908);
Comment, 39 YALE L.J. 542 (1930); 15 CALIF. L. REv. 46 (1926); 15 CALIr. L.
REv. 235 (1927); 40 HAnv. L. REv. 110 (1926).
15. Reinhardt v. Passaic-Clifton Natl Bank & Trust Co., 16 N.J. Super. 430, 84
A.2d 741 (App. Div. 1951) (dictum).
16. Id. at 436, 84 A.2d at 744.
17. Calamita v. Tradesmens Nat'l Bank, 135 Conn. 326, 327, 64 A.2d 46, 47 (1949)
("the undersigned hereby requests"); Hiroshima v. Bank of Italy, 78 Cal. App. 362,
248 Pac. 947, 949 (Dist. Ct. App. 1926) ("the undersigned makes the foregoing
request as an act of courtesy only").
18. Los Angeles Inv. Co. v. Home Say. Bank, 180 Cal. 601, 182 Pac. 293 (1919).
19. Hiroshima v. Bank of Italy, 78 Cal. App. 362, 248 Pac. 947 (Dist. Ct. App.
1926).
20. See Martinez v. National City Bank, 80 F. Supp. 545 (D.P.R. 1948); Hodnick v.
Fidelity Trust Co., 183 N.E. 488 (Ind. Ct. App. 1932); Tremont Trust Co. v. Burack,
235 Mass. 398, 126 N.E. 782 (1920); Gaita v. Windsor Bank, 231 N.Y. 152, 167 N.E.
203 (1929).
21. In South Dakota the relevant provision is: "Contracts Against Public Policy. All
contracts which have for their object, directly or indirectly, to exempt any one from
responsibility for his own fraud or willful injury to the person or property of another
or from violation of law whether willful or negligent, are against the policy of the
law." S.D. CODE § 10.0702 (1939).
22. "Whether or not a contract is against public policy is a question of law for the
court to determine from all of the circumstances in a particular case." Hodnick v.
Fidelity Trust Co., 183 N.E. 488, 491 (Ind. Ct. App. 1932).
1963]
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In addition, the negligent bank has attempted to defend against
liability by showing that the depositor has a duty to examine his
returned statement and checks and give notice of any discovered
defalcation, and that upon failure to perform this duty, the negli-
gence of the bank is offset. Founded in common law as a defense
against a forged, or altered instrumenta 3 the duty required the notice
to be given within a reasonable time.24 The purposes of this notice
were to allow a bank to proceed immediately against the wrongdoer,
and to permit a more expeditious verification of accounts for the
bank's protection from unjust claims.25 In an effort to strengthen the
defense, banks have stipulated within the contract of deposit that
without notice within an established period of time of infirmities in
the depositor's stated account the bank would be released from its
common-law liability. When a court has determined the stipulated
time to be reasonable, it will enforce the provision as to forgeries
and alterations that were unreported by the depositor within the
period.2 6 In a jurisdiction under the Negotiable Instruments Law
the inclusion in the contract of deposit of both attempts to restrict
common-law liability is reassuring to a bank desiring any degree of
protection from liability. 7 However, the introduction of the Uniform
Commercial Code in an increasing number of jurisdictions suggests
a short-lived reassurance; under the Code, the restrictive clauses fail
to exempt the bank from loss if they attempt to disclaim liability
for "failure to exercise ordinary care."m A qualification of this pro-
vision allows the bank to reasonably establish, by contract, the
standard of care from which the bank's responsibility to its depositor
shall be determined.2
In the instant case, the court recognized a bank's common-law
23. Leather Mfrs.' Bank v. Morgan, 117 U.S. 96 (1886); First Nat'l Bank v. Allen,
14 So. 335 (Ala. 1893); Scanlon-Gipson Lumber Co. v. Germania Bank, 90 Minn. 478,
97 N.W. 380 (1903); Myers v. Southwestern Nat'l Bank, 193 Pa. 1, 44 Atd. 280
(1899).
24. Leather Mfrs.' Bank v. Morgan, 117 U.S. 96 (1886); Scanlon-Gipson Lumber
Co. v. Germania Bank, 90 Minn. 478, 97 N.W. 380 (1903).
25. "'Perhaps as the jury found defendant was at fault but the point is if the notice
had been given it might have been able to have shown the contrary. At any rate, it
appears to be a reasonable construction of the contract to conclude that notice should
be given in such cases so that a bank with multiple transactions is forewarned in
sufficient time so that it may ascertain the facts and protect itself against unjust
claims."' 115 N.W.2d at 885 (S.D. 1962) (quoting the opinion of the trial judge).
26. See Brunswick Corp. v. Northwestern Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 214 Minn. 370,
8 N.W.2d 333 (1943); Semingson v. Stockyards Nat'l Bank, 162 Minn. 424, 203
N.W. 412 (1925).
27. Spanogle, The Bank-Depositor Relationship-A Comparison of the Present Ten-
nessee Law and the Uniform Commercial Code, 16 Vm.ND. L. Rv. 79, 100 n.139 (1962).
28. UNnwo.m CommcrA.L CODE § 4-103(1).
29. Leary, Article 4: Bank Deposits and Collections Under the Uniform Commercial
Code, 15 U. Prrr. L. REv. 565, 581 (1954).
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liability but also recognized the defense against its negligent depositor
arising from the contractual duty of the depositor to examine, within
ten days after mailing, the statement of account and cancelled checks,
and to report to the bank not only any alterations or forgeries but also
4any discrepancy" in the amounts.-3 In addition the court recognized
the right of the bank to accept or refuse a deposit and to agree upon
the terms and conditions under which the deposit will be accepted,
so long as they are not in conflict with a controlling statute (including
the Negotiable Instruments Law) or other rule of law.31 The court
found no such conflict under the given circumstances either in the
contractual stipulation that "notice be given . . . within ten days,"
or in the provision excusing the bank's negligence.32 As to plaintiff's
claim that by virtue of his stop-payment order the defendant had
actual notice of the error and consequently additional notice was
unnecessary the court was unsympathetic since the contractual pro-
vision required specific action of the plaintiff which he had not per-
formed.3 The court, recognizing the right of the bank to contract in
the deposit agreement so as to restrict its liability for paying a stop-
payment item through "'accident or oversight,"' dismissed plaintiff's
contention that his contributory negligence was immaterial in light
of the defendant's negligence.-4 It noted that those authorities who
felt otherwise substantiated their feelings on the grounds of lack of
consideration and public policy. Distinguishing this case from those
in which the release clause was imbedded in an agreement executed
subsequent to the deposit contract, the court found no problem as
to consideration. 35 However the court made no specific response to
the problem of public policy. Rather, it addressed itself to the joint
grounds of consideration and public policy in concluding that "the
weight of authority supports the view that such a stipulation in a
stop order constitutes a valid and enforceable contract."
36
This case correctly holds that the problem of lack of consideration
is cured by the inclusion in the contract of deposit of the exculpa-
tory provision as to accidental or inadvertent payment,37 but its sug-
gestion that such relocation cures the public policy obstacle is er-
roneous. Regardless of when the depositor signs the contract, the
point is that the bank has exceeded the reasonable bounds allowed a
quasi-public institution in its dealings with the public. Although
30. 115 N.W.2d at 885 (1962).
31. Ibid.





37. See text accompanying note 35 supra.
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limitations of liability for negligence are not foreign to the field of
public service institutions, total abrogation of liability is.- To allow
banks to contract as private organizations and transact as public
service organizations is inconsistent. Such inconsistency pricks at the
very image the banks labor to project to the public.
As to the second exculpatory provision, the court in the instant case
gave little consideration to the distinction between the various de-
falcations which create a "difference in account" and contractually
require notice by the depositor. Yet a pertinent distinction exists.
In the areas of forgery and alteration, an appreciation of the nature
of the defect and a recognition of the bank's liability regardless of
whether a reasonable examination would have disclosed the defect
make it reasonable that the depositor be charged with a responsibility
to assist the bank in minimizing its exposure. By fulfilling this duty
the depositor helps the bank to minimize any injury resulting from its
negligence. By contractually extending the depositor's duty to en-
compass "any difference of account" and interpreting the phrase as
inclusive of errors other than forgery and alteration, the justification
is purportedly to minimize the effect of false claims that become more
easily established with the passage of time.9 And yet, to extend the
scope of the duty of depositor in this respect should require that the
bank justify the request for such protection by manifest evidence
of its sincerity. The bank's failure in the instant case automatically
to issue monthly statements to its depositors is hardly in keeping with
its contention that a sense of currency as to the depositor's accounts
is professionally necessary; the depositor was issued his statement
not by virtue of any bank-administered program but through his
own initiative.40 Since the contract of deposit gave the bank the
option of sending the depositor's statement when it chose,4 1 an
awareness of circumstances that could possibly have litigious reper-
cussions (e.g., the payment of the check over a stop-payment order)
would require more than a passive role to absolve the bank from
liability. In fact the bank, by reserving the right to send the de-
positor's statement at its option instead of automatically mailing it
within a reasonable period, should be charged with the duty to
exercise the option upon reasonable notice of any negligent act as
to depositor's account. In summary, a bank desirous of a greater
degree of protection from its own negligence through exculpatory
clauses will be warned by the instant case to place such clauses in
the contract of deposit. The obstacle of lack of consideration will
38. WATmI s, SsnwPR,,s AND CARRms § 2-26 (5th ed. 1962).
39. See note 25 supra.
40. See note 5 supra.
41. Brief for Respondent, p. 18, Haman v. First Nat'l Bank, 115 N.W.2d 883
(S.D. 1962).
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thereby be removed. However, the case is not very persuasive au-
thority for the proposition that such placement eliminates the public
policy argument.4 A bank would be better advised to avoid false
confidence in this holding and to ensure that it exercises every
reasonable means to maintain a position consistent with that degree
of care which justifies the contractually created duty of the depositor.
In the situation presented in the instant case, the bank should have
pursued one of two reasonable courses of action: (1) deletion of the
optional mailing clause and automatic mailing of depositor's state-
ments; or (2) exercise of the mailing option upon reasonable notice
of any transaction in which the bank has acted negligently toward
the depositor's account.
Carriers-Routes-Action for Reparation Available
Under Motor Carrier Act for Unreasonable Routing
Defendant motor carrier transported shipments for plaintiff shipper
between intrastate points, using an interstate route and charging the
applicable interstate rate instead of using an available intrastate
route with an accompanying lower rate.' Upon submission to the
Interstate Commerce Commission' the routing practice was found
unreasonable, whereupon plaintiff instituted suit in a federal district
court for reparation of the difference between the rates.3 The lower
court's dismissal4 was affirmed 5 by the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, on the authority of T.I.M.E., Inc. v. United States.
6
On certiorari in the United States Supreme Court, held, reversed, three
judges dissenting. Survival of a judicial remedy of reparation for
unreasonable routing practices is not inconsistent with the regulatory
scheme of the Motor Carrier Act of 1935 and such a remedy is
available through the act's saving clause. 7 Hewitt-Robins, Inc. v.
Eastern Freight-Ways, Inc., 371 U.S. 84 (1962).
42. See UNwonm Co mcurL CODE §§ 4-103(1), -406(1).
1. Between 1953 and 1955 plaintiff made numerous shipments of rubber pads
between Buffalo and New York City. The rate charged was the published rate
properly filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission. The intrastate route and
rate used were also properly filed with the New York Commerce Commission.
2. 302 I.C.C. 173 (1957).
3. The amount of excess charges was approximately $10,000.
4. 187 F. Supp. 722 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
5. 293 F.2d 205 (2d Cir. 1961) (one judge dissenting).
6. 359 U.S. 464 (1959).
7. Section 216(j) of the Motor Carrier Act preserves any "remedy . . . not incon-
sistent" with it. Motor Carrier Act, § 216(j), 49 Stat. 558 (1935), 49 U.S.C. § 316(j)
(1958). If any common law right of action would not be inconsistent with the act's




At common law, reparation was awarded an injured shipper for a
carrier's breach of the duty to select the cheaper of two equally con-
venient alternative routes.8 The purpose of the Motor Carrier Act of
19359 was to protect carriers from self-destruction by unrestrained
competition within the industry. The act (part II of the Interstate
Commerce Act) ,1 as do the railroad and navigation acts (parts I
and III respectively of the Interstate Commerce Act)," declares that
unreasonable practices are unlawful, but it differs from parts I and
III by failing to provide any express procedure for reparation for
practices found to be unreasonable. 12 Section 13 of part I authorizes
suit in the federal district courts for reparation for unreasonable
practices, but the issue of reasonableness is retained within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission in
order to preserve uniformity.13  The T.I.M.E. case involved the
unreasonableness of rates under the Motor Carrier Act; the court
held that a shipper has no statutory right and no surviving common
law right to recover unreasonable charges, since to retain such a com-
mon law right would disrupt the statutory scheme of regulation. 14 An
analogous statute, the Federal Power Act,'5 is also without provision
for reparation of unreasonable rates. Originally, in actions for
reparation under that act, the issue of reasonableness was de-
termined by the commission, with the courts using the commission's
determination as a basis for awarding relief.16 This procedure, which
8. See, e.g., Galveston H. & S.A. Ry. v. Lykes Bros., 294 Fed. 968 (S.D. Tex.
1923); Parker v. Great W. Ry., 7 Man. & G. 252, 135 Eng. Rep. 107 (C.P. 1844). In
Northern Pac. Ry. v. Solum, 247 U.S. 477 (1918), the Court said, "In the absence of
shipping instructions it is ordinarily the duty of the carrier to ship by the cheaper
route." Id. at 482. See DomE, BA nrTis~s AND CAmms 460 (1914).
9. Motor Carrier Act § 201-27, 49 Stat. 543-67 (1935), as amended, 49 U.S.C.
§§ 301-27 (1958). See George, Federal Motor Carrier Act of 1935, 21 CouM .i L.Q.
249 (1936).
10. Note 9 supra.
11. Interstate Commerce Act, part I, 24 Stat. 379-87 (1887), as amended, 49
U.S.C. §§ 1-300 (1958); part III, 54 Stat. 929 (1940), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §§
901-23 (1958). Part I provides for a retroactive rate adjustment through a suit for
reparation provided by §§ 8, 9, 13, 16, 49 U.S.C. §§ 8, 9, 13, 16 (1958). See
Southern Pac. Ry. v. Darnell-Taenzer Lumber Co., 245 U.S. 531 (1918); cf. 12 Smr.
L. RLv. 674 (1959).
12. T.I.M.E., Inc. v. United States, supra note 6; see 13 VAND. L. R v. 412 (1959).
13. The Court in Texas & Pac. R.R. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426 (1907),
held that the determination of reasonableness is within the exclusive province of an
administrative body, since only that body can issue orders regarding the practice
and provide for a uniform construction of the statute. See 3 DAvis, ADmmINSTRATiVE
LAW § 19.01 (1958); Jaffe, Primary Jurisdiction Reconsidered; The Anti-Trust Laws,
102 U. PA. L. REv. 577 (1954); Note, 30 GEo. L.J. 545 (1942); 62 CoLUM. L. REV.
520 (1962); cf. T.I.M.E., Inc. v. United States, supra note 6.
14. See 13 VND. L. REv. 412 (1959).
15. Federal Power Act, 49 Stat. 838 (1935), as amended, 16 U.S.C. §§ 791-828
(1958). Like the Motor Carrier Act, the Federal Power Act also declares unreasonable
practices unlawful but makes no provision for reparation.
16. The method used is analogous to that used under the Motor Carrier Act prior
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was similar to one used here under the Motor Carrier Act,17 was
rejected by the Supreme Court in 1951.18 Congress, although presented
with numerous opportunities, 9 failed to amend the Motor Carrier
Act to provide an explicit procedure for reparation awards. This
failure has been advanced to support both positions, i.e., (1) it is
indicative of a congressional intent not to provide a procedure similar
to parts I and 111,20 or (2) Congress felt that there was no need to
act since an equitable arrangement had evolved.21 The latter argument
is based on Bell Potato Chip Co. v. Aberdeen Truck Lines, Inc.,2
where the commission, using the saving clause, which retains com-
mon law remedies if consistent with the regulatory scheme, deter-
mined that if it could not award reparation, it could determine the
reasonableness of a practice, which determination could then be
used as a basis of court action.
The majority opinion distinguished the instant case from the
T.I.M.E. decision on the ground that T.I.M.E. concerned rates while
the instant case involved routes.23 Since rates are surrounded with
numerous statutory safeguards, such as filing rate schedules with
the commission, permitting the commission to determine that a
published rate is unreasonable would disrupt the statutory scheme of
regulation; on the other hand, according to the majority of the Court,
the matter of routes is dealt with primarily on an ad hoc basis, with-
out prior regulation of the carrier's selection of a route. The majority
noted that a motor shipper cannot choose the route to be used, while
the rail shipper has a choice of route; therefore, if no method of re-
to T.I.M.E. The issue of reasonableness is submitted to the commission for a
determination. Once the commission determines the practice to be unreasonable, an
action is instituted in court for reparation.
17. See, e.g., United States v. Garner, 134 F. Supp. 16 (E.D.N.C. 1955); New
York & New Brunswick Auto Express Co. v. United States, 126 F. Supp. 215 (Ct. Cl.
1954).
18. Montana-Dakota Util. Co. v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246
(1951). The Court said the Federal Power Act, like the Motor Carrier Act, declares
unreasonable rates unlawful but does not create a cause of action for recovery of
unreasonable past charges. If the commission could declare the rate unreasonable for
the purpose of a reparation suit, then it would be doing indirectly what it was not
empowered to do directly.
19. The commission favors an amendment to create uniformity with the other
sections of the Interstate Commerce Act. Hearings Before the House Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H.R. 2324, 2295, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1947).
See also S. RE_. No. 433, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1940).
20. See T.I.M.E., Inc. v. United States, supra note 6; cf. Montana-Dakota Util.
Co. v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., supra note 18.
21. See 62 COLuM. L. REv. 520, 523 n.25 (1962).
22. 43 M.C.C. 337 (1944). See Monheim, An Analysis of the Question of Repara-
tions Involving Motor Carriers, 27 ICC PRAc. J. 257 (1959); cf. W.A. Barrows Por-
celain Enamel Co. v. Cushman Motor Delivery Co., 11 M.C.C. 365 (1939).
23. 371 U.S. at 86-87.
24. Id. at 87.
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covery existed the motor shipper would be completely at the mercy
of the carrier.2 The dissent asserted that the case was squarely within
the purview of T.I.M.E.26 An attempt was made to point out certain
devices protecting against unreasonable routes, and it was shown
that only a handful of cases had been based on unreasonable practices
over the past twenty-four years.27
It would be an inequitable application of the statute to subject a
shipper to the whim of a carrier by denying reparation for an un-
reasonable routing practice when there are no prospective safeguards.
The correctness of the instant decision hinges on its distinguishability
from T.I.M.E., which the Court accomplished adequately. The dissent
correctly asserted that there are safeguards on selection of routes, but
these safeguards are applied subsequently and not prospectively, as
in the rate situation. If this decision is a spur to litigation, as the
dissent suggested, then increased litigation should be accepted if the
alternative is for an injured shipper to be left remediless. There is no
question but that the commission should have exclusive jurisdiction
to determine the reasonableness of the practice, as they possess a
certain expertise, and uniform application is desirable; but it is foolish
to say that this is sufficient. The practice may be determined to be
unreasonable, but the shipper would still have an unreimbursed
pecuniary loss. The Court wisely perceived this dilemma and cor-
rected it by extending the foregoing process one step further: once
the issue of unreasonableness has been determined, judicial relief in
the form of reparation is available. Since the commission cannot
prospectively regulate routes, as it can rates, this result is not inconsist-
ent with the scheme of the Motor Carrier Act; therefore, the majority's
construction of the saving clause seems correct.
Constitutional Law-Full Faith and Credit-
Collateral Attack on Errors of Court of Prior Forum
A Florida decree granted the plaintiff an absolute divorce from her
husband, awarded the plaintiff permanent alimony during her life-
time, and provided that in the event her husband predeceased her
the alimony would continue as a charge upon his estate. After the
divorce the husband remarried and moved to West Virginia but con-
tinued to pay the alimony until his death. The plaintiff brought the
present action in West Virginia to enforce against his estate a claim
for unpaid alimony accrued after the death. The defendants in the
25. Id. at 88.
26. Id. at 89. Justices Harlan, Stewart, and White dissented.
27. Id. at 92.
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case were the executor of the estate and the wife and son of the
second marriage. The trial court found for the defendants. On
appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, held,
affirmed. The courts of one state need not grant full faith and credit
to a provision in another state's divorce decree which granted alimony
for a period beyond the husband's life without statutory authority or
an agreement between the parties; such a provision is beyond the
Florida court's jurisdiction, and the decree is therefore void and of
no force and effect in Florida. Aldrich v. Aldrich, 127 S.E.2d 385
(W. Va. 1962), cert. granted, 372 U.S. 963 (1963).
Under the full faith and credit clause,1 a final judgment of F-i
must be given the same effect in F-2, including res judicata effect,
that it enjoys in F-1, if F-1 had jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant and the subject matter of the action.2 So F-2 must inquire
into the law of F-1 to determine the standing of the judgment under
the law of F-1. If the doctrine of res judicata prevents the impeach-
ing of the judgment in F-1, then it is unimpeachable in F-2.' A mis-
take of law on the part of the F-1 court is not a defense against the
judgment in F-2.4 The full faith and credit clause precludes any
inquiry into the logic or consistency of the decision of F-1 or the
validity of the legal principles upon which the judgment is based.
If the court in F-2 decides that there is error in F-1, and it is only
error and not a lack of jurisdiction, then F-2 must give full faith and
credit. When F-i had personal jurisdiction of the parties and afforded
an opportunity to litigate any jurisdictional issue, it is unlikely that
the res judicata effect will be ignored unless there are extremely
strong grounds of "no jurisdiction over the subject matter."5 The res
judicata principle is usually stated as follows:
1. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
2. "It is settled by repeated decisions of this Court that the full faith and credit
clause of the Constitution requires that a judgment of a State which had jurisdiction of
the parties and the subject matter in suit, shall be given in the Courts of every other
State the same credit, validity and effect which it has in the State where it was
rendered, and be equally conclusive upon the merits .. " Roche v. McDonald, 275
U.S. 449, 451 (1928). See discussion and authorities cited in Cheatham, Res Judicata
and the Full Faith and Credit Clause: Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 44 COLuM.
L. RFv. 330 (1944); Sumner, Full Faith and Credit for Judicial Proceedings, 2
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 441 (1955); 107 U. PA. L. REv. 261 (1958).
3. For cases where the issue was either litigated or the parties had the opportunity
to do so: Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371 (1940);
Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32 (1938); American Sur. Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U.S. 156
(1932).
4. Milliken v. Myer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940); Roche v. McDonald, supra note 2;
Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1905); 16 MoNr. L. REv. 54 (1955); 1 OLA.
L. REv. 287 (1949).
5. Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S. 378 (1948); Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948); Chicot
County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, supra note 3. The Supreme Court will
examine and weigh the conflicting policies of the law of F-1 in an effort to protect
the judgment of F-2. Barber v. Barber, 323 U.S. 77 (1944); Adams v. Saenger, 303
1963]
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When the court has jurisdiction over the parties and determines that it
has jurisdiction over the subject matter, parties cannot collaterally attack
the judgment on the ground that the court did not have jurisdiction over
the subject matter, unless the policy underlying the doctrine of res judicata
is outweighed by the policy against permitting the court to act beyond its
jurisdiction.6
The West Virginia court conceded that Florida had jurisdiction of
the parties and the subject matter of the suit. After reviewing the
Florida decisions and statutes relevant to making alimony a charge on
a defendant's estate, it found that the Florida court "did not have
jurisdiction" to make such an award . 7 Though speaking of "jurisdic-
tion," the court, acting in essentially an appellate capacity, determined
that the Florida divorce court misconstrued Florida law.
After stating that West Virginia is to give the Florida judgment the
same force and effect that it has in Florida and that Florida law will
control the conditions and extent of impeachment of the judgment,
8
the court did not deal with the questions that these principles present.
It failed to examine Florida law as to the impeachability or standing
of the judgment there, but rather inquired whether the Florida cases
and statutes support the decree rendered. This inquiry ignores en-
tirely the considerations of res judicata and full faith and credit,
which the court admits to be the controlling factors in the case.
Generally, when a divorce decree cannot be attacked in the rendering
state for lack of jurisdiction by parties actually before the court or
strangers,9 it cannot be attacked by them anywhere.10 Likewise, a
third party in privity usually cannot attack the judgment collaterally
if parties to the action cannot do so." The right of a stranger to assail
the decree is governed by the law of the forum rendering the decree,
and there is a division 2 among the states as to whether or not the
interest of the stranger which is affected must have accrued prior to
the time when the decree was rendered.' 3 Two Supreme Court cases
U.S. 59 (1938).
6. Duke v. Durfee, 308 F.2d 209 (8th Cir. 1962), cert. granted, 83 Sup. Ct. 509
(1963). For critical comment see 63 CoLTA. L. Ruv. 353 (1963); 49 VA. L. REv.
180 (1963). The case is also commented on in 37 TurL. L. REv. 335 (1963).
7. Aldrich v. Aldrich, 127 S.E.2d 385, 393 (W. Va. 1962).
8. Id. at 389.
9. As the term is used here, stranger means a third party who though neither party
nor privy has some interest which is affected by the divorce decree (e.g., a subsequent
spouse).
10. See note 5 supra.
11. Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581 (1951), held that the law of the divorce
forum should describe the limits of privity.
12. Compare Old Colony Trust Co. v. Porter, 324 Mass. 581, 88 N.E.2d 135 (1949),
with de Marigny v. de Marigny, 43 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 1949).
13. See generally Comment, Stranger Attack on Sister-State Decrees of Divorce,
24 U. Cm. L. Pv. 376 (1957).
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construing the law of Florida concluded that the stranger could attack
a decree that was presumed to be binding on the parties only when
he had a pre-existing interest at the time of the suit which would be
affected by the decree. 14 This would appear to block any collateral
attack in Florida by the wife and son of the second marriage (de-
fendants here), since they certainly had no interest existent at the
time the plaintiff got her judgment. The conclusion seems inescapable
that if West Virginia intended to respect the validity of the decree in
the rendering state it was bound to deny the collateral attack.
However, the principle of res judicata is, in certain instances, out-
weighed by the policy against permitting a court to act beyond its
jurisdiction. Among the factors to be considered in permitting col-
lateral attack on a judgment for lack of jurisdiction are clear lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter, determination that jurisdiction
depended upon a question of law rather than of fact, that the court
was one of limited rather than of general jurisdiction, that the ques-
tion was not actually litigated, and that the policy against the court
acting beyond its jurisdiction was strong.15 To override the require-
ment of res judicata there must be a strong countervailing policy.
16
The usual application of these exceptional elements occurs when
there is a collateral attack in F-1 against its own judgment. There
seems to be no direct authority concerning their use in the situation
before this court, an attack in F-2 on an F-i judgment.17 The opinion
of the West Virginia court gives no exceptional factors which would
justify the denial of full faith and credit to the Florida decree. Since
the decree is not impeachable in Florida, it should not be impeachable
in West Virginia.18
14. Cook v. Cook, 342 U.S. 126 (1951); Johnson v. Muelberger, supra note 11;
Sumner, Full Faith and Credit for Divorce Decrees-Present Doctrine and Possible
Changes, 9 VAND. L. REv. 1 (1955).
15. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), Cos'sxcTs §§ 111a, 112, comments (Tent. Draft No.
1, 1953); RESTATEMENT, Ju-=ENTS § 10 (1942).
16. See note 6 supra.
17. See Boskey & Braucher, Jurisdiction and Collateral Attack: October Term
1939, 40 CoLun'r. L. REv. 1006 (1940). This article discusses the application in a
series of Supreme Court cases of res judicata principles to questions of jurisdiction.
18. The instant case is commented on in 14 SYtCUSE L. REv. 497 (1963) and 65
W. VA. L. REv. 89 (1962).
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Restraint of Trade-Labor Law-Where Defendants
Stipulated They Were Independent Contractors and
Joined Union To Fix Prices, Having No Other Legitimate
Union Interest, Membership May Be Terminated Under
Sherman Act
The United States brought a civil action under section 1 of the
Sherman Act' to enjoin a union, its business agent, and four self-
employed grease peddlers2 from unlawfully conspiring and combining
in an unreasonable restraint of trade and commerce in yellow grease.
The defendants stipulated that their conduct was unlawful, but con-
tended that a "labor dispute" was present, and therefore the district
court was barred by section 4 of the Norris-La Guardia Act 3 and
sections 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act4 from ordering the union to
terminate the union membership of the grease peddlers. The district
court found that there was no competition between the peddlers and
union members, that the only object of the peddlers' membership
was to increase their profit by price fixing, and issued an order to
terminate the union membership of the self-employed peddlers.' On
1. "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
declared to be illegal." 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958).
2. It was stipulated that these grease peddlers were independent contractors. Their
earnings as middlemen consisted of the difference between the price at which they
bought the commodity and the price at which they sold to the processors, less the
cost of operating and maintaining their trucks. Los Angeles Meat Drivers Union,
Local 626 v. United States, 371 U.S. 94, 110 (1962). The processors obtained their
grease in two ways: (1) The union members, employees of the processors, picked up
and hauled the grease from the restaurants; (2) other processors purchased grease
directly from the grease peddlers who procured their grease from sources other than
restaurants. Id. at 96-97.
3. "No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining
order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of
any labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons participating or interested in such
dispute (as these terms are herein defined) from doing, whether singly or in concert,
any of the following acts: . . . . (b) Becoming or remaining a member of any
labor organization or of any employer organization.... ".47 Stat. 70 (1932), as
amended, 29 U.S.C. § 104(b) (1958).
4. Section 6: "Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid
the existence and operation of labor . . . organizations, instituted for the purposes
of mutual help . . . nor shall such organizations, or the members thereof, be held
or construed to be illegal combinations, or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the
antitrust laws." 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1958). Section 20: "No
restraining order or injunction shall be granted by any court of the United States, or a
judge or the judges thereof, in any case between an employer and employees, or
between employers and employees, or between employees, or between persons em-
ployed and persons seeking employment, involving, or growing out of, a dispute
concerning terms or conditions of employment. 38 Stat. 738 (1914), as amended,
29 U.S.C. § 52 (1958).
5. United States v. Los Angeles Meat Drivers Union, Local 626, 196 F. Supp. 12
(S.D. Cal. 1961).
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appeal6 to the Supreme Court of the United States, held, affirmed.
Where a defendant's stipulations show there is no competition and
that the only object in union membership is to fix prices, an order
terminating the membership for violation of the antitrust laws is
proper. Los Angeles Meat Drivers Union, Local 626 v. United States,
371 U.S. 94 (1962).
In 1914 Congress ostensibly removed labor organization activity
from the sanctions of the Sherman Act by enacting section 6 of the
Clayton Act which took unions out of the "illegal combination" class,
7
and section 20 which forbade injunctions against boycotts, picketing
and strikes connected with "labor disputes."8 However, the Supreme
Court restricted the apparent labor union advantages under the Clay-
ton Act by a series of cases9 which caused Congress to broaden the
definition of a "labor dispute" in the Norris-La Guardia Act of 1932.10
Nevertheless, the Court has required that aspects of the employer-
employee relationship be significantly related to the controversy if a
case is to be treated as arising out of or concerning a "labor dispute.""
Subsequently, the Court in United States v. Hutcheson 2 declared
that the Sherman, Clayton, and Norris-La Guardia Acts must be
jointly construed 13 and that "so long as a union acts in its self-interest
and does not combine with non-labor groups the licit and illicit under
6. This was a direct appeal under the provisions of the Expediting Act, 32 Stat.
823 (1903), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 29 (1958).
7. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1958), quoted in part, note 4 supra.
8. 38 Stat. 738 (1914), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1958), quoted in part, note
4 supra.
9. See, e.g., United Leather Workers v. Herkert & Meisel Trunk Co., 265 U.S.
457 (1924); Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921). For com-
ments, see GREGoRY, LABor AND T=E Lw 223 (2d rev. ed. 1958); Boudin, The
Sherman Act and Labor Disputes, 39 CoLum. L. RFv. 1283 (1939), 40 COLum L. REv.
14 (1940).
10. 47 Stat. 70 (1932), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1958).
11. Section 13 of Norris-La Guardia defines "labor dispute," 47 Stat. 73 (1932),
29 U.S.C. § 113 (1958). However, the Court has set some limits on section 13: "We
recognize that by the terms of the [Norris-La Guardia] statute there may be a 'labor
dispute' where the disputants do not stand in the proximate relation of employer
and employee. But the statutory classification, however broad, of parties and circum-
stances to which a 'labor dispute' may relate does not expand the application of the
Act to include controversies upon which the employer-employee relationship has no
bearing. .. . The controversy here is altogether between fish sellers and fish buyers
* * * [and] does not place in controversy the wages or hours, or other terms and
conditions of employment...." Columbia River Packers Ass'n v. Hinton, 315 U.S.
143, 146 (1942). See also United States v. Sportswear Mfrs. Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460
(1949) (manufacturer and contractor sought to allocate work and fix prices).
12. 312 U.S. 219 (1941) (jurisdictional dispute). See Gregory, The New Sher-
man-Clayton-Norris-La Guardia Act, 8. U. Cin. L. REv. 503 (1941); Nathanson &
Wirtz, The Hutcheson Case: Another View, 36 ILL. L. REv. 41 (1941); Steffen,
Labor Activities in Restraint of Trade: The Hutcheson Case, 36 ILL. L. RPv. 1
(1941). Cf. United States v. Brims, 272 U.S. 549 (1926).
13. "Such legislation must not be read in a spirit of mutilating narrowness. On
matters far less vital and far less interrelated we have had occasion to point out the
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§ 20 [of the Clayton Act] are not to be distinguished."' 4 Allen Bradley
Co. v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 315 re-
affirmed the Hutcheson rationale, holding that the same labor activi-
ties may or may not be in violation of the Sherman Act depending
upon whether the union acts alone or in combination with business
groups, and enjoined a combination of union and employers which
was formed to fix prices. In the absence of a "labor dispute" it is
well settled that an offending association of businessmen can be
ordered dissolved to remedy most effectively the unlawful condition.16
The majority of the Supreme Court in the instant case approved
the finding of the district court that this was not a case "involving or
growing out of a labor dispute," but rather was one involving an
illegal combination between businessmen and a union to restrain
commerce.17 As no "labor dispute" was involved, the prohibitive
sections of the Norris-La Guardia and Clayton Acts did not apply,
and under its equity power the district court could order dissolution.18
The Court was careful to point out that a labor organization might
often have a legitimate interest in soliciting self-employed entrepre-
neurs as members, 19 but determined that was not the case here.2 Mr.
importance of giving 'hospitable scope' to Congressional purpose even when meticulous
words are lacking." 312 U.S. at 235.
14. Id. at 232.
15. 325 U.S. 797 (1945) (combination using union's boycott power to monopolize
electrical equipment). Sherman Act sanctions applied in Local 175, Int'l Bhd. of
Elec. Workers v. United States, 219 F.2d 431 (6th Cir. 1955) (combination with
employers to suppress ompetition of electrical equipment); Streiffer v. Seafarers Sea
Chest Corp., 162 F. Supp. 602 (E.D. La. 1958) (union corporation formed to monopo-
lize sale of slop chests); United States v. Milk Drivers, Local 471, 153 F. Supp. 803
(D.C. Minn. 1957) (combination with store owners to fix retail price). Union-business
conspiracy was not found in Hunt v. Crumboch, 325 U.S. 821 (1945) (union refused
to supply workers where only unionized employers could obtain contracts); Adams
Dairy Co. v. St. Louis Dairy Co., 260 F.2d 46 (8th Cir. 1958) (union-dairy group
contract had purpose of forcing competing dairy to adopt unsound business practices);
United States v. Employing Plasterers Ass'n, 138 F. Supp. 546 (N.D. Ill. 1956)
(union imposed own standards on work quality).
16. International Boxing Club, Inc. v. United States, 358 U.S. 242 (1959); Schine
Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. 110 (1948); Hartford-Empire Co.
v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945); United States v. Crescent Amusement Co.,
323 U.S. 173 (1944).
17. 371 U.S. at 98.
18. 371 U.S. at 98, citing Hartford Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386,
428 (1945).
19. 371 U.S. at 103, citing Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 24 v. Oliver, 358 U.S.
283 (1959) (union's picketing of peddlers sustained under first amendment); Bakery
Drivers, Local 802 v. Wol, 315 U.S. 769 (1942) (conflict between union and
peddlers); Milk Wagon Drivers' Union, Local 753 v. Lake Valley Farm Prods. Inc.,
311 U.S. 91 (1940) (peddlers flourished causing union members to lose jobs). In the
instant case the district court found that the Supreme Court had never directly passed
on the issue of whether an independent contractor could validly join a labor union;
however, the district court found an implication in the above cases that such con-
tractors could join if they competed with union members, and the purpose for organiza-
tion was to eliminate unfair competition with union members. 196 W. Supp. at 15.
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justice Goldberg, concurring in the result, thought the district court
too narrowly circumscribed the permissible area of legitimate union
activity,21 but approved the result because the record showed no other
legitimate union interest presently being served by the membership
of these peddlers. In his dissenting opinion Mr. justice Douglas re-
jected the stipulations of the peddlers' status (independent contrac-
tors who do not compete) and applied the "economic reality" test of
NLRB v. Hearst Publications.m He pointed out that certain marginal
groups, though entrepreneural in form, were more nearly comparable
in economic status to employees and that they lacked the bargaining
power necessary to obtain decent hours, wages, and working condi-
tions. He reasoned that all who hauled grease were in the "same
boat," and concluded with a finding that with respect to the remedies
available the situation should be characterized as a "labor dispute."23
The defendants' broad stipulations make this case difficult to
examine for they amount to conclusions foreclosing a significant in-
quiry by the court. 4 However, the economic milieu of the peddlers
See also United States v. Fish Smokers Trade Counsel, Inc., 183 F. Supp. 227
(S.D.N.Y. 1960).
20. "Here as in Columbia River Co., the grease peddlers were sellers of com-
modities, who became 'members' of the union only for the purpose of bringing union
power to bear in the successful enforcement of the illegal combination in restraint of
the traffic in yellow grease." 371 U.S. at 102.
21. "To believe that labor union interests may not properly extend beyond mere
direct job and wage competition is to ignore not only economic and social realities
so obvious as not to need mention, but also the graphic lesson of American labor union
history." Id. at 105.
22. "Unless the common-law tests are to be imported and made exclusively con-
trolling, without regard to the statutes purposes, it cannot be irrelevant that the
particular workers in these cases are subject, as a matter of economic fact, to the
evils the statute was designed to eradicate and that the remedies it affords are
appropriate for preventing them or curing their harmful effects in the special situation.
Interruption of commerce through strikes and unrest may stem as well from labor
disputes between some who, for other purposes, are technically 'independent con-
tractors' and their employers as from disputes between persons who, for those
purposes, are 'employees' and their employers." 322 U.S. 111, 127 (1944). But see
H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1947) which condemned the Hearst
case approach. As a result the labor acts now exclude "independent contractors." 49
Stat. 450, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1958). See Leidy, Salesman as Inde-
pendent Contractors, 28 MicH. L. REv. 365 (1930); Steffen, Independent Contractor
and the Good Life, 2 U. Car. L. REv. 501 (1935); Stevens, The Test of the Employ-
ment Relation, 38 MIcH. L. REv. 188 (1939); Wolfe, Determination of Employer-
Employee Relationships in Social Legislation, 41 CoLum. L. RFv. 1015 (1941). Since
the 1947 amendments the Board has consistently used the "right-of-control" test. 23
NLRB, ANNUAL REPoRT 40 (1958).
23. The Norris-La Guardia Act "is broad and includes 'any controversy concerning
terms or conditions of employment or concerning the association and representation of
persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or
condition of employment.' 29 U.S.C. § 113 (d)." 371 U.S. at 112.
24. But the Court has repeatedly held that stipulations as to questions of law are
not binding. Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148 (1942); Estate of
Sanford v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 39 (1939); Swift & Co. v. Hocking Valley R.R.,
243 U.S. 281 (1917); California v. San Pablo & T.R.R., 149 U.S. 308 (1893); Los
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would seem to allow only a finding that they were independent con-
tractors,25 and perhaps for this reason the Court was not disposed to
inquire further into their status. In the instant case the majority did
not expressly approve of the district court's "competition-object"
test,2 6 but did make findings consistent with such a test.2 7 Both the
concurring and dissenting opinions take issue with the district courts
use of "actual or potential wage or job competition," as the measure of
competition to be used, but there is no disagreement as to the unlaw-
ful purpose of the peddler-union combination. While it does not
appear that it would necessarily have produced a different result,
it seems proper to reject the "economic reality" test of competition
proposed by Mr. Justice Douglas since it has been disapproved by
Congress.29 Such an exception to the sanctions of the Sherman Act
would allow a number of small businessmen to combine into a guild-
like agency having substantial economic power to operate as a
monopoly. Mr. Justice Goldberg said that the majority, by implication,
overruled the strict view of the district court and stated that job or
Angeles Shipbuilding & Drydock Corp. v. United States, 289 F.2d 222 (9th Cir. 1961);
Hanson v. Ford Motor Co., 278 F.2d 586 (8th Cir. 1960). Cf. United States v.
Reading Co., 289 F.2d 7 (3d Cir. 1961) (attempt to limit issues by stipulation of
due care upheld). For list of state cases see Annot., 92 A.L.R. 663 (1934). At least
one Supreme Court case has, by dictum, indicated that it will disregard a stipulation
of the parties as to the facts, accepted and applied by the court below, if the
stipulation obviously forecloses real questions of law. United States v. John J. Fein
& Co., 334 U.S. 624, 640 (1948).
25. It appears that the peddlers were not subject to the processors' right of control
in the physical performance of the services. From the abbreviated fact statement it
further appears that:
(1) there was no agreement governing the right of control;
(2) the grease peddlers were in a distinct business (35-40 in Los Angeles area);
(3) the service of hauling could be performed by either a processor's employee, or
by a peddler without supervision;
(4) the skill required was low;
(5) the peddlers supplied their own tools and trucks, and performed the work
where and when they chose;
(6) the peddlers had been in business for some years prior;
(7) the peddlers were paid by the haul-load and not by the hour, etc.;
(8) the processors to whom the peddlers sold did not usually perform the hauling
for themselves;
(9) and that the parties did not believe they were creating the relation of em-
ployer-employee. See lEsTATENT (SEcoND), AGENCY § 220 (1958).
26. See note 19 supra.
27. Object: The peddlers joined "for the purpose of increasing the margin between
the prices they paid for grease and the prices at which they sold it to processors."
371 U.S. at 97.
Competition: "There was no showing of any actual or potential wage or job com-
petition, or of any other economic interrelationship, between the grease peddlers and
the other members of the union." Id. at 98.
28. Cf. United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704 (1947).
29 Seeinote 22 supra. But the congressional disapproval was given with reference




wage competition is not the sole measure of union activity, but there
may be other legitimate union purposes; he concurred because there
were no legitimate union interests present.30 However, such a wide
road into the union may be ignoring, or at least neglecting, the policy
of the Sherman Act when it is recalled that an independent contractor
is saved from that act once "validly" within the union.3' Just how
much and what kind of competition the Court will require is unclear,
but the tone of the opinions points to a very low standard, both as
to quality and quantum.
Domestic Relations-Annulment-Female Impotence Is
Made Curable by the Surgical Creation of a Functional
Organ
Defendant, a twenty-one-year-old woman married to plaintiff, had
normal female external sex characteristics but suffered from vaginal
astresia, which meant that she had no more than an incipient vagina
in the form of a cul-de-sac.' This condition admittedly rendered
sexual intercourse impossible between defendant and plaintiff, but
defendant testified that she was willing to undergo an operation to
construct a vagina, which operation was purportedly successful in
eighty-nine per cent of the cases. Plaintiff alleged that the condition
existed at the time of marriage but was unknown to him at that time2
and that because of this defect the marriage had never been con-
summated, though regular and frequent attempts had been made.
Plaintiff also claimed that even if defendant was willing to undergo
the operation, the type of copulation possible after a successful opera-
tion would not constitute copula vera. On the ground of his spouse's
impotence, plaintiff sought a decree of nullity, and from a denial of
30. 371 U.S. at 105.
31. See note 3 supra.
1. "In November, 1951, when the wife was a girl of 17, she was taken by her
mother to Addenbrooke's Hospital in Cambridge because she had never menstruated.
There she was examined by a consultant obstetrician and gynaecologist, who found
that though all her external sex characteristics were perfectly normal she had no, or
virtually no, vagina and no uterus. She was advised that she would never menstruate,
that she would never be able to bear children, but that if and when she wanted to
marry, it would be possible, with an operation, to construct an artificial vagina."
S. Y. v. S. Y., [1962] 3 Weekly L.R. 526, 527 (C.A.)
2. There was evidence that the husband had previous sexual experience (he had
fathered a child by another woman), that he knew defendant could not have children,
and that he bad attempted penetration with defendant prior to marriage. Id. at 527.
Plaintiff claimed (and the court did not seem to question his assertion) that he at-
tributed the failure to have successful intercourse "to the conditions in which the
intercourse was attempted." Ibid.
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same he appealed. Held, affirmed. The existence of an operation by
which a vestigial vagina may be enlarged to admit full pentration by
the husband renders the condition of impotence merely temporary and
curable; enjoyment of sexual intercourse is not a required element of
copula vera, S. Y. v. S. Y., [1962] 3 Weekly L.R. 526 (C.A.).
Incurable impotency is a ground for a decree of nullity of marriage
in England.3 The classic English case on possibility of cure by medical
treatment is D. v. A.,4 decided in 1845, in which the court stated that,
since there was no reasonable possibility of medical cure of an
incipient vagina, this condition constituted incurable impotency.5
Following advances in medical technology making surgical repair of
this defect possible, English courts have denied a decree of nullity if
the temporarily impotent spouse is willing to undergo a treatment6
which is reasonably certain of success. 7 However, where an operation
does not create an ability to engage in copula vera, a decree of nullity
will be granted.8
In the United States, impotency is not a ground for annulment
unless so provided by statute;9 but at the present time, impotency is
a statutory ground for annulment in twenty-five states10 and for di-
vorce in forty-three states." Impotency is defined as a lack of ability
to copulate, not inability to procreate.12 To be a ground for annulment
3. M. v. M., [1956] 3 Weekly L.R. 975 (P. Ct.); D. v. A., 1 Rob. Ece. 279, 163
Eng. Rep. 1039 (Consistory Ct. 1845); 3 NELsox, DIVORcE AND ANNULMIE,r § 31.26
(2d ed. 1945); Nullity and Impotence, 180 L.T. 392 (1935).
4. 1 Rob. Ecc. 279, 163 Eng. Rep. 1039 (Consistory Ct. 1845).
5. Id. at 297-300, 163 Eng. Rep. at 1045-46.
6. G. v. G., [1960] 3 Weekly L.R. 648 (P. Ct.); M. v. M., [1956] 3 Weekly L.R.
975 (P. Ct.).
7. S. v. S., [1962] All E.R. 816 (C.A.); S. v. S., [1955] 2 Weekly L.R. 246 (P.
Ct.).
8. B. v. B., [1954] 3 Weekly L.R. 237 (P. Ct.).
9. Southern Pac. Co. v. Industrial Comm'r, 54 Ariz. 1, 91 P.2d 700 (1939); S. v. S.,
42 Del. (3 Terry) 192, 29 A.2d 325 (Super. Ct. 1942); D. v. D., 41 Del. (2 Terry) 263,
20 A.2d 139 (Super. Ct. 1941); Linneman v. Linneman, 1 Ill. App. 2d 48, 116 N.E.2d
182 (1953); MADDEN, PERSONS AND DOMESTiC RELATIONS § 16 (1931); 3 NELSON,
DIVORCE AND ANN.u mNT § 31.26 (2d ed. 1945).
10. Aric. STAT. ANN. § 55-102 (1947); CAL. Crv. CODE § 82 (Deering 1961); COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-3-2 (1953); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46-28 (1958); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 13, § 1551(1) (1953); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-403 (1961); GA. CODE ANN. § 53-102
(3) (1935); HAWAI REV. LAWS § 324-1(e) (1955); IDAHo CODE ANN. § 32-501
(1948); IOWA, CODE ANN. § 598.19 (1946); ME. R1Ev. STAT. ANN. C. 166, §§ 51, 55
n.III (1954); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 22.115 (1957); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 2A:
34-1 (1952); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-334 (1943); N. J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-1 (1952);
N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 7; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-3 (1950); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-
04-01 (1960); S.D. CODE § 14.0601 (1939); TEx. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 4628 (Vernon's
1960); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 512 (1958); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-45 (1950); W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 4701 (1961); Wis. STAT. § 247.02 (1957); Wyo. STAT. § 20-46 (1957).
11. See Vernon, Annulment of Marriages in New Mexico: Part lI-Proposed Statute,
2 NAT. RES. J. 270, 271-72 & nn.4-7 (1962).
12. Stepanek v. Stepanek, 14 Cal. Rptr. 793 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961); S. v. S., 42
Del. (3 Terry) 192, 29 A.2d 325 (Super. Ct. 1942); S. v. S., 211 Ga. 365, 86 S.E.2d
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or divorce, the defect must exist 3 and be unknown to the moving
spouse 14 at the time of marriage; and it must be incurable.15 While
impotency resulting from advancing years has been held not to be a
sufficient ground,16 the condition need not be solely organic, but may
be a combination of organic and psychological phenomena which
prevent copulation.17 The plaintiff has the burden of proving im-
potency and incurability,18 and the usual method is by expert medical
testimony.19 Little authority exists as to what condition, before or
after surgical repair, constitutes an ability to participate in the vaguely
defined act of copula vera. At least one case has stated that the wife's
ability to enjoy copulation is irrelevant if she has the ability to
participate,20 but legal authority is extremely sparse as to whether
103 (1955); Griffith v. Griffith, 162 IMI. 368, 44 N.E. 820 (1896); Kinkaid v. Kinkaid,
256 IIl. 548, 100 N.E. 217 (1912); Bunger v. Bunger, 85 Kan. 564, 117 Pac. 1017
(1911); J. G. v. H. G., 33 Md. 401 (1870); S. v. S., 192 Mass. 194, 77 N.E. 1025
(1906); Payne v. Payne, 46 Minn. 467, 49 N.W. 230 (1891); Kempf v. Kempf, 34
Mo. 211 (1863); Smith v. Smith, 206 Mo. App. 646, 229 S.W. 398 (1921); Turney
v. Avery, 92 N.J. Eq. 473, 113 AtI. 710 (1921); Kirshbaum v. Kirshbaum, 92 N.J.
Eq. 7, 111 At. 697 (1920); Tompkins v. Tompkins, 92 N.J. Eq. 113, 111 At. 599
(1920); Godfrey v. Shatwell, 38 N.J. Super 501, 119 A.2d 479 (1955); Donati v.
Church, 13 N.J. Super 454, 80 A.2d 633 (1951); Kronman v. KYronman, 247 App.
Div. 186, 286 N.Y. Supp. 627 (1936); Steinberger v. Steinberger, 33 N.Y.S.2d 596
(Sup. Ct. 1940); Vanden Berg v. Vanden Berg, 197 N.Y. Supp. 641 (Sup. Ct. 1923);
Schroter v. Schroter, 56 Misc. 69, 106 N.Y. Supp. 22 (Sup. Ct. 1907); Carmichael v.
Carmichael, 106 Ore. 198, 211 Pac. 916 (1923); Wilson v. Wilson, 126 Pa. Super
423, 191 Ad. 666 (1937).
13. Cott v. Cott. 98 So. 2d 379 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1957); D. v. D., 41 Del. (2
Terry) 263, 20 A.2d 139 (Super. Ct. 1941); Griffith v. Griffith, 162 III. 368, 44 N.E.
820 (1896); Payne v. Payne, 46 Minn. 467, 49 N.W. 230 (1891).
14. E.g., D. v. D., 41 Del. (2 Terry) 263, 20 A.2d 139 (Super. Ct. 1941). See
MADDLN, op. cit. supra note 9, at § 36; 1 NELSON, op. cit. supra note 9, at § 8.03; 3
NELSON, op. cit. supra note 9, at § 31.26.
15. Stepanek v. Stepanek, 14 Cal. Rptr. 793 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961); Rickards v.
Rickards, 166 A.2d 425 (Del. Super. Ct. 1959); D. v. D., 41 Del. (2 Terry) 263, 20
A.2d 139 (Super. Ct. 1941); Griffith v. Griffith, 162 Il. 368, 44 N.E. 820 (1896);
Grosvenor v. Grosvenor, 194 Ill. App. 652 (1915); Payne v. Payne, 46 Minn.
467, 49 N.W. 230 (1891); Kempf v. Kempf, 34 Mo. 211 (1863); Smith v.
Smith, 206 Mo. App. 646, 229 S.W. 398 (1921); Heller v. Heller, 116 N.J. Eq. 543,
174 AU. 573 (1934); Fehr v. Fehr, 92 N.J. Eq. 316, 112 At. 486 (1920); Godfrey
v. Shatwell, 38 N.J. Super. 501, 119 A.2d 479 (1955); Heibink v. Heibink, 56 N.Y.S.2d
394 (Sup. Ct. 1945); Vanden Berg v. Vanden Berg, 197 N.Y. Supp. 641 (Sup. Ct.
1923); A. C. v. B. C., 10 Weekly Notes Cas. 569 (Pa. C.P. 1881); Reed v. Reed, 26
Tenn. App. 690, 177 S.W.2d 26 (M.S. 1943).
16. Hatch v. Hatch, 58 Misc. 54, 110 N.Y. Supp. 18 (Sup. Ct. 1908).
17. Rickards v. Rickards, 166 A.2d 425 (Del. Super. Ct. 1960); Helen v. Thomas,
150 A.2d 833 (Del. Super. Ct. 1959); Griffith v. Griffith, 162 Ill. 368, 44 N.E. 820
(1896); Grosvenor v. Grosvenor, 194 Ill. App. 652 (1915); Heibink v. Heibink, 56
N.Y.S.2d 394 (Sup. Ct. 1945); Vanden Berg v. Vanden Berg, 197 N.Y. Supp. 641
(Sup. Ct. 1923).
18. Kinkaid v. Kinkaid, 256 Il. 548, 100 N.E. 217 (1912); Reed v. Reed, 26 Tenn.
App. 690, 177 S.W. 26 (M.S. 1943).
19. S. v. S., 211 Ga. 365, 86 S.E.2d 103 (1955).
20. Ibid. The Georgia court held that a woman who was paralyzed from the waist
down was able to participate in copula vera since she had a natural genital organ, for,
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sexual enjoyment is a required element of copula vera.21
Three basic treatments have emerged for both congenital absence
of the vagina and vaginal astresia: the Frank treatment;22 the Wharton
operation;23 and the McIndoe operation.24 The latter, which is the one
described by the medical experts in the instant case, is medically
successful in eighty-one per cent of the cases and results in few
complaints by patients of impediments to intercourse.21 Since con-
genital absence of the vagina is only rarely accompanied by absence
of the ovaries, the patient always has complete and normal secondary
female characteristics including the clitoris.26 Thus, after a successful
operation the patient is usually able to enjoy copulationF-though,
if the uterus is also absent, there can, of course, be no possibility of
procreation.
In the instant case, the court ruled that the evidence established
that the defendant had an incipient vagina, and that this condition
was not a ground for a decree of nullity since the vestigial vagina
could be enlarged to normal size by surgical creation of an artificial
vaginal vault. Accepting the reasoning of the case of D. v. A.2 as
good and controlling law, the court held that recent changes in
medical techniques rendered defendant's condition curable.30 There-
fore, the decree of nullity was denied, though both defendant's con-
dition and the legal principles involved were almost identical to those
in D. v. A. in which, in 1845, a decree of nullity was granted. By
ruling that the defendant's defect was a vestigial vagina rather than
the complete absence of a vagina, the court obviated the necessity of
said the court, inability to reach orgasm resulting from lack of sensory perception
does not negate the possibility of copulation. On this basis, her husband was denied
an annulment.
21. It has sometimes been held, however, that continued acts of even partial or
imperfect connection over an unreasonably long period of time will constitute ratification
and thus deprive the complaining spouse of his cause of action. Donati v. Church, 13
N.J. Super. 454, 80 A.2d 633 (1951); Cofer v. Cofer, 287 S.W.2d 212 (Tex. Civ. App.
1956).
22. The Frank treatment is nonsurgical and consists of continuous dilation over a
period of months. TE LiNDE, OPEATIVE GYNEcOLoGY 717-19 (3d ed. 1962).
23. The Wharton operation involves the cutting of a canal and the placing therein of
a mold until the incision heals. Id. at 719-20.
24. The McIndoe operation consists of an incision, followed by the placement
of a skin graft taken from the inner thigh to line the constructed vaginal vault, and
finally the insertion of a mold until the incision heals. Id. at 720-26. See generally
LA-wyE" MEDICAL CycrPE.DA § 36.8 (Frankel et al. ed. 1960).
25. Thompson, Wharton, & Te Linde, Congenital Absence of the Vagina, An Analysis
of Thirty-two Cases Corrected by the McIndoe Operation, 74 AMNEuCAN JOunNAL OF
OBsTmnics AN GvN'coLoGY 397, 403 (1957).
26. TE L=nE, op. cit. supra note 22, at 716-17.
27. Ibid.; Thompson, Wharton, & Te Linde, supra note 25, at 404-05.
28. [19621 3 Weekly L.R. at 538.
29. 1 Rob. Eec. 279, 163 Eng. Rep. 1039 (Consistory Ct. 1845).
30. [1962] 3 Weekly L.R. at 539.
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answering plaintiff's argument that complete absence of a vagina is
incurable impotency whether or not an artificial vagina can be
surgically constructed. However, in an interesting dictum, the court
stated that there was no legal difference between these two conditions
since medical authority indicated that, under either condition, it was
possible to construct a vaginal vault surgically which would admit
full penetration by the male.31 Declaring that the degree of sexual
satisfaction to be obtained by either party is irrelevant, the court held
that an artificial vagina, located in precisely the same position as a
natural one, would create an ability to participate in copula vera;2
therefore, defendant was not incurably impotent.
The court's holding on this somewhat unusual fact situation graphi-
cally illustrates both the English view and the majority American
view that there need only exist a medical treatment reasonably likely
to create an ability to copulate-though not to create a perfectly
natural organ-to render female impotency curable. However, the
assertion by the court that the degree of sexual satisfaction to be
obtained by the parties engaging in coitus involving a surgically
constructed organ is not a determining factor regarding what is and
what is not curable, is for the most part untested in both England and
the United States. This probably results from the fact that nearly all
women so afflicted possess, like the defendant here, natural and
complete secondary sexual characteristics and thus experience no
obstacle to enjoyment following a successful operation.3 However, in
that small percentage of cases in which surgical repair cannot produce
tactile perception in the vaginal vault, courts might well consider the
possible psychological effects on both partners to the marriage. It is
conceivable that a lack of enjoyment by a purportedly cured wife,
which would seem readily discernible by the husband, might make
the relation so one-sided as to be distinctly unappealing to him. One
of the purposes of allowing annulment and divorce for incurable
impotency is to lessen the possibility that the capable spouse will
commit adultery in order to obtain sexual satisfaction. If the physical
condition of the wife which has existed since before the marriage is
such that only adulterous sexual intercourse is possible for the hus-
band, the purpose of discouragement of adultery would seem best
served by granting an annulment.
31. Id. at 539-41.
32. Id. at 540-41.
33. See notes 26 & 27 supra.
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Equity-Power of a State To Provide Medical
Treatment for a Child Despite the Parents'
Objection Based on Religious Belief
Parents of a "blue baby" suffering from a serious heart defect
refused permission for blood transfusions which physicians believed
essential for the child's survival.1 The parents were Jehovah's Wit-
nesses and based their refusal on religious grounds.2 At the request
of a hospital administrator, a special guardian was appointed by court
order for the purpose of granting permission for the transfusions.3
While appeal of the order was pending in the appellate division, the
question was certified to the Supreme Court of New Jersey on its
own motion.4 Held, order affirmed. The religious freedom of a parent
is not violated by equity's removal of an infant from parental custody
for the purpose of administering medical treatment which is contrary
to the parents' religious beliefs. State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 181
A.2d 751, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890 (1962).
Sharply conflicting interests clash head-on whenever a court of
equity is presented with a petition to remove a child from the custody
of his parent. Despite difficulties inherent in such judicial action,
equity has consistently taken jurisdiction to protect the intangible
personal rights and welfare of the child. In the view taken by the
early common law courts, a father had the right to the custody of his
minor child to the exclusion of all others, including the mother.5
English chancellors, however, began early to temper this apparently
1. Physicians concluded that the blood transfusions were not a cure, but were a
stop-gap method of keeping the child alive and preventing mental damage. They
bad treated the child without resorting to transfusions for as long as they thought
possible before invoking the aid of the court to carry out the transfusions.
2. The parents, who were represented by counsel at the hearing before the Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court, did not introduce any medical testimony. The father
asserted that he was a minister of the Jehovah's Witnesses sect and set out that group's
objection to blood transfusions, quoting from the Witnesses' Bible, New World
Translation of the Holy Scriptures (1961), and specifically from Leviticus 17:11-12.
3. The court based its authority to take jurisdiction on a New Jersey statute, the
pertinent part of which reads: "When the parents of any minor child . . . are grossly
immoral or unfit to be intrusted with the care and education of such child, or shall
neglect to provide the child with proper protection, maintenance and education . . .
it shall be lawful for any person interested in the welfare of such child to institute an
action in the Superior Court or the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court . . . for the
purpose of having the child brought before the court, and for the further relief pro-
vided by this chapter." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-9 (1960).
4. Despite receiving the transfusions, the child did not survive, and the question be-
fore the court was for all practical purposes moot when the Supreme Court of New
Jersey handed down its decision. However, both sides urged the court to decide the
case because of its importance to the public in settling the issue in order that parents,
physicians and hospitals would have proper legal guidance. 37 N.J. at 469, 181 A.2d
at 755.
5. Ex parte Hopkins, 3 P. Wms. 152, 24 Eng. Rep. 1009 (Ch. 1732).
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absolute right6 through application of the doctrine of parens patriae,7
whereby the state, in the exercise of its sovereign powers, acts to
protect those persons, including infants, who are unable to protect
themselves." Under this doctrine, the chancellor would take jurisdic-
tion and decide the controversy even if no question of property rights
was involvedY In direct conflict were the right of a parent to rear
his child as he saw fit'0 and the interest of the state in protecting and
nurturing its future citizens." As time passed, the personal right of
the parent to control the child became conditional; 2 the welfare of
the child became the dominant factor. 3 Thus, the doctrine of parens
patriae has become an important equitable doctrine of increasing
vitality. However, the use of the doctrine to justify a court of equity
in taking custody of a child to ensure that the child receives proper
medical attention is a relatively recent innovation.14 Whenever such
6. Early equity courts did not recognize the natural right of a father to the custody
of his child as an absolute right and did not hesitate to interfere when the father
was grossly unfit to retain custody. Wellesley v. Duke of Beaufort, 2 Russ. 1, 38 Eng.
Rep. 236 (Ch. 1827), aff'd sub noma. Wellesley v. Wellesley, 2 Bligh N.S. 124, 4 Eng.
Rep. 1078 (Ch. 1828), has an excellent discussion of the jurisdiction of a chancery
court over infants. See also Eyre v. Countess of Shaftsbury, 2 P. Wins. 103, 24 Eng.
Rep. 659 (Ch. 1722).
7. The doctrine has been exercised by courts of equity in England for more than
two centuries. Although there are other theories, its origin seems to rest on the fiction
of the right of the king to serve as general protector of all infants in the realm. Ex
parte Badger, 286 Mo. 139, 226 S.W. 936, 939 (1920).
8. Helton v. Crawley, 241 Iowa 296, 41 N.W.2d 60 (1950); Johnson v. State, 18 N.J.
422, 114 A.2d 1 (1955); McIntosh v. Dill, 86 Okla. 1, 205 Pac. 917 (1922).
9. "Regardless of any question of property rights, the chancellors have always
exercised jurisdiction over the care and control of minor children by delegation of the
power of the state to exercise such control." McCLNTocK, EQ=rrY § 162 (2d ed. 1948).
10. The great value placed by early chancellors upon the father's right to custody
is forcefully demonstrated by the extremely low standards of conduct necessary before
removing a child from the father's custody. See, e.g., Wellesley v. Wellesley, 1 Dow
& Clark 152, 6 Eng. Rep. 481 (H.L. 1828) (father carrying on illicit relationship);
Shelley v. Westbrooke, Jac. 266, 37 Eng. Rep. 850 (Ch. 1821) (father an atheist and
guilty of adultery); Lyons v. Blenkin, Jac. 245, 37 Eng. Rep. 842 (Ch. 1821)
(abandonment); Creuze v. Hunter, 2 Cox 243, 30 Eng. Rep. 113 (Ch. 1790) (father
an outlaw).
11. "[T]he welfare of the child should be looked to as a future member of society
upon whom in the fullness of time will fall its share of the burdens and responsibilities
of citizenship." Ex parte Badger, 286 Mo. 139, 226 S.W. 936, 939 (1920).
12. "The natural right of a father [parent] to the custody of his child is not an
absolute property right, but rather a trust reposed in the father [parent] by the state
as parens patriae." Gardner v. Hall, 132 N.J. Eq. 64, 26 A.2d 799, 809 (1942).
(Footnotes omitted.)
13. The tendency of modem courts is to give additional weight to the rights of
children when opposed to a parent's right to custody. This approach is based on the
theory that a child has a right to a fair start in life and that the child's welfare is the
paramount consideration. There is, however, a strong presumption that a child's wel-
fare is best served when he is left in the custody of his parents. 1 ScHourLm, MAnmrE,
DivoncE, SEP, A TON AN Domzsnc RELATioNs § 744 (6th ed. 1921).
14. At least a partial explanation of the late application of the doctrine to medical
treatment and surgery is that perhaps medical science had to develop a substantial
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action is proposed, the court must answer difficult arguments growing
out of the collision of conflicting interests. There are few decisions in
the United States concerning the jurisdiction of courts to withdraw a
child from parental custody for medical purposes,1 an area now
largely controlled by statute.'6 The statutes are of two general types,
one of which imposes criminal sanctions against parents who fail to
provide care, support and maintenance for their children. The theory
of such an enactment is that the threat of criminal sanctions will deter
parents from neglecting their children.1" The second and more im-
portant type of legislation provides for the setting up of juvenile
court machinery designed to provide special treatment for cases
involving juveniles.' Juvenile court acts vary widely but have two
key provisions in common: (1) their wording makes it clear that
they are aimed directly at "unfit parents"; and (2) they give the
courts express authority to remove a child from the custody of such
a parent.19 If a parent is "unfit" under the statute, the court can step
in and appoint for the child a guardian who will permit medical
treatment. The juvenile acts themselves fall into two categories.
The New York type of statute20 expressly declares a child to be"neglected" if his parent fails to provide medical care. The other
category includes those statutes which describe parental neglect in
general terms but do not expressly require a parent to provide
degree of reliability before a court with equitable powers could feel justified in over-
riding parents. This attitude is indicated by the reluctance of the courts to act when
the surgery or treatment involves a high degree of risk to the child's health or life.
See 13 Wyo. L.J. 88, 89 (1958).
15. Perhaps the first American case on the subject is Heinemann's Appeal, 96 Pa.
112, 42 Am. Rep. 532 (1880), where the court based its decision on a state statute.
16. All decisions noted in this survey in which a child was withdrawn from parental
custody for medical treatment are based on statutes. It has been suggested that under
the common law a court of equity would not deprive otherwise competent parents of
control of a child in order that the infant be allowed to receive medical attention.
28 RocKY MT. L. flnv. 235, 236 (1956).
17. "Parental failure to provide medical treatment for children has been the subject
of criminal action against the parent, at common law or pursuant to statute, for non-
support or neglect, or, where death results, for manslaughter." 12 WASH. & Lmn L. BEV.
239 (1955).
18. Examples of representative state statutes include: ILL. Rav. STAT. c. 23, §8
2001-36 (1955); Mo. ANt. STAT. §§ 211.011-.431 (1959); N.Y.C. Soc. WELFAInE Acr
§§ 371-89; N.D. REV. CODE §§ 27-1601 to -41 (1943); Omxo REv. CODE §§ 2151.01-.99
(Anderson 1953); Tnx. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 2330-38 (1948); WAsH. REV. CODE §
13.04.010-.180 (1956); Wyo. COMP. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-29 to -58 (1945).
19. See note 18 supra.
20. "'Neglected child' means a male less than sixteen years of age or a female less
than eighteen years of age (a) whose parent or other person legally responsible for
his care does not adequately supply the child with food, clothing, shelter, education, or
medical or surgical care .... ." N.Y.C. Soc. W nm. AcT § 371(4). Other ex-
amples of statutory language expressly referring to failure to provide medical care are:
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.031 (1959); N.D. REV. CODE § 27-1608 (1943); Onio REV.
CODE § 2151.03 (Anderson 1953).
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medical care for his child.21 These enactments create a problem of
interpretation. The courts must decide whether the failure to provide
medical care, under the circumstances of the case, constitutes neglect
rendering the parent unfit under the statute to retain custody of the
child. Factors which appear to govern the decisions include (1) the
relative danger of the treatment or surgery,22 (2) the necessity of the
medical attention to save life,26 and (3) the advisability of having the
child undergo the treatment in the interests of his psychological well-
being.24 When necessary medical care has been denied by a parent
because of poverty, ignorance, abandonment or meanness, the courts
have had little trouble justifying the appointment of a guardian under
the statutes. But when medical aid is denied because of a religious
or philosophical belief of the parent, a question arises under the
Constitution's "freedom of religion" guaranty.
The Supreme Court has upheld as constitutional other types of
laws which restrict the exercise of religious freedom. These decisions
are based on Thomas Jefferson's idea that while profession and propa-
gation of religious principles should not be restrained, governmental
interference is allowed "when principles break out into overt acts
against peace and good order."26 For example, in a case distinguish-
able from, but closely akin to the medical care cases, the Supreme
Court held in Prince v. Massachusetts26 that a parent cannot make
a martyr of a child because of the parent's religious belief 2 7 Decisions
by the Supreme Court indicate that freedom of religion under the
first amendment consists of two distinct concepts: (1) the freedom of
each individual to hold his own religious beliefs and (2) the freedom
to practice those beliefs.26 The freedom to believe is conceded to be
21. "Persons of either sex under 16 years of age, whose parents or guardians
neglect or wilfully fail to provide for them, or allow them to have vicious associates or
visit vicious places, or fail to exercise proper parental discipline and control over them,
are classed as neglected children." Wyo. CoM'. STAT. ANN. § 14-40(2) (1945). Other
examples of generally worded statutes not expressly requiring parents to provide proper
medical care are: ILL. REv. STAT. c. 23, § 2001 (1955); TEx. REv. Crv. STAT. art. 2330
(1948); WAsH. REv. CODE § 13.04.010 (1956).
22. Morrison v. State, 252 S.W.2d 97 (Mo. App. 1952) (blood transfusions almost
devoid of risk to life); In re Hudson, 13 Wash. 2d 673, 126 P.2d 765 (1942) (risk of
amputation considered); Oakey v. Jackson, [1914] 1 K.B. 216 (adenoids operation
involves only minor risk).
23. See 13 Wyo. L.J. 88, 91 (1958) and citations noted.
24. In re Seiferth, 127 N.Y.S.2d 63 (Child Ct. 1954), rev'd, 284 App. Div. 221,
137 N.Y.S.2d 35 (1955).
25. This principle was enunciated by Jefferson in an early Virginia law. 12 Hen-
ing's Stat. 84. In a leading case decided in 1878, the Supreme Court relied on the
principle to chart the course of religious liberty in the United States. Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145, 163 (1878).
26. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
27. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of a member of the Jehovah's Wit-
nesses sect for violation of a state statute in allowing her nine-year-old ward to dis-
tribute religious tracts.
28. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04' (1939). This case delineates
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absolute, while the freedom to practice a particular belief through
worship or other outward manifestation is said to be a qualified right,
subject to regulation for the protection of society.2 Thus, forms of
worship "not injurious to the equal rights of others"30 are allowed,
while any action disturbing the peace, good order, or public welfare
may be curtailed.31 The power of the state to interfere with the
performance of "religious" acts is strikingly illustrated by the human
sacrifice analogy in Reynolds v. United States.3 There still remains
the unqualified right to believe, but the right to act must yield
where interests of society as a whole dictate a contrary course and are
"held paramount to certain personal freedoms."33
The proposition laid down by the Supreme Court in Prince v.
Massachusetts that "neither rights of religion nor rights of parent-
hood are beyond limitation"z3 is the heart of the instant decision.
The New Jersey court declined to dismiss on the ground that the
question was moot,35 and instead found that the trial court properly
removed the infant from the custody of his parents. To reach this
decision, the court relied squarely on the doctrine of parens patriae
as codified in the broadly worded New Jersey statute.36 The court
distinguished the right to believe from the right to act3 7 in finding
that religious freedom guaranteed by the first amendment had not
been violated. It concluded that the right to act is a qualified right,
subject to state controls in the interest of society as a whole.3 In a
clear, well-reasoned opinion, the New Jersey court did not appear
to change the law, but reasserted an ancient principle of equity juris-
diction in protecting personal rights of an infant.39
the dimensions of freedom to act in pursuance of religious beliefs. In holding that
the right to act is not absolute, Cantwell cites Reynolds v. United States, supra note
25, and Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
29. Reynolds v. United States, supra note 25, at 166; Davis v. Beason, supra note 28.
30. Davis v. Beason, supra note 28, at 342.
31. "Whilst legislation for the establishment of a religion is forbidden, and its
free exercise permitted, it does not follow that everything which may be so called can
be tolerated. Crime is not the less odious because sanctioned by what any particular
sect may designate as religion." Id. at 345.
32. "Suppose one believed that human sacrifices were a necessary part of religious
worship, would it be seriously contended that the civil government under which he
lived could not interefere to prevent a sacrifice? Or if a wife religiously believed
it was her duty to burn herself upon the funeral pile of her dead husband, would it be
beyond the power of the civil government to prevent her carrying her belief into
practice"? Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878).
33. This language is used by the court in the principal case. 37 N.J. at 474, 181
A.2d at 757.
34. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
35. Note 4 supra.
36. Note 3 supra.
37. Davis v. Beason, note 28 supra.
38. Note 33 supra.
39. "This much is certain: . .. [parents patriae] exists and has been exercised by
[VOL. 16
RECENT CASES
Although the United States Supreme Court declined to grant
certiorari and finally decide the religious freedom question within
the context of removing an infant from parental custody for the
purpose of administering medical treatment, there seems to be little
real doubt as to its decision in such a case. It appears highly unlikely
that the Court would further restrict the limited control a state may
exercise over religious "acts."40 Still, a decision would have settled
the issue and conceivably made it less difficult in the future for an
ailing child to obtain the medical care to which he is entitled despite
the religious objections of parents.4'
Evidence-Witnesses-Clinical Psychologist May Give
Expert Testimony on Existence of Mental Disease
Insanity was the sole defense relied upon by defendant in a criminal
proceeding which resulted in conviction for housebreaking and as-
sault.' Clinical psychologists who had subjected defendant to psycho-
logical tests gave opinion testimony that defendant was suffering from
a mental disease at the time of the alleged crimes.2 The trial court
courts of equity for more than two centuries in England and in the different states of
this republic for shorter periods of time, but for like reasons and purposes." Ex parte
Badger, 286 Mo. 139, 226 S.W. 936, 939 (1920).
40. See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
41. The Supreme Court denied certiorari without comment. The reason for the
denial is purely conjectural, but it is highly probable that the denial came in absence
of a justiciable controversy.
1. The trial in the District of Columbia, which in 1954 changed from the "right-
wrong plus irresistible impulse" definition of insanity to what has become known as
the "Durham" or "product" test of criminal responsibility. "The rule we now hold must
be applied .... is simply that an accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful
act was the product of mental disease or mental defect." Durham v. United States,
214 F.2d 862, 874-75 (D.C. Cir. 1954). In abandoning a definition of insanity, the
court hoped to make better use of the testimony of experts who had come to "under-
stand there was a legal insanity' different from any clinical mental illness." Carter v.
United States, 252 F.2d 608, 617 (D.C. Cir. 1957). "Thus . . .a jurisdiction adopted
a rule which leaves the psychiatrist free to speak in a psychiatric frame of reference
rather than to conform to unrealistic legal artificialities." MAcDoNALD, PsYcmA'rY
AN THE CamrNrAL 29 (1958) [hereinafter cited as MAcDoNALD].
2. Defendant had been confined to two hospitals for over a year after indictment
before being declared mentally competent to stand trial. It was while he was confined
to these institutions that the three psychologists (who testified) administered the
psychological tests which served as the basis for their opinions. All three were mem-
bers of the staffs of these institutions and apparently had doctor of philosophy degrees.
The tests given defendant included the intelligence tests which are a standard part of
psychological test batteries. MAcDoNALD 163. Three different series of tests were
administered with different results being obtained on the I.Q. section in each series.
Defendant's I.Q. first appeared to be 63, then 74, and finally 90. (For a discussion
of the accuracy of these tests see MAcDoNALD 163-65.) Relying upon the results of
these test batteries, all three psychologists were of the opinion that defendant had
been suffering from a mental disease, schizophrenia, at the time of the alleged crime.
Two were of the opinion that the alleged crimes and the disease were related.
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instructed the jury to disregard this testimony on the grounds that a
clinical psychologist cannot qualify as an expert on mental condition
and is therefore not competent to express an opinion as to the
existence of a mental disease. On appeal, the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia, sitting en banc, held, reversed
and remanded. A clinical psychologist may qualify as an expert on
mental condition and having qualified may give opinion testimony as
to the existence of mental disease.3 Jenkins v. United States, 307 F.2d
637 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
Under the American opinion rule, the ordinary lay witness may
relate to the trier of fact only what he has observed; he is not per-
mitted to draw inferences from his observations, i.e., to give opinion
testimony.4 The expert witness, however, is called for the express
purpose of drawing inferences, either from his personal observations
or from assumed facts.5 The question of whether a witness qualifies as
3. This was an alternative holding. The first assignment of error considered by the
court was the exclusion by the trial court of a diagnosis which a psychiatrist had
revised upon learning the result of the most recent I.Q. test and without first person-
ally re-examining the defendant. This testimony was excluded by the trial court on
the grounds that the expert must base his opinion on his personal observations or
resort to the hypothetical question. See note 5 infra: and accompanying text. The court
of appeals held that a qualified expert could express a direct opinion which was based
in part on personal observation and in part on the reports of others wvhich were not
offered in evidence but which the expert customarily relies upon in the practice of
his profession.
This decision appears to be contrary to the weight of authority. See McConmuicir,
EvmENcE § 15, at 32 (1954) [hereinafter cited as McCoiazcaC]; 3 W11..onr,
EvmENcE § 688(4) (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as WirxwoRE]. A case directly in
point with this aspect of the present decision is People v. Black, 367 Ill. 209, 10 N.E.2d
801 (1937). A medical doctor's diagnosis that the accused was sane was rejected
because it was based in part on tests administered by psychologists, reports of social
workers, and an examination by another physician. The court stated that the witness
had, in effect, weighed the evidence and thereby invaded the province of the jury.
4. McCou.cx § 11. Wigmore emphasizes the fact that the American opinion rule
is the child of error. English courts permit the lay witness to draw inferences from
his observations. American courts misinterpreted the phrase "mere opinion" to mean
"inference." In England it was used to designate "the guess of a person who had no
personal knowledge .... " 7 WriaonE § 1917, at 10.
A major exception to the American opinion rule is the rule that the lay witness is
permitted to express an opinion as to mental condition. 7 WIGMoRE § 1938. "'The rule
in this jurisdiction is that a layman may express an opinion as to mental competency,
provided he first states the facts upon which he bases his opinion."' Blunt v. United
States, 244 F.2d 355, 366 (D.C. Cir. 1957), quoting United States v. Lyles, Criminal
No. 119-54, D.D.C., Jan. 19, 1957.
5. "An observer is qualified to testify because he has firsthand knowledge which the
jury does not have . .. . The expert has something different to contribute. This is a
power to draw inferences from the facts which a jury would not be competent to
draw." McCoRMIcK § 13, at 28. When the expert does not have personal observations
upon which to base his opinion, he is asked to draw inferences from assumed facts
through the use of hypothetical questions. Id. § 14, at 30.
The use currently being made of expert witnesses has been severely criticized because
the practice of having the expert called by a party has had the result of the expert's
becoming an advocate. See 3 WIGMoRE § 563; McCormick, Science, Experts and the
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an expert in a particular field has been interpreted by state and federal
courts to be a matter entirely for the trial court's discretion, and the
determination is reviewable only if that discretion is abused.6 For
this reason, in addition to the fact that psychology is a relatively new
science,7 appellate courts have only rarely considered the issue of
whether a clinical psychologiste may qualify as an expert on mental
conditionf When they have considered the issue, they have been
confronted with the argument that mental disorders are medical
Courts, 29 TExAs L. REv. 611 (1951). Expert witnesses were originally called by the
court and were considered "helpers of the court." "After they began to be regarded
as witnesses of the parties under the adversary system, they gradually took on, in
most instances, the role of expert advocates. In this role they have given shocking
exhibitions of partisanship in criminal cases, will contests, and personal injury litigation."
MOR AN, BASIC PROBLEMS oF EVIDENCE 222 (1963).
The return to the ancient practice of having the expert called by the court has been
universally recommended. See MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 403 (1942); UNrroRM
RULE OF EVIDENCE 59; McCoRMICK § 17, at 35; MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF
EVIDENCE 224 (1963); 2 WIGMoRE § 563.
6. McCoRmicK § 13, at 29. As at least one commentator has pointed out, the
qualification of expert witnesses involves questions of law and fact. What qualifications
are required of a witness in order to be recognized as an expert in a particular field
is a question of law. Whether a particular witness possesses those qualifications is a
question of fact. Only the latter lies within the domain of the trial court's discretion.
Cusack, Qualify Your Psychologist, 27 INS. CouNsEL J. 339, 340 (1960). Because the
courts have refused to make this distinction very few rules have been developed relating
to the qualifications required of expert witnesses. McComIU'cK § 13, at 29.
7. A German court in 1911 was apparently the first to avail itself of a psychologist
as an expert witness. McCary, The Psychologist in Court, 33 CM.-KENT L. REV. 230
(1955). In 1920 there were only 3.7 psychologists in the United States per million
inhabitants; by 1950 the ratio had increased to 48.4 per million. CraK, AMEnrCA'S
PsYcHOIocisTs 13 (1957).
8. "Clinical psychology is a form of applied psychology which endeavors to define
the capacities and characteristics of an individual by the use of various methods of
measurement, analysis, and observation, and which, on the basis of an integration of
these findings with data secured from a physical examination and social history, gives
recommendations for the readjustment of the individual. A clinical psychologist is a
university-trained specialist in the field of clinical psychology, having a Ph. D. degree
in psychology from an accredited institution. He is qualified to examine and apply
psychotherapeutic measures to persons manifesting personality disorders.
"Psychiatry is a branch of medicine which deals with the recognition and treatment
of mental disorders. A psychiatrist is a medical doctor who specializes in the diagnosis
and treatment of individuals manifesting marked abnormalities of behavior. A psychia-
trist has an M. D. degree and special training in psychiatry. Although there is no
clear-cut distinction between the fields of abnormal psychology and psychiatry, there
are several differences between a clinical psychologist and a psychiatrist. First, being
medically trained, a psychiatrist is qualified to administer medication, whereas a
clinical psychologist is not. The psychologist must depend on a physician for a
physical examination of his patient. . . . Second, in actual practice psychiatrists deal
principally with the more severe types of personality disorders requiring institutionaliza-
tion, whereas clinical psychologists tend to concern themselves with less severe forms
of personality maladjustment. Clinical psychologists also are trained in the administra-
tion and interpretation of psychological testing instruments-intelligence and achieve-
ment tests, personality inventories, projection tests, interest inventories, aptitude tests,
etc." THORPE, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MENTAL HEALTH 22-23 (1950).




diseases which can be properly diagnosed only by medical doctors. 10
One of the few rules which the courts have been able to develop
relating to the training and experience required of an expert witness
is that a medical doctor, regardless of his area of specialization, gen-
erally qualifies as an expert on mental condition.' Some of the
reported decisions in which this rule has been mentioned contain
language which suggests that only a medical doctor may qualify as
an expert in this field.12 There appears, however, to be only one case,
a 1935 decision, in which an appellate court has held a psychologist
incompetent on this ground at common law.13 The majority of the
higher courts have indicated that a psychologist is not prohibited from
qualifying as an expert on mental condition.' 4 The first judicial state-
ment to this effect and the one which has become the leading au-
thority for this proposition despite the fact that it is dictum is People
v. Hawthorne, decided by a divided Michigan Supreme Court in
1940.1' The Hawthorne majority rejected the argument that only a
medical doctor may qualify, on the grounds that some clinical psychol-
ogists were as well qualified to detect insanity as medical doctors who
had little or no experience in the diagnosis of mental disorders but
10. See cases cited note 14 infra.
11. 3 WiGMonE § 560. Some jurisdictions, including the District of Columbia, re-
cognize as experts on mental condition only those medical doctors who specialize in
the diagnosis and treatment of mental disorders. E.g., Lewis v. American Security &
Trust Co., 289 Fed. 916 (D.C. Cir. 1923); Old Colony Trust Co. v. DiCola, 233
Mass. 119, 123 N.E. 454 (1919); In re Lindou's Will, 241 App. Div. 819, 270 N.Y.
Supp. 771 (1934).
12. "Mental 'disease' means mental illness. Mental illnesses are of many parts and
have many characteristics. They, like physical illnesses, are the subject matter of
medical science .... The law wants from the medical experts medical diagnostic testi-
mony as to a mental illness, if any, and expert medical opinion as to the relationship,
if any, between the disease and the act of which the prisoner is accused." Carter v.
United States, 252 F.2d 608, 617-18 (D.C. Cir. 1957). But see Odom v. State, 174
Ala. 4, 56 So. 913 (1911). "As a general rule, only medical men-that is, persons
licensed by law to practice the profession of medicine-can testify as experts on the
question of insanity; and the propriety of this general limitation is too patent to permit
of discussion .... An exception may perhaps be recognized where the witness has made
a protracted and systematic study of mental science and diseases under approved
conditions .... " Id. at 7, 56 So. at 914.
13. Dobbs v. State, 191 Ark. 236, 85 S.W.2d 694 (1935). California courts have
construed that state's sexual psychopathy statute as requiring an expert in that particular
area of mental disorder to be a medical doctor specializing in the treatment of mental
disorders. On this ground they have denied psychologists expert status. People v.
Jones, 42 Cal. 2d 219, 266 P.2d 38 (1954).
14. Hidden v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 217 F.2d 818 (4th Cir. 1954); People v.
McNichol, 100 Cal. App. 2d 554, 224 P.2d 21 (Dist. Ct. App. 1950); People v.
Hawthorne, 293 Mich. 15, 291 N.W. 205 (1940) (dictum); In re Masters, 216 Minn.
553, 13 N.W.2d 487 (1944); State v. Padilla, 66 N.M. 289, 347 P.2d 312 (1959);
Doherty v. Dean, 337 S.W.2d 153 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960); Watson v. State, 161 Tex.
Crim. 5, 273 S.W.2d 879, rev'd on other grounds on rehearing, 161 Tex. Crim. 9, 273
S.W.2d 882 (1954). Contra, Dobbs v. State, 191 Ark. 236, 85 S.W.2d 694 (1935);
People v. Jones, 42 Cal. 2d 219, 266 P.2d 38 (1954).
15. 293 Mich. 15, 291 N.W. 205 (1940).
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were nevertheless recognized as experts. 16 Hawthorne and the deci-
sions following it, while making it clear that not everyone claiming the
title of clinical psychologist may qualify as an expert, have-with one
exception-declined to establish what qualifications are required. 17 The
single exception is State v. Padilla' in which the New Mexico
Supreme Court established the following minimum requirements: (1)
doctor of philosophy degree, (2) five years postgraduate training in
clinical psychology, (3) one year as psychology intern in a mental
hospital approved by the American Psychological Association.
In the present appeal, the court was again urged to deny the
psychologist expert status because of his lack of medical training. 9
In addition to raising the argument that mental disorders are medical
diseases, the attack on the psychologist's competency called into
question the reliability of psychological tests which serve as the
primary basis for his opinion.20 It was emphasized that medical
doctors who specialize in the treatment of mental disorders do not
place such great reliance on these tests but consider them in con-
junction with other data.2 In rejecting the proposition that medical
training is a sine qua non for qualification as an expert, the majority
did not-indeed, could not-rely on the Hawthorne rationale, since the
District of Columbia recognizes as experts on mental condition only
those medical doctors who specialize in the treatment of mental dis-
orders. 22 The contention that only medical doctors should be per-
mitted to qualify because mental disease is a medical problem was
disposed of by the majority by citing cases in which non-medical
witnesses were permitted to give opinion testimony on medical mat-
ters.2 The proper criterion, stated the majority, is whether the
witness' training and experience enables him to form an opinion
16. Id. at 23, 291 N.W. at 208.
17. See cases cited note 14 supra.
18. 66 N.M. 289, 298, 347 P.2d 312, 318 (1959).
19. See dissenting opinion of Chief Judge Miller and Circuit judge Bastian, 307 F.2d
at 651; Brief for the American Psychiatric Association as Amicus Curiae, pp. 12-17.
20. See Brief for the American Psychiatric Association as Amicus Curiae, pp. 23-26.
MacDonald makes the following observations on the reliability of psychological tests:
"Psychological tests administered by a qualified and experienced psychologist make
a valuable contribution to the total psychiatric examination of a criminal suspect ...
"It is important to be aware of the limitations as well as the merits of psychological
tests. It would be unreasonable to demand of the psychologist a decision as to criminal
responsibility. In some cases he may be able to answer this question but not invariably,
as there is no psychological test designed to determine the criminal responsibility of a
suspect. A battery of psychological tests may, however, a [sic] provide much useful
information in the evaluation of intelligence, personality and clinical diagnosis." MAc-
DoNALD 162-63.
21. Brief for American Psychiatric Association as Amicus Curiae, pp. 17-19.
22. See note 11 supra.
23. 307 F.2d at 643.
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which will be useful to the jury.24 Although the majority apparently
did not consider it necessary to rebut expressly the argument that
psychological tests in themselves are not sufficiently reliable to enable
a witness to form a useful opinion, it did note that they are customarily
relied upon by medical experts in making their diagnoses.2 The
majority also tacitly recognized that medical experts are better quali-
fied to form an opinion than psychologists, but indicated that this
should not be determinative of the psychologist's competency since
there is no requirement that only the best qualified witnesses be
accepted as experts by the courts.2 The question of what training and
experience will be required of psychologists was expressly deferred
to the trial court.27 Nevertheless, the majority opinion contains at
least one standard which cannot be ignored by the trial judge. Clinical
psychologists, certified by the American Board of Examiners in Pro-
fessional Psychology, whose required post-doctoral experience in-
cludes "substantial experience in a hospital or clinical setting in
association with psychiatrists or neurologists . . . should ordinarily
qualify as expert witnesses."
28
In disposing of the contention that mental disorders lie exclusively
within the realm of medical science, it would appear that the majority
could have relied upon another line of authority in addition to the
cases cited. Mental abnormalities seem to have always been treated
by the courts as being in a category apart from strictly physical ill-
nesses since one of the major exceptions to the American opinion rule
is that a layman may express an opinion on mental condition based
on his personal observations.2 A troublesome aspect of the present
decision is that the testimony of all three psychologists appears to
fall squarely within this exception. Apparently each of them inter-
viewed defendant and was present when some of the tests were
administered. Nevertheless, the decision is significant judicial recog-
nition of the properly trained psychologist's ability to detect mental
disorders through psychological testing techniques. It also calls atten-
tion to the fact that there are an increasing number of specialists
whose training and experience enable them to aid triers of fact in
drawing inferences which the lay juror or even the experienced jurist
is not capable of drawing. The courts will not make proper use of
these potential experts, however, as long as the practice of having
24. Id. at 643, 644.
25. Id. at 642, 645. See note 3 supra.
26. 307 F.2d at 643.
27. Id. at 645.
28. Ibid. The requirements for certification include: (1) Ph. D. degree, (2) five
years professional experience, four of which must be postdoctoral, (3) passage of
written and oral examinations. Kelley, Sanford & Clark, The Meaning of the ABEPP
Diploma, 16 AmucAN PSYCHOLOGIST 132, 133 (1961).
29. See note 4 supra.
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experts called by the parties rather than the court continues. The
abuses which result when the expert becomes an advocate30 undoubt-
edly have caused trial judges, as in the present case, to be overly
reluctant to allow witnesses to give expert opinion testimony. As
specialized branches of knowledge become more highly developed,
the need for reform becomes more acute.31
Insurance-Automobile Liability Policy-Obligation To
Defend Not Controlled by Allegations in Third
Party's Complaint Against Insured
Plaintiff insured brought suit to recover attorney fees and expenses
incurred in defending a suit' which he contended that the defendant
insurer was obligated by contract to defend.2 Defendant refused to
defend because the complaint in the suit by the injured party against
the insured alleged that the injured party was an employee of insured
and hence fell within the employee exclusion clause of the policy.3
Plaintiff's attorney furnished defendant with information that the in-
jured party was not his employee but an independent contractor, and
defendant made no further investigation. The trial court sustained
a general demurrer and dismissed the petition. On appeal, held,
reversed. An automobile liability insurer whose policy obligates it to
defend all suits against the insured alleging damages within policy
coverage, even if the suit is groundless, is required to defend a suit
30. See note 5 supra.
31. Ibid.
1. The injured party originally brought suit against insured in a United States
district court in North Carolina. The action was later dismissed by the claimant, who
then brought suit in a Virginia court, again naming insured as defendant. Insurer was
notified of all such suits, but refused to defend, on the ground that claimant was an
employee of the insured and hence within the employee exclusion clause of the policy.
The Virginia court entered a decree finding that claimant as a matter of fact was not
an employee of defendant (insured) and that she was operating the vehicle with the
permission, consent, and authority of insured.
2. The policy provided that: "With respect to such insurance as is afforded by this
policy for bodily injury liability and for property damage liability, the company shall
(a) defend any suit against the insured alleging such injury, sickness, disease or
destruction and seeking damages on account thereof, even if such suit is groundless,
false or fraudulent, but the company may make such investigation, negotiation and
settlement of any claim or suit as it deems expedient." Under exclusions the policy
provided that: "This policy does not apply: (d) . . . to bodily injury to or sickness,
disease or death of any employee of the insured arising out of and in the course of (1)
domestic employment by the insured . ... " Loftin v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 127
S.E.2d 53, 54-55 (Ga. Ct. App. 1962). For a discussion of employee exclusion
clauses see Plummer, Automobile Policy Exclusions, 13 V.amu. L. REv. 945, 952 (1960).
3. The defendant informed insured that upon investigation it had found that the
injured parties "were in the course of their employment for you and/or the Union
Circulation Company at the time." 127 S.E.2d at 55.
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against its insured where the alleged facts, which place the claim
within an exception, are false and the true facts, which are known
or ascertainable by the insurer, would require insurer to defend.
Loftin v. United States Fire Insurance Co., 127 S.E.2d 53 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1962).
Standard automobile liability policies provide that the insurer shall
defend the insured in all those cases in which the company would be
obligated to pay a resulting judgment under the policy.4 It is gener-
ally held that the scope of this duty to defend is to be determined by
the allegations of the complaint.5 Thus if the complaint alleges facts
which, if established, could require the company to pay the judgment,
the insurer is bound to defend.6 Likewise most courts have held that
the allegations of the complaint control where they do not indicate
coverage.7 In a small number of jurisdictions, however, the obligation
4. APPLwEAN, AuTroMOLtE LAnmrry INSURANCE 83-84 (1938).
5. APPLEmAN, A To monmE LrABnxrr INSURANCE 94-101 (1938); 7A APPLENAN,
INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4683, at 436 (1962).
6. 7A APPLEmAN, INSURANCE LA-W AND PRAcnCE § 4682, at 428 (1962).
7. Such a rule has been indicated by statements of the courts in the following cases,
inter alia, although there are sufficient variations in facts to leave room for doubt
in some instances.
Alabama: American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Agricola Furnace Co., 236 Ala. 535, 183
So. 677 (1938).
Alaska: Theodore v. Zurich Gen. Acc. & Liab. Ins. Co., 364 P.2d 51 (Alaska 1961).
Arkansas: Equity Mut. Ins. Co. v. Southern Ice Co., 232 Ark. 41, 334 S.W.2d 688
(1960) (insurer breached duty to defend where allegations against insured were not
:mere legal conclusions but factual allegations); Home Indem. Co. v. Snowden, 223
Ark. 64, 264 S.W.2d 642 (1954).
California: Columbia So. Chem. Corp. v. Manufacturers & Wholesalers Indem.
Exch., 190 Cal. App. 2d 194, 11 Cal. Rptr. 762 (1961) (allegations control, but rule
must be applied with extreme care to include all potentialities of pleadings in cov-
erage); Cametal Corp. v. National Auto. & Cas. Ins. Co., 189 Cal. App. 2d 831, 11
Cal. Rptr. 280 (Super. Ct. 1961), modified sub. nom. Continental Cas. Co. v. Zurich Ins.
Co., 17 Cal. Rptr. 12, 366 P.2d 455 (1961) (complaint must be read in four
corners and facts arrayed in complete pattern without regard to nicieties of pleading);
Firco, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund. Ins. Co., 173 Cal. App. 2d 524, 343 P.2d 311 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1959) (where allegations may or may not be covered by policy, insurer is obligated
to undertake defense and to continue until it appears that claim is not within
coverage); Ritchie v. Anchor Cas. Co., 135 Cal. App. 2d 245, 286 P.2d 1000 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1955).
Connecticut: Allstate Ins. Co. v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 204 F. Supp. 83 (D.
Conn. 1962) (insurer's duty to defend a groundless suit tested by allegations of com-
plaint); Smedly Co. v. Employer's Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 143 Conn. 510, 123 A.2d 755
(1956).
District of Columbia: Boyle v. National Cas. Co., 84 A.2d 614 (Mun. Ct. App. D.C.
1951) (allegations control regardless of facts ascertained before suit or developed in
process of litigation or by ultimate outcome).
Florida: Zipperer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 254 F.2d 853 (5th Cir. 1958)
(allegations determine insurer's duty to defend); Bennett v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 132
So. 2d 788 (Fla. 1961).
Illinois: Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 199 F. Supp. 769 (E.D.
111. 1961) (duty to defend does not depend on whether ultimate liability must
necessarily be covered by policy, but on whether it might be so covered under any of
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the allegations of the pleadings); Rom v. Gephart, 30 Ill. App. 2d 199, 173 N.E.2d
828 (1961) (where complaint states different causes of action, one of which is
within coverage, insurer is bound to defend one within coverage); Canadian Radium
& Uranium Corp. v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 342 IMI. App. 456, 97 N.E.2d 132 (1951).
Indiana: Mitzner v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 94 Ind. App. 362, 154 N.E. 881 (1927).
Kansas: Midland Constr. Co. v. United States Cas. Co., 214 F.2d 665 (10th Cir.
1954) (where complaint fails to allege facts which, if established, create liability within
the policy, no duty rests upon insurer to defend); Leonard v. Maryland Cas. Co., 158
Kan. 263, 146 P.2d 378 (1944) (duty to defend measured by allegations of petition).
Louisiana: Butler v. Maryland Cas. Co., 147 F. Supp. 391 (E.D. La. 1956) (obliga-
tion to defend determined by allegations of petition; mere fact that petition charges
that defendant is assured of insurer, does not obligate insurer to defend if defendant
is not in fact insured); Kansas v. Sun Indem. Co., 37 So. 2d 621 (La. App. 1948)
(allegations of complaint determine insurer's obligation to defend).
Massachusetts: Klefbeck v. Dous, 302 Mass. 383, 19 N.E.2d 308 (1939) (duty to
defend determined by allegations of complaint); Fessenden School, Inc. v. American
Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 289 Mass. 124, 193 N.E. 558 (1935).
Minnesota: Employer's Liab. Assur. Corp. v. Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal Co., 214
F.2d 418 (8th Cir. 1954) (duty to defend depends upon claim made in complaint);
Bobich v. Oja, 258 Minn. 287, 104 N.W.2d 19 (1960) (insurer not bound to defend
suit on claim outside coverage of policy).
Mississippi: Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Logan, 238 Miss. 580, 119
So. 2d 268 (1960) (duty to defend determined by allegations of complaint).
Nebraska: Pickens v. Maryland Cas. Co., 141 Neb. 105, 2 N.W.2d 593 (1942)
(insurer not obligated to defend action arising out of accident not covered by public
liability policy).
New Hampshire: Hersey v. Maryland Cas. Co., 102 N.H. 541, 162 A.2d 160 (1960)
(insurer's obligation to defend suit limited to suit upon claim for which it has assumed
liability under terms of the policy; if there is no coverage, there is no duty to defend).
New Jersey: Finley v. Factory Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 38 N.J. Super. 390, 119 A.2d
29 (1955) (liability insurer's duty to defend arises when complaint states a claim
constituting insured risk); Danek v. Hommer, 28 N.J. Super. 68, 100 A.2d 198, aff'd
per curiam, 30 N.J. Super. 585, 105 A.2d 677 (1954) (complaint should be laid
alongside policy and determination made whether, if allegations are sustained, insurer
vill be required to pay).
New York: Scheer & Sons Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 35 Misc. 2d 262, 229
N.Y.S.2d 248 (Sup. Ct. 1962) (insurer's duty to defend is broader than his obligation
to pay, but does not extend to parties who are not insured at all); Brooklyn & Queens
Allied Oil Burner Serv. Co. v. Security Mut. Ins. Co., 24 Misc. 2d 765, 208 N.Y.S.2d
259 (Sup. Ct. 1960) (insurer obliged to defend if there is potentially a case under
the complaint within coverage of policy; fact that insurer is possessed of information
which may show claim against insured falls outside coverage of policy of no conse-
quence); Mireider v. New Hampshire Fire Ins. Co., 24 Misc. 2d 765, 204 N.Y.S.2d
504 (N.Y. City Ct. 1960).
North Carolina: Stout v. Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., 307 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1962)
(duty determined by allegations of complaint, but rule does not apply where in-
tentional injuries by insured expressly excluded from coverage; intentional injury case
is a typical problem, but court intimates that it would follow the general rule).
Ohio: Travelers Ins. Co. v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 178 N.E.2d 613 (Ohio App.
1961) (allegations of complaint determine insurer's duty to defend even though insurer
may not ultimately be liable); Lessak v. Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co., 168 Ohio St. 153,
151 N.E.2d 730, aff'd, 106 Ohio App. 179, 153 N.E.2d 787 (1957) (obligation to
defend arises when petition pleading action within coverage filed against insured).
Oregon: Tidewater Associated Oil Co. v. Northwest Cas. Co., 264 F.2d 879 (9th Cir.
1959) (insurer required to defend, if by any reasonable intendment of complaint, and
regardless of ultimate merit, liability of a kind covered by policy could be inferred).
Pennsylvania: Gulf Ins. Co. v. Mack Warehouse Corp., 212 F. Supp. 39 (E.D. Pa.
1962) (obligation of insurer to defend action determined by allegations of complaint);
Wilson v. Maryland Cas. Co., 377 Pa. 588, 105 A.2d 304 (1954) (insurer's duty to
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of an insurance company to defend its insured is to be determined by
the actual facts brought to the attention of the company, rather than
by false allegations in a complaint.8 A few courts have adopted an
defend must be determined solely by allegations of complaint).
Rhode Island: Thomas v. American Universal Ins. Co., 80 R.I. 129, 93 A.2d 309
(1952) (insurer's duty to defend determined by allegations of complaint, regardless of
facts made known before action tried or during litigation).
South Carolina: Heyward v. American Cas. Co., 129 F. Supp. 4 (E.D.S.C. 1955)
(duty of insurer to defend suit against insured depends upon allegations of complaint
in that suit); Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Hendrix, 199 F.2d 53 (4th Cir. 1952)
(where actions against insured contain various claims, some within and some without
indemnity agreement, insurer must take charge of entire suit).
South Dakota: Black Hills Kennel Club, Inc. v. Firemans Fund Indem. Co., 77 S.D.
503, 94 N.W.2d 90 (1959) (insurer not obligated to defend action based on claim out-
side coverage of policy).
Tennessee: Kern v. Transit Cas. Co., 207 F. Supp. 437 (E.D. Tenn. 1962) (insurer's
duty to defend determined from allegations of complaint and not from outcome of
suit); First Nat'l Bank v. South Carolina Ins. Co., 207 Tenn. 520, 341 S.W.2d 569
(1960); South Knoxville Brick Co. v. Empire State Surety Co., 126 Tenn. 402, 150
S.W. 92 (1912). See Covington, Insurance-1961 Tennessee Survey, 14 VAND. L. Rrv.
1303, 1309 (1961).
Texas: Liberty Ins. Co. v. Bawls, 358 S.W.2d 920 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962) (insurance
company has obligation to defend even though additional allegations are made which,
if proved and made basis for judgment against insured, would take case out of
provisions of coverage of policy); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Newsom, 352 S.W.2d 888
(Tex. Civ. App. 1962) (insurer not obligated to investigate truthfulness of third
party's allegations against insured of matters excluded from coverage or to take
insured's statements as true, and insurer had to decide at its peril whether complaint
alleged injuries within coverage); General Ins. Corp. v. Harris, 327 S.W.2d 651 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1959) (insurer's duty to defend determined by nature of claim alleged in
petition in action against insured).
Utah: United Pac. Ins. Co. v. Northwestern Nat. Ins. Co., 185 F.2d 443 (10th Cir.
1950) (insurer bound to defend only suits alleging a cause of action and not bound
to defend any action not falling within coverage of policy).
Vermont: American Fid. Co. v. Deerfield Valley Grain Co., 43 F. Supp. 841 (D.
Vt. 1942) (insurer's duty to defend should be determined from allegations of
petition in such action); Commercial Ins. Co. v. Papandrea, 121 Vt. 326, 159 A.2d
333 (1960) (duty to defend measured by allegations upon which claim is stated).
Virginia: London Guar. & Acc. Co. v. White & Bros., Inc., 188 Va. 195, 49
S.E.2d 254 (1948) (duty determined by allegations of injured party; if allegations left
doubt, refusal of insurer to defend was at his own risk).
Washington: Murray v. Mossman, 56 Wash. 2d 909, 355 P.2d 985 (1960) (insured's
right of recovery against insurance company sounds in tort and is founded on bad
faith); Lawrence v. Northwest Cas. Co., 50 Wash. 2d 282, 311 P.2d 670 (1957)
(insurer's liability determined by allegations of complaint filed against insured).
Wisconsin: Wisconsin Transp. Co. v. Great Lakes Cas. Co., 241 Wis. 523, 6 N.W.2d
708 (1942) (insurer under duty to investigate claim and defend action against in-
sured even though claim or action might ultimately be determined to be groundless).
8. New Mexico: Albuquerque Gravel Prods. Co. v. American Employers Ins. Co., 282
F.2d 218 (10th Cir. 1960) (duty of liability insurer to defend action against insured
determined from allegations of complaint, unless insurer knows that true, but un-
pleaded, basis for claims brings them within coverage of policy).
Oklahoma: American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Southwestern Greyhound Lines, Inc., 283
F.2d 648 (10th Cir. 1960) (obligation to defend determined by actual facts brought
to attention of insurer rather than pertinent but untrue allegations contained in com-
plaint); United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Briscoe, 205 Okla. 618, 2.39 P.2d 754
(1952) (liability insurer not obligated to defend groundless suit against insured when
insurer would not be liable under its policy for any recovery in such suit).
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extension of this qualification requiring the insurer to consider not
only those facts which it knows, but also those which could be
learned through reasonable investigation.9
In the instant case the court found that the policy language was
ambiguous10 and misleading to the insured." The court acknowledged
the general rule but stated that it was inadquate here as a construc-
tion of the contract of insurance. Since the insurer undertook to
defend even groundless suits, a fortiori it should defend suits within
the contract coverage in spite of false allegations.' 2 To make the
scope of the duty realistic, the court held that the insurer is bound
to conduct a reasonable investigation of the accident in order to deter-
mine its own liability. The court held that the burden was on the
insurer to show that the injury came within an exception to the policy
coverage and that this burden was not sustained by a showing that
the allegations of the complaint did not indicate coverage. 13 In
answer to defendant's contention that either the true facts or the
allegations must uniformly control the insurer's liability, the court
stated that in the former situation the insurer is obligated to defend
"even groundless" suits and that in the latter situation the insurer is
obligated to defend with respect to such insurance as is afforded by
9. Georgia: American Fid. & Cas. Co. v. Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmer's Mut.
Cas. Ins. Co., 280 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1960); Loftin v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 127
SE.2d 53 (Ga. Ct. App. 1962) (insurer required to defend suits against its insured in
which alleged facts, which placed claim within exception to coverage, were false and
true facts, which placed claim within coverage of policy, were known or ascertainable
by insurer).
Missouri: State ex rel. Inter-State Oil Co. v. Bland, 354 Mo. 622, 190 S.W.2d 227
(1945) (insurance company cannot ignore actual facts which it knows or could know
from a reasonable investigation, in determining its liability under a liability policy
to defend action against insured); Marshall's U.S. Auto Supply, Inc. v. Maryland Cas.
Co., 354 Mo. 455, 189 S.W.2d 529 (1945) (insurance company cannot ignore actual
facts known or ascertainable from a reasonable investigation, in determining its lia-
bility under policy, though such facts are not alleged in petition).
Vermont: McGettrick v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 264 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1959) (in-
surer liable for breach of contract to defend where there was evidence that he did
not make reasonable investigation).
10. "The dubiousness of asserting the non-ambiguity of the contract provision in
issue is well illustrated by the lack of agreement among the decisions throughout the
country on this problem. . . . An interpretation of the words, 'such insurance as is
afforded by this policy' to mean other than 'insurance afforded according to the
true facts' would be unreasonable. . . . If the insurer intended otherwise, it could
have made its intent clear and unmistakable by undertaking to defend 'unless the
complaint alleges facts which show the claim to be excluded from coverage,' or by
using other unambiguous language ....... 127 S.E.2d at 57-58.
11, "In considering the policy as a whole, laymen might well conclude that the
company would defend any suit arising from an accidental injury in truth covered
by the policy despite the manner in which the injured party presented his claim, as
well as a suit falsely showing coverage." Id. at 58-59.
12. Id. at 56-57.
13. "With respect to an exception to the duty to defend, this burden is not carried
merely by proving that the allegations of the complaint alleges [sic] facts excluding the
claim from the policy." Id. at 58.
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the policy "any suit alleging personal injury."14 The determination of
the insurer's duty to defend, therefore, rests upon objective facts.
The court concluded that when the insured has given notice and the
information required, the assertions of a stranger to the contract
should not determine the insurer's duty to defend. 5
The purpose of the defense clause in an automobile liability policy
is twofold. On the one hand the insurer is able to protect against
collusion and incompetence by its power to control and conduct the
defense of any suits which are brought against the insured on the
policy. In addition, the insured will not be tempted to compromise
or default on a claim in order to avoid the expense of litigation. On
the other hand, the defense clause benefits the insured whenever he
is sued on the policy. Therefore the determination of the obligation
to defend is of the utmost importance. If the insurer determines his
duty to defend strictly from the allegations of the complaint, the
insured will be at the mercy of the injured claimant's pleadings. Yet
if one determines the duty of the insurer to defend from the true
facts, which may not be ascertainable until after a verdict is reached,
the insurer may then be liable for breach of contract to defend even
though it has acted reasonably and in good faith. The rule announced
in the instant case would seem to be the most equitable to both
parties concerned, since the insurer has the greater facilities for the
investigation of any claims; moreover it was the insurer who drafted
the contract in the first place. The dissent's objection that the insurer
should be able to rely absolutely either on allegations or true facts
would seem to be inequitable on its face. As was pointed out by the
majority, the layman might well interpret the policy to mean that the
insurer would defend all suits arising out of the use of the insured
vehicle, notwithstanding the manner in which the action was pleaded.
Furthermore, if one were to lay down the rule that the allegations of
the complaint control in all situations, then what effect will the right
to amend have, since many states follow the federal rules of pro-
cedure, where the allegations can be amended at any time up to and
including the time when a judgment is rendered? In addition, where
the terms of a contract are ambiguous, they are always construed
against the writer, for it is he who allowed the ambiguity to creep in.
Trade Regulation-Advertising-Permissible Scope of FTC
Cease and Desist Order Against Manufacturer for
Deceptive Advertising Practices
The Federal Trade Commission, recognizing that television is a




relatively new and tremendously important outlet for high-pressure
advertising, has recently been waging a strenuous campaign to keep
the advertisements within reasonable bounds.' In the first case of
the campaign to emerge for full scale court review, Colgate-Palmolive
Company, through its advertising agency, Ted Bates & Company,
released television commercials extolling the superior wetting qualities
of its "Rapid Shave" shaving cream. The highlight of the commercials
was a demonstration in which coarse sandpaper was apparently
shaved with the aid of "Rapid Shave." Actually, the "sandpaper" was
merely sand sprinkled on plexiglass, and in fact "Rapid Shave" would
not shave actual sandpaper. The FTC issued a cease and desist order
prohibiting the company and the agency from, among other things,
using in connection with any product demonstrations which are not
accurate or genuine.2 On appeal, held, order set aside and remanded.
Where respondents' violation was a single misleading demonstration
of a single product, an order directed against all future demonstrations
of all products is too broad.3 Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Federal Trade
Commission, 310 F.2d 89 (1st Cir. 1962). On remand, the Commis-
sion clarified the order and the principles of law on which it was
based, and removed some obvious ambiguities, but made no sub-
stantial changes in its effect on Colgate-Palmolive.
4
The touchstone of liability under the Federal Trade Commission
Act for false advertising is consumer deception. 5 This primarily in-
volves a duty not to misinform rather than an affirmative duty to
disclose.6 The accepted policy with respect to the scope of FTC cease
and desist orders is for the courts to defer to the Commission's
expertise and specialized knowledge by giving it broad discretion in
framing its orders.7 An order may, however, come under judicial
scrutiny when (1) it is vague, as typified by the order framed in the
broad language of the applicable statute,8 or (2) "the remedy selected
1. See Legislation & Administration, 37 NOTRE DAME LAW. 524 (1962); Note, 36
ST. Joms L. REv. 274 (1962).
2. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 3 TRADE REc. RE,. ff 15643 (1961).
3. The order also seemingly required that the demonstrations be literally accurate
even where such would not be necessary to convey actual truth and no public
interest would be served thereby; this was the primary reason for setting it aside.
In addition a sanction against the advertising agency as broad as that against the
principal was held to be open to objection.
4. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 3 TRADE BREG. REP'. ff 16318 (Feb. 18, 1963) (opinion
only; proposed order released as FTC Docket No. 7736).
5. The statutory basis is Federal Trade Commission Act § 5(a) (1), as amended,
66 Stat. 632 (1952), 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1) (1958), banning "unfair methods of
competition" and "unfair or deceptive acts or practices." Injury or likelihood of injury
may be either to the consumer or to a competitor, but danger of consumer deception
is still necessary to produce injury to either. See FTC v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291
U.S. 67, 78 (1934); Colgate-Palmolive Co., supra note 4, at 21156.
6. See Alberty v. FTC, 182 F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 818 (1950).
7. E.g., Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608 (1946).
8. See, e.g., FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948); NLRB v. Express Pub-
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has no reasonable relation to the unlawful practices found to exist,"'
in that it is too broad as to practices, products, or parties affected. A
criticism of the first type of order is that Congress, in passing a law
and creating an agency to administer it, speaks in generalities and
leaves the agency to fill in the details; by falling back on the statutory
generalities the agency abdicates its function to the court that may
in the future be called on to enforce the order.10 The most recent
Supreme Court decision on the subject" gives an indication of the
chances of success on the second ground of attack. The Court refused
to set a broad order aside but indicated that its holding would have
been different had the same order been issued under present law,
which provides that cease and desist orders automatically become
final' 2 and thereby expose the respondent to liability for heavy civil
penalties.'3 This idea of fashioning the order in light of its practical
effect found immediate approval in the lower courts' 4 and, apparently,
in the eyes of at least one of the FTC Commissioners.15 Precedent
lishing Co., 312 U.S. 426 (1941) (order not to violate the NLRA held too broad);
Swanee Paper Corp. v. FTC, 291 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
987 (1962). But cf. FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470 (1952).
9. Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608, 613 (1946); see, e.g., FTC v. Mandel
Bros., 359 U.S. 385 (1959); FTC v. National Lead Co., 352 U.S. 419 (1959).
10. See FTC v. Morton Salt Co., supra note 8, at 54; FTC v. Ruberoid Co., supra
note 8, at 480 (Jackson, J., dissenting); I DAVIs, AD.NuISTRATVE LAw TREATIsE
§ 8.19, at 607 (1958); Connor, The Defense of Abandonment in Proceedings Before
the Federal Trade Commission, 49 GEo. L.J. 722, 729-32 (1961); Elman, The FTC
and Procedural Reform, 14 AD. L. REV. 105 (1961); Note, 29 U. Crr. L. REv. 706
(1962); cf. C.E. Niehoff & Co. v. FTC, 241 F.2d 37 (7th Cir. 1957), rev'd pcr curtam
sub nom. Moog Indus., Inc. v. FTC, 355 U.S. 411 (1958).
11. FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., 368 U.S. 360 (1962).
12. Clayton Act § 11(g), as amended, 73 Stat. 244 (1959), 15 U.S.C. § 21(g)
(Supp. III, 1961). This subsection is substantially identical with Federal Trade
Commission Act § 5(g), as amended, 52 Stat. 113 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 45(g) (1958).
The Broch case was brought under the Clayton Act, the instant case under the
Federal Trade Commission Act.
13. Clayton Act § 11(l), as amended, 73 Stat. 245 (1959), 15 U.S.C. § 21(l) (Supp.
III, 1961). This subsection is substantially the same as Federal Trade Commission
Act § 5(l), as amended, 52 Stat. 114 (1938), as amended, 64 Stat. 21 (1950), 15
U.S.C. § 45 (1) (1958).
14. See Giant Food, Inc. v. FTC, 307 F.2d 184 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 83 Sup. Ct.
723 (1963); American News Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 104 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 371
U.S. 824 (1962); Grand Union Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1962). But cf.
Vanity Fair Paper Mills, Inc. v. FTC, 311 F.2d 480 (2d Cir. 1962), where the court
points out that if the order is too broad to perfectly apprise the respondent as to
what is prohibited, this defect is not of compelling importance because respondent
must, under FTC Rules of Practice, Procedures and Organization § 5.6, 16 C.F.R. §
3.26 (1960), propose his method of compliance, which may either be accepted or
rejected by the Commission. Interestingly, a rationale similar to the Broch dictum
was proposed some years ago, R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FTC, 192 F.2d 535 (7th
Cir. 1951), apparently never gained much of a foothold, and was finally overruled,
Mandel Bros., Inc. v. FTC, 254 F.2d 18 (7th Cir. 1958), reted in part on other
grounds, 359 U.S. 358 (1959).
15. See Vanity Fair Paper Mills, Inc., 3 TRADE REc. REP. U 15796, 20611 (Elman,
C., dissenting), aff'd, 311 F.2d 480 (2d Cir. 1962). Commissioner Elman's dissent
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affords little concrete assistance in determining the permissible scope
of an order directed at deceptive advertising because the FTC has
heretofore been content to issue much narrower orders against decep-
tive advertising than in other areas of enforcement.16 In the few
deceptive advertising cases where the scope of the order has been
seriously attacked,17 the courts have permitted the orders to proscribe
the particular deceptive practice as applied to any product. These
cases are not, however, determinative of the Commission's authority,
since there was no definite holding that the degree of specificity as to
prohibited practices was the outer limit of permissible breadth, and
there were circumstances justifying an order applicable to all pro-
ducts.'8 These circumstances may not be present in a case involving
a single product of a highly diversified company like Colgate-
Palmolive. Common-sense application of the above mentioned
Itreasonable relation" generality may still provide the most concrete
assistance.
Indications of a recent shift in policy are apparent. One response
by the Commission to criticisms of its case by case method of en-
forcing the Federal Trade Commission Act is announcement of an
intention to promulgate industry-wide Trade Regulation Rules de-
claring certain practices unlawful.' 9 Rules applicable to advertising
are forthcoming.
20
The objectionable part of the order against Colgate-Palmolive
briefly and persuasively outlines the relevant considerations in arriving at a proper order.
The court of appeals approved the dissent as a statement of what the Commission
should do but refused to hold that it stated what they must do.
16. Connor, supra note 10, at 730 n.33; see, e.g., Standard Brands, Inc., 56 F.T.C.
1488 (1960) (consent order); Brooklyn Fashion Center, Inc., 56 F.T.C. 535 (1959);
Azome Utah Mining Co., 54 F.T.C. 269 (1957); J. David Paisley Co., 54 F.T.C. 87
(1957) (consent order); cf. Bankers Sec. Corp. v. FTC, 297 F.2d 403 (3d Cir. 1961);
Niresk Indus., Inc., v. FTC, 278 F.2d 337 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 883
(1960); Consumer Sales Corp. v. FTC, 198 F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344
U.S. 912 (1953).
17. Bankers Sec. Corp. v. FTC, supra note 16; Niresk Indus., Inc. v. FTC, supra
note 16; Consumer Sales Corp., v. FTC, supra note 16. But of. Korber Hats, Inc. v.
FTC, 311 F.2d 358 (1st Cir. 1962).
18. In the Niresk and Consumer Sales cases the respondent companies dealt in a
specialized line of products; in Bankers Sec. the respondent was a department store
which admitted that the specific deceptive practice was applicable to most of its
merchandise and had been so used on occasion. But in the Korber Hats case, decided
after the instant case by the same panel of judges, the court questioned, in light of
the Broch dictum, the propriety of an order prohibiting substantially all misrepresenta-
tions about a specific product.
19. Address by Commissioner Anderson, Charlotte-Piedmont Better Business Bureau,
Nov. 16, 1962, reported in 5 TRADE BEG. RE. 11 50164 (1962); see Elman, supra note
10; 5 TRADE REG. REP. 11 50153 (1962); Address by FTC Chairman Dixon, Section'on
Antitrust Law of the New York State Bar Association, Jan. 24, 1963, reported in 5
TRADE REG. REP. f 50169 (1963).
20. Address by Commissioner MacIntyre, National Congress of Petroleum Retailers,
Inc., Aug. 22, 1962, reported in 5 TRADE REG. REP. ff 50155 (1962).
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proscribed representing the merits of "any product" by means of
"demonstrations"' that are not "genuine or accurate."2' The first
ground for setting aside the order was a conclusion that it is common
and legally unobjectionable advertising practice to use demonstrations
that, although not genuine, are nevertheless not misleading and thus
would be permissible.22 The court declined to undertake to modify the
order but sent it back to the Commission with "suggestions."23 It was
suggested, but expressly not decided, that had it been proper to hold
all non-genuine demonstrations illegal, the order might have been
appropriate. The necessary inference from this is that the defect
might be cured merely by limiting the order to misleading demon-
strations, but the court seemingly negatived this inference by express-
ing dissatisfaction with the idea of a broad prohibition against
demonstrations when the offense is narrow-"a single misrepresenta-
tion about a single product."24 Discussion of the issue was closed with
a citation to Colgate-Palmolive Co.- (a different case) as one example
of a properly drawn order for this situation. The facts in that case
were sufficiently similar to those of the instant case for the order to
be paraphrased and applied here; were this done, it would prohibit
Colgate-Palmolive from misrepresenting, presumably by any method,
the wetting properties of any shaving cream manufactured by it.
On remand the Commission emphasized that it had found two
unfair practices: (1) misrepresentation of the qualities of "Rapid
Shave" and (2) representation that the visual demonstration
proved that which it did not.26 The part of the order applicable to
the latter finding was refrained to remove any possible doubt as to
its interpretation, but even in its new form it does not appear to
conform to the mandate of the court of appeals. 27 The proposed
new order prohibits visual demonstrations that do not, because of the
use of a substitute, actually prove what they appear to prove about
any product. The application to any product was justified by mention-
21. 310 F.2d at 93.
22. E.g., iced tea does not look like iced tea when reproduced on the television
screen; therefore it is permissible to use colored water that looks, on the television
screen, like iced tea should look.
23. 310 F.2d at 93.
24. Ibid. Nowhere in the opinion is there any discussion of the second paragraph of
the order which prohibited any misrepresentation of the qualities of shaving cream.
This provision was left intact on remand.
25. ThAE REG. REP. 1960-61 Transfer Binder 1 29445 (1961) (a different proceed-
ing against Colgate in connection with their toothpaste).
26. 3 TrADE REG. REP. at 21157.
27. The Commission frankly acknowledges that it is merely removing the technical
defects to clarify the issues for possible further judicial review. Id. at 21154. The
basic disagreement here is as to what constitutes a violation of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act; this comment is addressed to the problem of what to do about it when
the violation is found.
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ing the obvious ineffectuality of putting a stop to "spurious television
demonstrations in advertising shaving cream, but to allow them to
continue the practice in advertising toothpaste or soap."- The need
for a broad scope was further buttressed by pointing out that in three
prior proceedings Colgate has been required to cease making thirty-
one misleading representations about eight products. 29
An evaluation of the propriety of the breadth of an order should be
made in cognizance of the theory underlying administrative cease and
desist proceedings. First, though, a distinction must be drawn be-
tween the question of whether the order is within the authority of
the Commission, i.e., able to withstand attack on appeal, and whether
the order, although technically unassailable, actually accomplishes its
desired purpose.30 This discussion will deal with the latter considera-
tion. The purpose of an order, as well as its effect, is twofold: (1) to
declare what is unlawful, and (2) to operate as an injunction against
the particular violator.3' Since, as previously noted, the Commission
intends to rely on industry-wide rules to set forth its interpretation of
the law, the impetus to seek broad orders on this first ground should
now be gone. Considerable breadth may still be desirable, though,
in accomplishing the second objective. It must be remembered that
a cease and desist order is not, strictly speaking, a penalty; it is an
injunction to refrain from violating the law in certain specified ways,
these ways being determined with reference to past conduct, pre-
sumably because past conduct is an indication of what future conduct
would be in absence of legal restraint.-2 The problem further sub-
28. Id. at 21158.
29. Colgate-Palmolive Co., supra note 25; Stipulation 8380, 49 F.T.C. 1601 (1952);
Stipulation 2867, 31 F.T.C. 1630 (1940).
30. FTC v. Ruberoid Co., supra note 8, illustrates the distinction; it is at least argu-
able that the order there was not well suited to deal with the situation, but it was
held that the defects were not such as to require it to be set aside. Justice Jackson's
dissent therein would seem to hold the Commission to a higher standard of com-
petency in drafting appropriate orders. Id. at 480. The dissent of Commissioner Elman
(the writer of both opinions in the instant case) in Vanity Fair Paper Mills, Inc., supra
note 15, is also illustrative of the distinction. There he proposed a tripartite process
to formulate a proper decision: (1) consideration of the breadth of the order, i.e.,
would the public interest be best served by extending the order's proscriptions to
practices like and related to those found to have existed; (2) explicit statements in
justification of the broad order, this being necessary both to show the requisite "reason-
able relation" and simply because the parties and the public have a right to be fully
informed; (3) formulation of the order with precision and clarity. The original de-
cision was apparently deficient on at least the second and third grounds; the most
recent makes it clear that the disagreement between the FTC and the court is on
the more fundamental problem of determination of the public interest.
31. For analytical purposes it has been suggested that these be designated the legis-
lative and judicial functions, respectively. Comment, 29 U. CM. L. REv. 706, 713
(1962).
32. One writer has expressed it in this manner: "The perfect cease and desist order
. . . would prohibit precisely those illegal acts which the respondent will in fact
commit." Id. at 719.
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divides into the issues of the breadth of the order in reference to (1)
the type of prohibited practice and (2) the products to be covered.
These issues are necessarily interrelated when the likelihood of future
misconduct is considered, since there are indications that the tendency
to engage in questionable advertising practices grows stronger as the
competition becomes keener.33 The gravamen of Colgate's wrong was
the representation, by a visual demonstration on television, that its
product had qualities that it did not have (or, in the view of the
FTC, that the demonstration was proof of a quality when in fact it
did not constitute such proof). The company had made similarly
misleading demonstrations regarding a like product in the past, and
such conduct warrants an inference of future repetition. Therefore,
the practice to be prohibited should be such demonstrative television
misrepresentations.35 Consideration of the same facts dictates that
the range of products included within the prohibition should extend
beyond shaving cream, but not beyond some generic class embodying
those products whose marketing situation allows a fair inference that
similar practices might be applied to them. Colgate's product line
may roughly be divided into four classes: toilet articles, household
products (principally soaps and detergents), proprietary drugs, and
ethical drugs.3 6 All but the last would seem to be marketed under
substantially similar conditions, e.g., they are highly advertised, low
cost, high-use consumer items. Therefore the order should include
the first three classes, although it is arguable that it should be limited
to toilet articles since the present violation and the proven past
violation concerned products in this class. At any rate, substantial
identity (or lack of it) of marketing conditions should be a fit subject
for introduction of the type of evidence that the FTC is well equipped
to evaluate. These considerations, with the exception of the one
concerning marketing conditions, are embodied in the present FTC
order. Even aside from the disagreement as to the type of demonstra-
tion to be prohibited, this has produced an order somewhat broader
than the court indicated would be proper, but the opinion sets forth
factual bases which should adequately support its breadth on further
33. Interview with advertising agency official, in Nashville, Tenn., Feb. 1963. The
circumstances surrounding the present case are an illustration. See Legislation &
Administration, 37 NoTmR Dwnn LAw. 524, 531 (1962), for an account of the FTC
proceedings against Colgate-Palmolive and against two other shaving cream manu-
facturers for similar practices. The author wryly observes: "Perhaps the Commission
should have allowed Rapid Shave, Rise, and Soft Stroke to continue their demonstrations
against each other; even more interesting tests and claims may have resulted as the
competition thickened."
34. Colgate-Palmolive Co., supra note 25.
35. Legally it is not necessary to limit the order to television misrepresentation,
Vanity Fair Paper Mills, Inc. v6 FTC, supra note 14, but because of the peculiar suita-
bility of the practice to the medium it would be wise to so restrict the order.
36. STANDAnD LisTD STOcK REPoRTs 566 (Standard & Poor 1962).
[VOL. 16
RECENT CASES
court review, except possibly as it would apply to products that are
not highly advertised high-use consumer items.
Securities-Investment Advisers Act of 1940-Act
Requires Showing of Common Law Fraud for
Violation of Sections 206(1) and (2)
An investment advisory service1 presented a financial analysis of
specific securities and recommendations to subscribers2 for the pur-
poses of protecting their investment capital, allowing a realization of
steady and attractive income, and allowing the accumulation of
capital gains.3 Without disclosing the transactions to its customers,
the advisory service by way of prior purchase or short sale availed
itself of the profit margin created through the market reaction to its
published advice.4 The Securities Exchange Commission, alleging a
1. "'Investment Adviser' means any person who, for compensation, engages in the
business of advising others, either directly or through publications or writings, as to
the value of securities . . . or who, for compensation and as part of a regular busi-
ness, issues or promulgates analyses or reports concerning securities; but does not in-
clude (A) a bank, or any holding company affiliate, as defined in the Banking Act of
1933, which is not an investment company; (B) any lawyer, accountant, engineer,
or teacher whose performance of such services is solely incidental to the practice of his
profession; (C) any broken or dealer whose performance of such services is solely
incidental to the conduct of his business as a broker or dealer and who receives no
special compensation therefor; (D) the publisher of any bona fide newspaper, news
magazine or business or financial publication of general and regular circulation; (E)
any person whose advice, analyses, or reports relate to no securities other than securities
which are direct obligations of or obligations guaranteed as to principal or interest by
the United States, or securities issued or guaranteed by corporations in which the United
States has a direct or indirect interest which shall have been designated by the
Secretary of the Treasury, pursuant to section 3(a) (12) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, as exempted securities for the purposes of that Act; or (F) such other
persons not within the intent of this paragraph, as the Commission may designate by
rules and regulations or order." Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 202(a)(11), 54
Stat. 848, 15 U.S.C. § 806-2(a)(11) (1958).
2. "There are about . . . 5,000 subscribers to the 'Capital Gains Report'; the . . .
publication is frequently distributed to a large group of about 100,000 nonsubscribers by
use of general mailing lists." SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 306 F.2d 606,
612 (1962) (Clark, J., dissenting).
3. The Capital Gains Report Circular reads as follows: "An Investment Service
devoted exclusively to (1) The protection of investment capital, (2) The realization of
a steady and attractive income therefrom, (3) The accumulation of CAPITAL GAINS
thru the timely purchase of corporate equities that are proved to be undervalued." Ibid.
4. The specific transactions questioned are as follows:
(a) On March 15, 1960, Capital Gains purchased 500 shares of Continental Insurance
Company stock at $47 %/ and $47 7/a per share. Three days later it circulated a report
recommending the purchase of the stock. On March 29th Capital Gains sold the stock
at $50 s.
(b) Between May 13th and May 20th 1960 Capital Gains purchased 5,300 shares
of United Fruit Company stock, at a total cost of $117,114.00. On May 27th, a re-
port was circulated recommending purchase of the stock. Between June 6th and June
10th, Capital Gains sold the 5,300 shares at a profit of $10,725.00.
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violation of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, sections 206(1) and
(2) ,5 sought a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction,
and final injunction against the advisory service to prevent it from
employing, in the terminology of the act, "any device, scheme, or
artifice to defraud any client or prospective client" 6 and from engaging
"in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates as
a fraud or deceit upon any client or prospective client."7 The district
court concluded that "fraud" and "deceit" are used in their technical
sense in the act. Consequently, in the absence of defendant's clearly
established intent actually to "defraud any client, or prospective
client" the court vacated the temporary restraining order and denied
the motion for a preliminary injunction.8 On appeal to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held, affirmed. Proof
of an undisclosed personal profit accruing to an investment adviser
from the predictable market effect of his honest advice does not
amount to common law fraud and thus is not so clearly a violation of
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, sections 206(1) and (2), as to
warrant a preliminary injunction in advance of a trial on the merits.
SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 306 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1962),
cert. granted, 371 U.S. 967 (1963).
Pursuant to section 30 of the Public Utility Holding Company Act
of 1935,9 the Securities and Exchange Commission made an overall
study and report on investment trusts, investment companies, and
investment advisers.10 This report and the recommendations of the
Commission" were forwarded to the Congress in seeking legislative
(c) On July 5th and July 14th, Capital Gains bought 2,000 shares of Creole
Petroleum. The Company recommended the stock on July 15th by an optimistic report
on Creole. Between July 20th and 22d, Capital Gains sold its shares at a profit.
(d) On August 6th, 1960, Capital Gains purchased 600 shares of Hart, Schaffner &
larx stock at $23. On August 12th, it issued a report recommending purchase of this
security. Within 10 days, the company sold all of its shares at a profit.
(e) Between October 4th and October 13th, 1960, Capital Gains sold short 500
shares of the Chock Full O'Nuts corporation at a net price of $34,200. On October
14th, it circulated a comparative report of the Chock Full O'Nuts Corporation position
in its industry suggesting its overvalue. On October 24th, Capital Gains covered its
short sale at a profit.
(f) On October 28th and October 31st, 1960, Capital Gains purchased 2,000 shares
of Union Pacific stock at approximately $25 per share. On November 1st, a circulated
report recommended the stock. On November 7th, Capital Gains sold the 2,000 shares
at $27. Id. at 612-13.
5. 54 Stat. 852, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 806-6(1), (2) (Supp. III, 1961).
6. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 206(1), 54 Stat. 852, as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 80b-6(1) (Supp. I1, 1961).
7. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 206(2), 54 Stat. 852, as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 80b-6(2) (Supp. III, 1961).
8. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 191 F. Supp. 897 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
9. 49 Stat. 837, 15 U.S.C. § 79z-4 (1958).
10. H.R. Doec. No. 477, 76th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1939).
11. Statement of Robert E. Healy, Commissioner, Securities and Exchange Com-
mission, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Securities & Exchange of the Senate
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enactment to ensure regulatory safeguards in the subject area, hereto-
fore unaffected by any of the four earlier regulatory acts.12 In re-
sponse, a committee draft sought a licensing requirement as to all
investment advisers, 13 a general clause preventing fraudulent and
deceitful practices within the industry,14 and an endowment of the
Commission with investigative powers to ensure compliance. 15 Due
to unanimously adverse reaction, 6 the provision for investigative
powers was deleted from the bill.' 7 The limited scope of subsequent
judicial interpretation of the Investment Advisers Act as so passed
has been attributed to the legislative pruning of these investigative
powers,' as well as a strict regard for what was once stated to be
the purpose of the act, i.e., a means for providing an industry census.' 9
Committee on Banking & Currency, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. pt.1, at 32 (1940).
12. Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1958);
Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 53 Stat. 1149, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-bbbb
(1958), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77ddd (Supp. III, 1961); Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a to hh-1 (1958); Public
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 803, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 79 to
79z-6 (1958).
13. S. 3580, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. § 204 (1940).
14. S. 3580, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. § 206(1), (2) (1940).
15. "Any investment adviser, or any person who presently contemplates becoming
an investment adviser, may register under this section by filing with the Commission
an application for registration. Such application shall contain such of the following
information and documents, in such form and detail, as the Commission may by
rules and regulations prescribe as necessary, or appropriate in the public interest, or
for the protection of investors: ... (3) Such further information and copies of such
further documents relating to such investment adviser, his or its affiliated persons and
employees, as the Commission may by rules and regulations or order prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors." S.
3580, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. § 204(c) (1940).
16. See Statement of Charles M. O'Hearn, Vice President and Director of Clarke,
Sinsabaugh & Co., Investment Counsel, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Securities
& Exchange of the Senate Committee on Banking & Currency, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. pt.
2, at 713, 716 (1940); Statement of Alexander Standish, President, Standish, Racey &
McKay, Inc., id. at 718, 720; Statement of Dwight C. Rose, Partner of Brundage, Story
& Rose, and President, Investment Counsel Association of America, id. at 723; State-
ment of Rudolph P. Berle, General Counsel, Investment Counsel Association of America,
id. at 742, 750; Statement of James N. White, of Scudder, Stevens & Clark, Investment
Counsel, id. at 755, 758.
17. See Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 203(c), 54 Stat. 850, 15 U.S.C. §
80b-3(c) (1958), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(c) (Supp. III, 1961).
18. "The most serious defect in the original statute was the absence of any
provision comparable to § 17(a) of the 1934 act, which gives the Commission
authority to inspect the books and records of registered brokers and dealers, to
prescribe what books and records shall be kept, and to require the filing of reports. Cer-
tainly the minuscule number of proceedings against registered advisers before 1960
as compared with those against registered brokers and dealers demonstrates either (1)
that the former industry is inherently a good deal more saintly than the latter or (2)
that a statute of this sort without inspection power is a statute without teeth. And
the Commission may be pardoned for having preferred the latter conclusion until the
former had been proved." 2 Loss, SFcmrrixs REGULATIo N 1408 (2d ed. 1961).
19. "[OJur fundamental approach to this problem is in the first instance, before we
could intelligently make an appraisal of the economic function or of the abuses which
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Regardless, the result requires an appreciation of and reliance on the
judicial definition of corollary terminology found in other of the
regulatory acts.20 Although the terms "fraud" and "deceit" as they
appear through the other regulatory acts have been regarded by some
authority as based strictly on common law fraud,2' the majority of
courts have regarded the terms as used in these acts as not to be
limited to the narrow confines of common law fraud, but to be
liberally interpreted as terms inclusive of all conduct tending to
deceive, or to mislead the purchasing public though not designed to
perpetrate fraud, or to injure others.22 In applying this non-common
law approach, courts confronted with prosecutions under the other
regulatory acts have indicated a duty to provide full and fair dis-
closure of those facts whose omission would mislead23 both as to
the stock to be sold 4 and the impartial nature of a broker.25 Yet, a
recognition of uncertainty as to the nature of interest requiring a
disclosure26 as to these other acts resulted in an amendment to the
might exist in that type of organization, to see if we would not get something which
approximated a compulsory census." Statement of David Schenker, Chief Counsel, SEC
Investment Trust Study, Hearing Before the Subcommittee of Securities & Exchange
of the Senate Committee on Banking & Currency, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. pt. 1, at 47, 48
(1939).
20. Cf. 3 Loss, SEcurrms REGULATION 1515 (2d ed. 1961): "These clauses (sections
206(1)-(2) of the Investment Advisers Act] are modeled on Clauses (1) and (3)
of § 17(a) of the Securities Act. Consequently, everything which has been said ...
applies with equal force to investment advisers, mutatis mutandis."
21. SEC Rule X-10B-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1949), as to the employment of any
device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, has been held to be based on common law fraud.
Tobacco & Allied Stocks, Inc. v. Transamerica Corp., 143 F. Supp. 323, 327 (D. Del.
1956).
22. See Los Angeles Trust Deed & Mortgage Exch. v. SEC, 264 F.2d 199 (9th Cir.
1959); Seipel v. SEC, 229 F.2d 758 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (per curiam; see 3 Loss,
SEcurMTIMs REGULATION 1515-16 & n.120 (2d ed. 1961) for content of parties' briefs);
Hughes v. SEC, 174 F.2d 969, 974 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC,
139 F.2d 434, 435-36 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 786 (1944); SEC v.
Torr, 15 F. Supp. 315 (S.D.N.Y. 1936), rev'd on other grounds, 87 F.2d 446 (2d Cir.
1937); 3 Loss, SEcunrrmEs REruLAT ON 1435 (2d ed. 1961); Shulman, Civil Liability
and the Securities Act, 43 Y.E L.J. 227 (1933).
23. "The statute did not require [a securities dealer] to state every fact about
stock offered that a prospective purchaser might like to know or that might, if known,
tend to influence his decision ...." But it did require statements not to be misleading.
Otis & Co. v. SEC, 106 F.2d 579, 582 (6th Cr. 1939).
24. Securities Act of 1933, §§ 4(1), 5(a)(1), as amended, 68 Stat. 684 (1954), 15
U.S.C. 88 77d(1), (a)(1) (1958); SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
25. "When a prospective buyer comes to a broker for advice he supposes that %vhat
he gets is an opinion unweighted by personal interest." United States v. Brown, 79
F.2d 321, 325 (2d Cir. 1935).
26. "Secto 9. Creation of rulemaking power over antifraud provisions ....
Because of the general language of the statutory antifraud provision and the ab-
sence of any express rulemaking power in connection with them, the SEC has always
had doubt as to the scope of the fraudulent and deceptive activities that are pro-
hibited .... ." Staff memorandum on S. 1182, The Investment Advisers Act of 1940,
in explanation of new subsection (4) for § 206, Hearings before the Subcommittee on
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Investment Advisers Act in 1960;27 this amendment was passed sub-
sequent to the alleged violation in the instant case. The amendment
incorporated an express prohibition of any practice which is "manipu-
lative"- and directed the Securities Exchange Commission to draft
rules and regulations defining and prescribing "means reasonably
designed to prevent such practices, and courses of business as are
fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative."29 Subsequently, the Commis-
sion has issued regulations dealing with registration of stock dealings
by investment advisers and their staffs30 and with types of advertising
deemed to be fraudulent, or deceptive.
31
The court characterized the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 as
less comprehensive than either the Securities Act of 1933, or the
Securities Exchange Act of 19 34 .-2 Rather than dealing with the
purchase and sale of securities and broker-dealer-customer relation-
ships, it was viewed as but a modest beginning toward regulation of
investment advisers, designed "to be a 'compulsory census' of the
industry."' ' Recognizing the relationship of trust and confidence
existing between an adviser and a purchaser, the court would con-
demn "scalping" for a third party seller,34 or advice not rendered in
good faith.3 However, the court failed to so regard personal profit
accruing from the predictable market effect of a broker's honest
advice.36 The adherence to the requisite of common law fraud or
deceit manifest in the distinction was further expressed by recognition
of "the recent warnings of the Supreme Court against excessive
judicial expansion of provisions of the securities laws to accomplish
objectives believed to be salutary."37 In post-enactment reflections by
both the Securities Exchange Commission 8 and legislative bodies,3 9
Securities of the Senate Committee on Banking & Currency, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 512,
516 (1959).
27. 74 Stat. 887 (1960), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (Supp. I1, 1961).
28. 74 Stat. 887 (1960), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(4) (Supp. III, 1961).
29. Ibid.
30. 26 Fed. Reg. 10000 (1961), proposing an addition of a para. (12) to 17 C.F.R.
§ 275. 204-2(a) (Supp. 1961).
31. 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-(1) (Supp. 1962).
32. 306 F.2d at 609.
33. Id. at 610.
34. Id. at 608.
35. Id. at 609.
36. Ibid.
37. Id. at 609 [citing Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403 (1962)].
38. Staff memorandum on S. 1182, The Investment Advisers Act of 1940, in ex-
planation of new subsection (4) for § 206, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on
Securities of the Senate Committee on Banking & Currency, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 512,
516 (1959).
39. Senate Subcommittee on Legislative Oversight, short section p. 53 of report-
from hearings held on September 17th, 1958, transcript, pp. 3753-67; H.R. REP. No.
2179, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. § 9 (1959); S. REP. No. 1760, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960).
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the court found substantiation for the stricter view.40 In addition, the
court regarded the 1960 amendment to the act authorizing the pro-
hibition of "manipulative" practices as recognition of the prior in-
adequacy of the act as a vehicle through which the Commission could
prosecute such infractions. 41 The provision of the amendment which
constitutes an authorization of the Commission to issue rules and
regulations as to specific infractions was regarded as further recogni-
tion of the prior inability of the Commissioner, under the act, to
prosecute infractions regarded as less than common law fraud or
deceit.42
The court's recognition of the pre-amendment impotence of the
act,43 as well as the clarity of prohibited practices" introduced by the
amendment,45 would scarcely seem to justify a characterization of
sections 206(1) and (2) as based upon common law fraud. The
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 is but one of a series of regulatory
acts of the securities market. In aggregate their philosophy of "let
the seller also beware"46 requires a full disclosure of relevant data
through a variety of devices. Except for necessary changes in points
of detail, the fact that the prohibited practices of non-common law
"fraud" and "deceit" are the same among the acts is exemplary of
this common purpose. Although the sterilization of investigative
powers47 distinguishes the 1940 act as to its impotency in aggressive
prosecution," the offensive practices remained the same under the
act; merely the means of prosecution changed. Consequently, any
characterization of the 1940 act as a mere tool for "compulsory census"
is reflective of history only, not of purpose. The further contention
that the purpose of the act should be confined by the 1960 amend-
ment's introduction of clarity as to prescribed offenses, i.e., "manipula-
tive" practices49 or an authorization for decree as to specific acts
found offensive,50 is without justification.51 That offensive practices
should be more clearly presented to potential offenders well serves
the purpose of the act. Yet, these new vehicles of clarification are not
in themselves a panacea to the interpretive problems surrounding the
40. "The history of the 1960 amendment confirms the narrow scope of the initial
enactment, in an area highly relevant here." 306 F.2d at 610.
41. Id. at 611.
42. Ibid.
43. Id. at 610.
44. Id. at 611.
45. 74 Stat. 887, (1960), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(4) (Supp. III, 1961).
46. H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1933).
47. See note 17 supra.
48. See note 18 supra.
49. See text accompanying note 41 supra.
50. See text accompanying note 42 supra.
51. 306 F.2d at 611 (dissenting opinion).
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act. The blank endorsement which Congress has given the Securities
and Exchange Commission, allowing the issuance of regulations con-
cerning offensive practices, is subject to the principles of administra-
tive law ensuring an adherence to the scope of the 1940 act.52 An
attempt to ignore the pre-existing purpose of the act and to define
its limits by reference to the legislative proceedings some fifteen to
twenty years subsequent to the enactment of the language would be
unwarranted statutory construction. Rather, it is the origins of the
act from which the propriety of prosecuting non-common law fraud
must be ascertained. Its dictates suggest that the failure of an invest-
ment adviser to inform a subscriber of its own pecuniary interest
which directly contravenes its compensated advice may be prosecuted
under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.
Taxation-Federal Estate Tax-Employer's Payments
Into Annuity in Which Decedent's Lifetime
Interest Is Subject to a Condition Precedent
Are Includible in Gross Estate
Decedent's employer voluntarily and unilaterally established an
unfunded deferred compensation plan by which decedent would
receive a stated maximum sum in sixty equal monthly installments if
he should become totally and permanently disabled.' The plan further
provided that if decedent received no payments prior to death, the
entire amount would be paid in monthly installments to his widow;
and if decedent received only part of the payments before death,
then the remaining installments would be paid to his widow. De-
cedent died having received no payments under the plan so that
the full amount was paid to the widow.2 The Commissioner assessed
52. Greene v. Dietz, 247 F.2d 689 (2d Cir. 1957).
1. Decedent was assistant to the president of the Chesapeake and Ohio Railway
Company. The company passed a resolution promising to pay certain high ranking
officials deferred compensation and death benefits out of the general funds of the
corporation.
2. Decedent died two years after the establishment of the plan. It apparently was
not contended that this was a life insurance contract which are expressly exempted
from estate tax under § 2039(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. However, it
might be argued that this plan was primarily a device to shift the risk of premature
death to the employer. Section 20.2039-1(d) of the Treasury Regulations of 1958
provides that when the reserve value of the policy equals the value of the death
benefits, then there is no longer an insurance risk, and it is not insurance under §
2039. If the company had set up a reserve and had made annual contributions based
on the value of decedent's services, it is unlikely that the reserve would have
equalled $100,000, the value of the death benefits, within two years. However, it is
doubtful whether an unfunded plan would ever be classified insurance under the test
of the regulations. LOWND-S & KRAMER, FEDERAL ESTATE AND G=FT TAxxs 214 (2d
1963]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
a deficiency when the value of the payments was not included in the
estate tax return, and decedents estate, having paid the deficiency,
filed this petition for a refund. Held, for the defendant. Payments
made by decedent's employer to his widow pursuant to a deferred
compensation plan by which decedent would have received pay-
ments if he had become totally and permanently disabled are in-
cludible in the gross estate under section 2039 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954. Baherns Estate v. United States, 305 F.2d 827 (Ct.
Cl. 1962).
Prior to 1954 there was considerable doubt as to the includibility
in the gross estate of the value of the survivor's interest in joint and
survivor type annuities, especially where such an annuity was pur-
chased by decedent's employer.3 The primary purpose for the passage
of section 2039 was to include the value of the survivor's interest in
such annuities whether purchased by the decedent or his employer.4
It is provided in section 2039 that the value of "an annuity or other
payment receivable by any beneficiary by reason of surviving the
decedent under any form of contract or agreement . . ." shall be
includible in the gross estate if under the contract the annuity "was
payable to the decedent, or the decedent possessed the right to
receive such annuity or payment . . . for his life or for any period
not ascertainable without reference to his death or for any period
which does not in fact end before his death."5 Congress, for consti-
tutional or other reasons, considered it necessary to require some sort
of lifetime interest in the decedent under the contract or agreement
in order to constitute a taxable transfer.6 The main problem presented
in the instant case is whether decedent's right to receive payments
only if he should become totally disabled, a future conditional right, is
such a lifetime interest as that contemplated by Congress. The
position of the treasury regulations, which is adopted by the instant
case, is that the term "possessed the right" means that decedent must
ed. 1962); see Note, Estate Taxation of Employee Death Benefits, 66 YALE L.J. 1217,
1233 (1957).
3. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Twogood's Estate, 194 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1952); Higgs'
Estate v. Commissioner, 184 F.2d 427 (3d Cir. 1950).
4. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 90 (1954); S. REP. No. 1622, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. 123 (1954).
5. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2039(a). Section 2039(b) provides in part: "For
purposes of this section, any contribution by the decedents employer or former em-
ployer to the purchase price of such contract or agreement . . . shall be considered to
be contributed by the decedent if made by reason of his employment."
6. The estate tax is a tax upon the right to transfer property at death. New York
Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345 (1921). It might be argued that there is no
transfer by decedent where he has no lifetime interest. However, it would probably
be constitutional either on the theory that the decedent makes a constructive transfer
by performing services or that the provision is necessary to prevent avoidance of the
tax. Helvering v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 296 U.S. 85 (1935).
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only have possessed "an enforceable right to receive payments at some
time in the future" and that such future right may be "conditional or
unconditional."7 Therefore, it is necessary to consider whether this is
a fair interpretation of "possessed the right." Although this is a case
of first impression under section 2039, there has been some discussion
of this problem by text writers, and they have voiced considerable
doubt as to the correctness of the interpretation given by the treasury
regulations.8 Congress employed language in section 2039 very simi-
lar to that used in section 2036,9 which taxes transfers where decedent
retained a life interest. It was expressly stated in the committee
reports that the rules applicable under section 2036 should be applied
in construing section 2039.10 The courts in construing section 2036
have held that the decedent has a "right to income" only where he
has retained a property right. Contract rights subject to conditions
precedent have been held insufficient to satisfy section 2036.11 Con-
tingent contract rights have also generally been considered mere
expectancies under other estate tax sections. 2 Contingent estates in
7. Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-1(b)(1) (1958).
8. Kramer, Employee Benefits and Federal Estate and Gift Taxes, 1959 DUKE L.J.
341, 359; Note, Contract Rights Subject to Conditions Precedent, 67 YALE LJ. 467,
475 (1958); Note, Estate Taxation of Employee Death Benefits, 66 YALE L.J. 1217,
1223 (1957). This doubt as to the Treasury's interpretation is aptly summed up as
follows: "The regulation implies that decedent had the requisite 'right to receive' if,
at the moment before death, a possibility existed that he would, at some future time
in life, possess an enforceable claim to payments. Thus, if decedent at death possessed
an expectancy, as in Goodman, a possibility of future vesting would justify inclusion of
the contract rights in the gross estate under section 2039. But this interpretation-
equating possibility with right-overreaches the statutory language." 67 YALE L.J. at
475.
9. INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 2036. It is provided in § 2036 (a) that the gross
estate shall include the value of property transferred by the decedent in which "he
has retained for his life or for any period not ascertainable without reference to his
death or for any period which does not in fact end before his death: (1) the possession
or enjoyment of, or the right to the income from, the property .... "
10. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A316 (1954); S. REP. No. 1622, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. 472 (1954).
11. E.g., Commissioner v. Twogood's Estate, 194 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1952); William
S. Miller, 14 T.C. 657 (1950). In the Twogood case decedent had the right to
receive an annuity from his employer which was contingent upon his meeting certain
requirements for retirement. In the opinion of the court, "[N]o life interest was re-
tained by the decedent in whatever his wife received. . . . All that decedent had prior
to his reaching his retirement date was a right to receive an annuity which was
contingent upon his meeting the requirements for retirement." 194 F.2d at 629.
12. The leading case on the property-expectancy problem is Dimock v. Corwin,
19 F. Supp. 56 (E.D.N.Y. 1937), aff'd on other grounds, 99 F.2d 799 (2d Cir. 1938),
aff'd, 306 U.S. 363 (1939), which held contract rights forfeitable at the whim of
one's employer were not property. The rule of the Dimock case has been extended to
include contingencies generally. See Libbey v. United States, 147 F. Supp. 383 (N.D.
Cal. 1956); Molter v. United States, 146 F. Supp. 497 (E.D.N.Y. 1956); Harmer v.
Glenn, 111 F. Supp. 52 (W.D. Ky. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 212 F.2d 483 (6th Cir.
1954); Albert L. Salt, 17 T.C. 92 (1951); William S. Miller, 14 T.C. 657 (1950);
M. Hadden Howell, 15 T.C. 224 (1950); Eugene F. Saxon, 12 T.C. 569 (1949); Emil
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property, on the other hand, have been treated as property rights
under section 2036.13
The court in the instant case relied primarily on the regulations in
finding that decedent "possessed the right" to payments within the
meaning of section 2039.14 However, after discussing at length the
position of the regulations, the court proceeded to attempt to justify
its holding independently of the regulations. The court reasoned from
the wording of the statute that for "possessed the right" to have any
meaning in addition to "was payable," it must be construed to apply
to payments coming due in the future. Therefore, the court argued,
section 2039 must apply to contingent payments because all future
payments are contingent on decedent living until a specified future
time. Consequently, the court concluded, since section 2039 ob-
viously applies to one type of contingency and makes no distinction
between types of contingencies, it must apply to all contingent rights
to payments.15 Finally, the court relied on decisions holding that
"right to income" under section 2036 applies to situations where the
transferor retains a secondary life estate contingent on surviving the
first life tenant.
16
The decision in the instant case apparently stands for the propo-
sition that interests which were considered expectancies and not
property under prior sections of the estate tax law are taxable under
section 2039. There is little support for this proposition outside the
regulations. 7 If Congress had not considered it necessary for decedent
to possess a lifetime property interest in order to make a constitutional
transfer of property, it is doubtful that any interest in the decedent
would have been required. The same economic benefit passes to the
survivor at decedent's death whether he possessed a lifetime interest
or not, so policywise there appears to be no reason to discriminate
between the two situations. The courts construing similarly worded
L. Stake, 11 T.C. 817 (1948). See also, for a discussion of the property-expectancy
problem under the estate tax, Kramer, Employee Benefits and Federal Estate and
Gift Taxes, 1959 DUKE L.J. 341, 348; Note, Contract Rights Subject to Conditions
Precedent, 67 YALE L.J. 467 (1958).
13. Commissioner v. Arent's Estate, 297 F.2d 894 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 369
U.S. 848 (1962); Marks v. Higgins, 213 F.2d 884 (2d Cir. 1954); Commissioner v.
Estate of Nathan, 159 F.2d 546 (7th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 843 (1948).
14. 305 F.2d at 831.
15. Ibid. The court not only is assuming that "possessed the right" applied to future
payments, but also that all payments coming due in the future are conditioned on
survivorship. This reasoning does not appear to be very convincing.
16. Id. at 832.
17. The court stated: "Unless they violate the statute they seek to implement,
such Treasury Regulations must be accepted in the areas they occupy." Id. at 829.
The court cites the regulations much as if they were binding authority, without seriously
questioning whether they represent a correct interpretation. In a case of first im-
pression under an ambiguous statute like § 2039, such an approach would seem to
result in resolving any ambiguity in favor of the Treasury.
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sections of the estate tax law have held unanimously that decedent
must have possessed a lifetime property interest in order to make a
taxable transfer and that a contract right subject to a condition pre-
cedent is not such an interest. The decisions under section 2036
which hold that contingent life estates are property would seem to
lend little support to the proposition that contingent contract rights
are property. 8 The interpretation given by the regulations and the
court appears desirable from a policy standpoint, since many, if not
most, employee benefits are subject to various contingencies which,
if permitted to exempt the benefits from the estate tax, would largely
limit section 2039 as a comprehensive tax upon employee death
benefits. 19 However, even if it be assumed that section 2039 was in-
tended to tax private annuities paid by reason of employment,20 it
does not appear that it can be properly construed to tax any annuity
where decedent's lifetime interest is a bare contract right subject to
a condition precedent.
21
18. Most jurisdictions recognize a contingent remainder as a valuable present
interest in property which is freely alienable inter vivos. Even though they are
contingent, such interests are nevertheless considered property. According to Pro-
fessor Simes, "[I]t can be said that modem law recognizes the contingent future
interest as an existing thing, not as something which will be acquired in the future,
and that the policy of the law is generally to permit people to alienate property
interests which they have .. " Smms, FtuT= INTERESTS § 32, at 103 (1951). The
courts have not expressly made any distinction but are uniform in holding contingent
remainders property and contingent contract rights expectancies for purposes of
estate taxation. See notes 11 and 12 supra.
19. See Kramer, Employee Benefits and Federal Estate and Gift Taxes, 1959 DUE
L.J. 341, 358. This expectancy loophole invites the avoidance of the tax by the
insertion of contingencies by employers for the sole purpose of escaping the tax.
It is unfortunate that this loophole was incorporated into § 2039, but since it was, it
will be difficult for the courts to ignore. Whether the decedent had a lifetime interest
or not would seem to be largely irrelevant since a valuable interest created by reason
of his employment passes in his estate, and in the interest of fairness, such interest
should be taxed equally in either case.
20. It might be argued from the language of § 2039(b) that private annuities paid
directly out of the funds of the employer are not to be taxed to the employee's
estate. Section 2039(b) states that § 2039(a) is applicable "to only such part of the
value of the annuity or other payment receivable under such contract or agreement as
is proportionate to that part of the purchase price therefor contributed by the de-
cedent. . . . Any contribution by the decedents employer or former employer to the
purchase price of such contract or agreement ... shall be considered to be contributed
by the decedent if made by reason of his employment." In a private annuity such as
the one in the instant case, it is difficult to find a "purchase" of an annuity by the
employer or a "contribution" in the ordinary sense of these words. See Kramer,
Employee Benefits and Federal Estate and Gift Taxes, 1959 Du=x L.J. 341, 368.
21. The recent decision in Estate of Edward H. Wadenitz, 39 T.C. No. 97 (March
20, 1963), purported to follow the principal case, but was placed upon a much more
narrow ground. The court held that a future conditional right to an annuity was a
sufficient lifetime interest in the decedent to satisfy the requirements of § 2039 where
the conditions were entirely within the control of the decedent.
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Taxation-Federal Estate Tax-Retained Administrative
Powers Over Trust Held Not a Power To Alter
or Amend Within Section 2038
Coexecutors brought an action for refund of federal estate taxes
paid under protest. The deceased settlor, one of the co-trustees,
created an inter vivos trust for his wife as life tenant and his daugh-
ters as remaindermen. He retained the following powers: (1) the
power to direct the investment policy; (2) the power to invade the
corpus for "happiness" of beneficiaries and for education of re-
maindermen; (3) the power to pay income to life tenant, and upon
his death, to the remaindermen.1 Upon settlor's death, a return was
filed excluding the assets of the trust property. The Commissioner
asserted a deficiency based upon the retained powers of administra-
tion. The coexecutors paid the deficiency and filed a claim for
refund which was denied by the Commissioner. The district court
rendered a judgment for the coexecutors. On appeal, held, affirmed.
The powers retained by the settlor were limited by an ascertainable
and judicially enforceable external standard and did not give the
settlor power to alter or amend the trust within the meaning of
section 811(d)(2) of the 1939 Code (now section 2038(a)(2)). 2
United States v. Powell, 307 F.2d 821 (10th Cir. 1962).
The Internal Revenue Service has met with few setbacks over
the years in its construction of the critical language of section 2038:
"[the] power . . . to alter, amend, or revoke. 3 The Supreme Court
has held that the terms "alter and amend" are not synonymous with
"revoke,"4 thereby allowing the application of section 2038 to ir-
revocable trusts. In determining whether reserved powers affected
1. The last power brought up the question of the duty to administer the trust so as
to preserve a fair balance between beneficiaries.
2. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 3, § 811(d)(2), 53 Stat. 121, is the applicable
section since the settlor executed the trust instrument in 1932.
3. INr. REv. CoPE- OF 1954, § 2038(a) (2). The prototype of what is now § 2038
was enacted in 1924. It was changed from time to time and took on its present form
in 1936. It provides that the gross estate shall include all property transferred by the
decedent "where the enjoyment thereof was subject at the date of his death to any
change through the exercise of a power, either by the decedent alone or in conjunction
with any other person, to alter, amend, or revoke..."
4. Porter v. Commissioner, 288 U.S. 436 (1933). The Court held that § 2038 was
intended by Congress to reach property in which the decedent had no interest of the
type that would be subject to § 2033, and that the terms "alter" and "amend" in §
2038 were not synonyms for "revoke." The Court further said: "We need not consider
whether every change, however slight or trivial, would be within the meaning of the
clause. Here the donor retained until his death power enough to enable him to make
a complete revision of all that he Ihad done in respect of the creation of the trusts
even to the extent of taking the property from the trustees and beneficiaries named
and transferring it absolutely or in trust for the benefit of others. So far as concerns
the tax here involved, there is no difference in principle between a transfer subject to
such changes and one that is revocable." Id. at 443.
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the beneficial enjoyment of the property, some courts have stated
that if the death of the settlor changes or firms up the relationships
between the parties, there has been an alteration sufficient to invoke
section 2038.5 The "termination of contingencies" upon which the
right of enjoyment is based, on enabling such right to vest in a par-
ticular beneficiary, has been used as a criterion by the Supreme
Court.6 The regulations do not require that the identity of a particular
beneficiary be subject to change, but call for the application of section
2038 when a trust instrument reserves a power affecting the "time or
manner of enjoyment of property or its income . . . ."7 One of the
most important cases in this area is State Street Trust Co. v. United
States.8 Until this decision the Commissioner had generally been
unsuccessful in trying to assert that the retention of investment
powers brought the corpus into the gross estate.9 Before the State
Street decision, the test apparently was whether the reserved power
effected any substantial change in the beneficial enjoyment of the
property in question. In deciding State Street the First Circuit
relied upon a case10 that set forth a test which seems applicable to
the instant situation-that of a "determinable external standard" and
an instrument "subject to court control."" The combination of an
external standard and court control was held to be enough to put the
trust beyond the discretionary control of the settlor. This decision
implied that a power in the trustee to do an act only if he satisfies
an external standard is a contingent power-contingent upon that
standard's being met. Until the standard is met, the power is simply
an expectancy and should not cause the inclusion of the trust in the
settlor-trustee's estate. 2 The retention of investment powers alone
is generally not enough to warrant inclusion of the corpus in the
gross estate.13 When this power is combined with the power to invade
5. Porter v. Commissioner, supra note 4. See also United States v. Wells, 283 U.S.
102 (1931).
6. It seems obvious that "one who has the power to terminate contingencies upon
which the right of enjoyment is staked, so as to make certain that a beneficiary will
have it who may never come into it if the power is not exercised, has power which
affects not only the time of the enjoyment but also the person or persons who may
enjoy the donation." Commissioner v. Estate of Holmes, 326 U.S. 480, 487 (1946).
7. "[Section] 2038 is applicable to any power affecting the time or manner of enjoy-
ment of property or its income, even though the identity of the beneficiary is not
affected." Treas. Reg. § 20.2038-1(a) (3) (1961).
8. 263 F.2d 635 (1st Cir. 1959).
9. Estate of Arnold Resch, 20 T.C. 171 (1953); Estate of John W. Neal, 8 T.C.
237 (1947); Estate of George W. Hall, 6 T.C. 933 (1946); Estate of Henry S. Downe,
2 T.C. 967 (1943).
10. Jennings v. Smith, 161 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1947).
11. Ibid.
12. LowNDas & KIAimR, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAxEs ch. 8, § 22 (1956).
13. See Fifth Ave. Bank v. Nunan, 59 F. Supp. 753 (E.D.N.Y. 1945); Estate of
George W. Hall, 6 T.C. 933 (1946); Estate of Henry S. Downe, 2 T.C. 967 (1943).
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the corpus for the "comfort, support, and/or happiness"'14 of the
beneficiaries, the courts have usually held the trust includable on the
grounds of an insufficient external standard.15 The power to control
the remainderman's interest is one that frequently is categorized as
a power to alter or amend. If a court feels that any power substan-
tially affects the interests of the life tenants and the remaindermen,
it will usually hold such a power to be one to alter or amend.16
In holding in the instant case that the settlor-trustee's powers
to control the investment policy and invade the corpus did not
give him the power to alter or amend the trust within the provisions
of section 2038, the Tenth Circuit relied heavily on the fact that
the discretionary powers conferred upon the trustee were subject
to review by the equity courts of Kansas. 17 Although counsel for the
United States argued that the investment powers gave the trustee
unbridled power to choose between the life tenant (the wife) and
the remaindermen (the daughters) 18 the court maintained that the
fact that there were two beneficiaries imposed a duty upon the
trustee to deal in an impartial manner.19 The court felt that this
duty to deal in a fair manner provided an ascertainable, external,
and judicially established standard, capable of being enforced by
a court of equity.20 The court went on to say that they had no
doubt that the courts of Kansas would intervene if the trustee in
the exercise of his investment powers displayed partiality as between
the life tenant and the remainder beneficiaries. The court distin-
guished State Street2' on its facts, in that the First Circuit had held
See also Dominick's Estate v. Commissioner, 152 F.2d 843 (2d Cir. 1946).
14. The Supreme Court feels that "only where the conditions on which the extent
of the invasion of the corpus depends are fixed by reference to some readily ascertain-
able and reliably predictable facts . . . will . . . elements of speculation be weeded
out." Merchant's Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 256 (1943).
15. The general rule seems to be that the trust will be includable if the grantor is a
trustee and a readily determinable external standard is not available. See Chase Nat'l
Bank v. Commissioner, 225 F.2d 621 (8th Cir. 1955); Mollenberg's Estate v. Com-
missioner, 173 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1949); Blunt v. Kelley, 131 F.2d 632 (3d Cir.
1942). See also Merchant's Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, supra note 14.
16. "Our conclusion is that the grantor of these trusts retained to himself as trustee
a sufficient power to alter or amend to affect very substantially the interests of the life
tenants and the remaindermen, even though he could not, unless he lost all the money
of the trusts by unfortunate investments, completely eliminate the remaindermen. He
could certainly affect them by many of the things he kept power in himself to do."
Commissioner v. Hager's Estate, 173 F.2d 613, 616 (3d Cir. 1949).
17. "It is well settled, under the law of Kansas, that a court of equity has power
to review the exercise of discretionary powers conferred upon trustees and to correct
any abuse in the exercise of such discretion." United States v. Powell, 307 F.2d 821,
824 (lOth Cir. 1962).
18. Ibid.
19. Id. at 825.
20. Ibid.
21. See note 8 supra.
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that the powers of the trustee in that case were so broad and all
inclusive as not to be within any limitation the Massachusetts courts
could impose. The court went on to hold that the term "happiness,"
as used in the trust instrument,2 was not a vague or undefinable term
but constituted a judicially enforceable external standard. Bothered
by case law that held "happiness" to be an insufficient standard,23
the court turned to Webster's New International Dictionary24 for
a definition and equated "happiness" to "welfare" and "comfort,"
well settled external standards.2 Counsel's argument that the powers
retained, if not sufficiently broad individually, were sufficiently
extensive cumulatively was turned aside by an axiom borrowed
from Judge Magruder's dissenting opinion in State Street: "the whole
cannot be greater than the sum of its parts. . ... 26
In comparing the decision in the instant case with State Street,
the essential difference seems to be the attitude of the courts with
respect to the effectiveness of the control exercised by the respective
state courts. While the Tenth Circuit felt that the Kansas courts
were fully capable of reviewing the powers retained by the trustee,
the First Circuit correctly concluded that no court of equity could
exercise jurisdiction upon so broad a base.27 As a practical matter, the
probability of a beneficiary seeking the aid of a court of equity in
such a close family matter as the one at hand is extremely remote.
Further, even the respective beneficiaries would probably not be
aware of the shifting of the benefits, much less a court of equity.
While the instant case asks an important question, namely, are the
management provisions of so broad a scope that they cut across the
dispositive provisions of the trust instrument, enabling the grantor
to affect the enjoyment of the trust property by shifting beneficial
interests, it is submitted that the State Street test is more realistic.28
In that case the First Circuit lumped all of the administrative powers
of the trustee together and found them to be offensively broad.
While no individual power was held to be sufficiently broad to
warrant the tag of section 2038, the court indicated that the combi-
nation of powers enabled the trustees to shift the economic benefits
between the life tenant and remaindermen. The Tenth Circuit's
confidence in the Kansas courts in the instant case could have been
strengthened by a more precise delineation of the limits of equity's
power to review a trustee's acts. The fact that the court had to juggle
22. 307 F.2d at 826.
23. See notes 14, 15 supra.
24. WEnsTm,, Nmv INTERNATioNAL DICTiONARY 1136 (2d ed. 1934).
25. 307 F.2d at 828.
26. 263 F.2d at 642.




various definitions29 of the word "happiness" to arrive at a definable
external standard suggests that the "beneficial enjoyment" test does
not solve the problems posed by the facts of this case. It is submitted
that the "sum of the administrative powers" test offers a touchstone
for judicial review and provides a higher degree of certainty for the
estate planner.
Taxation-Federal Income Taxation-Legal Expenses
Incurred by Husband To Protect His Property
Against Claim of Wife Arising from Marital
Dispute Are Not Deductible
After Baer v. Commissioner,' lower federal courts were frequently
confronted with the question of whether any portion of a husband's
attorney's fees emanating from a divorce in which the wife claimed
a portion of her spouse's income-producing property was deductible
as an expense incurred for the "management, conservation, or mainte-
nance of property held for the production of income." Two recent
cases confronted the Supreme Court with this question. In the first
case, respondent, president and principal owner of three General
Motors dealerships, litigated his wife's California community property
claims arising from divorce.2 The California Supreme Court granted
respondent a divorce and denied his wife's alimony and community
property claims in the entirety.3 Thereafter, the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue denied respondent's legal expense deduction on
the ground that it was a personal expense. In a refund suit, the
Court of Claims held that eighty per cent of the legal fees were at-
tributable to respondent's defense against his wife's community prop-
erty claims, and thus were deductible under section 23(a) (2) of the
1939 Code, the predecessor to section 212(2) of the 1954 Code.4
29. See note 24 supra.
1. 196 F.2d 646 (8th Cir. 1952).
2. The husband's primary source of income was the salary and dividends he received
from the three automobile dealerships. United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39, 41
(1963). The wife's claims had two aspects: first, that earnings retained by the
corporations were the product of her husband's services (these were considered
community property under California law); second, that she was the innocent party
in the divorce proceeding and therefore was entitled to more than a one-half interest
in the community property under California statute. Id. at 41-42.
If the wife had proven her charges of marital infidelity, the respondent might have
lost the General Motors franchises because General Motors had the right to terminate
them if any interest in the dealership was transferred without its consent. See
Gilmore v. United States, 290 F.2d 942, 946 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
3. Gilmore v. Gilmore, 45 Cal. 2d 142, 287 P.2d 769 (1955).
4. Gilmore v. United States, 290 F.2d 942, 948 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
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On certiorari in the United States Supreme Court, held, reversed
and remanded. Legal expenses incurred by a husband in a divorce
proceeding are personal and not deductible under section 23(a)(2)
of the 1939 Code, regardless of the potential consequences of the
wife's claims on the husband's income-producing assets. United
States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39 (1963).
In the second case, respondent, the president of a family owned
publishing company, was sued for divorce by his wife. At the time
of this proceeding, the respondent and his wife each owned a twenty-
eight per cent interest in the corporation and jointly owned the real
estate on which the company was situated. After extended negotia-
tions between the parties' attorneys, a property settlement was
reached.5 Thereafter, the South Carolina divorce court granted the
wife a divorce, approved the property settlement, and ordered re-
spondent to pay the attorneys' fees for both parties. The Commis-
sioner disallowed respondent's deduction for these attorneys' fees. In
a refund suit, the district court held that the attorneys' fees were
deductible expenses within section 212(2) of the 1954 Code.6 The
court of appeals affirmed.7 On certiorari in the United States Supreme
Court, held, reversed. Legal expenses incurred by a husband in
resolving his wife's property interests in a marital dispute are personal
and not deductible under section 212(2) of the 1954 Code, even
though the expenditures were utilized to arrange a stock transfer and
business lease and to assure the husband control of the business
through the use of a trust arrangement. United States v. Patrick,
372 U.S. 53 (1963).
Prior to the 1942 amendment of the 1939 Code, attorney's fees
were not deductible unless they were an ordinary and necessary
business expense.8 To alleviate inequities resulting to the non-
business taxpayer, Congress amended the 1939 Code, thereby creating
a new category of deductions, non-trade or non-business expenses.9
5. As a result of the settlement, the respondent obtained his wife's 28% interest for
$112,000, a new long-term lease on the real property on which the company was
situated was executed, and this realty was transferred to a trust. United States v.
Patrick, 372 U.S. 53, 54-55 (1963).
6. Patrick v. United States, 186 F. Supp. 48 (W.D.S.C. 1960).
7. Patrick v. United States, 288 F.2d 292 (4th Cir. 1961).
8. See, e.g., Frank G. Robins, 8 B.T.A. 523 (1927); David G. Joyce, 3 B.T.A. 393
(1926). If the expenses were personal, they were not deductible. Int. Rev. Code of
1939 § 24(a)(1), as amended, ch. 619, § 127, 56 Stat. 826 (1942).
9. As a result of Higgins v. Commissioner, 312 U.S. 212 (1941), expenses incurred
by an individual in investment activities were personal and not deductible even
though a professional stock broker was entitled to a business expense deduction for
identical expenditures. In hearings before the House Ways and Means Committee, the
Higgins decision was criticized and the following amendment to § 23 (deductions from
gross income) of the 1939 Code was recommended. "§ 23(3) Nonbusiness expenses.
-All the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year,
19631
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A non-business expense, to be deductible, must be: (1) ordinary and
necessary, (2) paid or incurred during the taxable year, (3) for the
production or collection of income, or for management, conservation,
or maintenance of property held for the production of gross income,'
and (4) must fall outside the statutory nondeductibility sanctions,
such as section 24(a) (1) of the 1939 Code (section 262 of the 1954
Code)." In determining whether legal expenditures emanating from
a divorce are deductible, two factual situations must be considered.
First, if no alimony or property settlement is involved in the divorce,
the legal expenses of neither party are deductible. 2 Second, where
the divorce also involves alimony, the wife's legal fees attributable to
other than those paid or incurred in carrying on any trade or business, to the extent
that such expenses were paid or incurred with respect to the production or collection
of, or to the management, protection, or conservation of property producing income
required to be included in gross income under this chapter." Hearings on the Revenue
Revision of 1941 Before the House Committee on Ways and Means, 77th Cong., 1st
Sess. 165 (1941).
Section 23(a) (2) of the 1939 Code provides: "(2) Non-Trade or Non-Business
Expenses-In the case of an individual, all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid
or incurred during the taxable year for the production or collection of income, or for
the management, conservation, or maintenance of property held for the production of
income."
Section 212 of the 1954 Code retains these basic provisions. It provides: "In the
case of an individual, there shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and
necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year-
(1) for the production or collection of income;
(2) for the management, conservation, or maintenance of property held for the
production of income; or
(3) in connection with the determination, collection, or refund of any tax."
10. "This amendment allows a deduction for the ordinary and necessary expenses
of an individual paid or incurred during the taxable year for the production and
collection of income, or for the management, conservation, or maintenance of property
held by the taxpayer for the production of income, whether or not such expenses are
paid or incurred in carrying on a trade or business....
"Expenses, to be deductible under section 23 (a) (2), must be ordinary and neces-
sary, which rule presupposes that they must be reasonable in amount and must bear
a reasonable and proximate relation to the production or collection of income, or to
the management, conservation, or maintenance of property held for that purpose.
"A deduction under this section is subject, except for the requirement of being
incurred with a trade or business, to all the restrictions and limitations that apply in
the case of the deduction under section 23 (a) (1) (A) of an expense paid or incurred
in carrying on any trade or business." H.R. REP'. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 74-
75 (1941); S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 87-88 (1941). See generally 4
MERTENs, FEDERAL INcomm TAXATION §§ 25 A.01-.09a (rev. 1960).
From the legislative history and subsequent case law it is evident that the business
expense and non-business expense deduction provisions are comparable and pari
materia. See Trust Under the Will of Bingham v. Commissioner, 325 U.S. 365, 373-74
(1945).
11. See Dohan, Deductibility of Non-Business Legal and Other Professional Expenses;
Expenses for Creation or Protection of Income or Property, Divorce, etc., N.Y.U. 17-ni
INST. ON FED. TAx 579, 581 (1959). Personal or family expenses are not deductible
under the 1939 Code. Note 9 supra. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 262.
12. Treas. Reg. § 1.262-1(7) (1960).
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the collection of alimony are deductible;13 whether the husband's
legal fees are deductible depends on the interpretation of the statu-
tory language "for management, conservation, or maintenance of
property" of section 23(a) (2) of the 1939 Code.14 Nowhere are these
terms defined in the Code, legislative history,15 or the Treasury Regu-
lations, although the Regulations provide that attorney's fees emanat-
ing from a divorce are "generally" not deductible. 16 Since the de-
duction is not expressly prohibited in all situations, it is necessary
to resort to case law to determine when the fees are deductible.
Examination of case law reveals that a split exists among the federal
courts concerning whether the husband's legal expenditures are
deductible. The courts denying deductibility follow Lykes v. United
States17 (a federal gift tax case) where the Court said that deducti-
13. "[T]he part of an attorney's fee and the part of the other costs paid in con-
nection with a divorce, legal separation, written separation agreement, or a decree for
support, which are properly attributable to the production or collection of amounts
includible in gross income under section 71 are deductible by the wife under section
212." Ibid. Fees expended by the wife to secure an increase in alimony are also
deductible as an ordinary and necessary expense incurred for the production of income.
Elsie B. Gale, 13 T.C. 661 (1949), aff'd, 191 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1951); Barbara B. Le
Mond, 13 T.C. 670 (1949). In spite of this regulation, some courts require that legal
expenses be capitalized. Shipp v. Commissioner, 217 F.2d 401 (9th Cir. 1954); Robert
L. Wilson, 37 T.C. No. 28 (1961).
14. See 4 MERTENs, FEERaAL INCOmE TAXATION § 25 A.09a (rev. 1960). See also
Brodsky & McKibbin, Deduction of Non-Trade or Non-Business Expenses, 2 TAx. L.
BEv. 39 (1946); Brookes, Litigation Expenses and the Income Tax, 12 TAx L. Rxv. 241
(1957); Brown, Tax Effects to Client of Legal Fees Paid, 35 TAXEs 808 (1957);
Dohan, Deductibility of Non-Business Legal and Other Professional Expenses; Expenses
for Creation or Protection of Income or Property, Divorce, etc., N.Y.U. 17TH INST. ON
FED. TAx 579 (1959); McDonald, Deduction of Attorney's Fees for Federal Income Tax
Purposes, 103 U. PA. L. Rlv. 168 (1954); Nahstol, Non-Trade and Non-Business Ex-
pense Deductions, 46 MicH. L. Bv. 1015 (1948).
15. See 4 MERTENs, FEDERAL INCom TAXATION § 25 A.09a (rev. 1960); Supreme
Court Says Property Settlement Legal Fees Are Not Deductible; Conflict Resolved, 18
J. TAXATION 214 (1963).
In defining the scope of "management," the Court in Trust Under the Will of Bing-
ham v. Commissioner, 325 U.S. 365 (1945), said that the cost of distributing the trust
corpus was "quite as much expenses of a function of 'management' of the trust property
as were expenses incurred in producing the trust income." Id. at 375. "Since there
is no requirement that business expenses be for the production of income, there is no
reason for that requirement in the case of like expenses of managing a trust, so long
as they are in connection with the management of property which is held for the
production of income." Id. at 374. Since most courts appear to consider management
and conservation interchangeably, the broad definition of management set forth in
Bingham Trust would seem to apply in interpreting the meaning and scope of "con-
servation." See 4 MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 25 A.09a (rev. 1960).
16. "Generally, attorney's fees and other costs paid in connection with a divorce,
separation, or decree for support are not deductible by either the husband or the
wife." Treas. Reg. § 1.262-1(7) (1960).
17. 343 U.S. 118 (1952). See, e.g., Harris v. United States, 275 F.2d 238 (9th Cir.
1960); Lewis v. Commissioner, 253 F.2d 821, 826-27 (2d Cir. 1958); Tressler v.
Commissioner, 228 F.2d 356, 361 (9th Cir. 1955) (the Baer rule was accepted but
inapplicable because the dispute concerned the question of liability, not the means of
payment); Smith's Estate v. Commissioner, 208 F.2d 349, 354 (3d Cir. 1953); Howard
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bility "turns wholly upon the nature of the activities to which they
[the attorneys fees] relate.""' Under this view, the character of the
expense (business or personal) depends on whether it originated
from the pursuit of income-producing activity. A contrary line of
authority allowing the deduction follows Baer v. Commissioner."9 In
Baer the taxpayer, president of a department store, deducted legal
expenses incurred resisting his wife's divorce claim. The wife claimed
one-sixth of the taxpayer's estate, a substantial portion of which con-
sisted of stock in the department store. The court distinguished
Lykes2O and allowed the taxpayer's deduction because the "expendi-
ture had a proximate and direct relation to the conservation and main-
tenance of specific property, the ownership or control of which
enabled the petitioner to receive income."21 The Baer approach
v. Commissioner, 202 F.2d 28, 30 (9th Cir. 1953); O'Loughlin v. United States, 192
F. Supp. 520 (D.N.J. 1961); Bonnyman v. United States, 156 F. Supp. 625 (E.D. Tenn.
1957), aff'd, 261 F.2d 835 (1958); Henry M. Rockwell, 37 T.C. No. 31 (1961)
(attorney's fees arising out of defense of a suit for breach of promise to marry are
personal expenses).
18. 343 U.S. at 123. "Legal expenses do not become deductible merely because they
are paid for services which relieve a taxpayer of liability. That argument would carry
us too far. It would mean that the expense of defending almost any claim would be
deductible by a taxpayer on the ground that such defense was made to help him keep
clear of liens whatever income-producing property he might have. For example, it
suggests that the expense of defending an action based upon personal injuries caused
by a taxpayer's negligence while driving an automobile for pleasure should be de-
ductible. Section 23 (a) (2) never has been so interpreted by us. It has been applied
to expenses on the basis of their immediate purposes rather than upon the basis of the
remote contributions they might make to the conservation of a taxpayer's income-
producing assets by reducing his general liabilities." Id. at 125.
"An expense (not otherwise deductible) paid or incurred by an individual in de-
termining or contesting a liability asserted against him does not become deductible by
reason of the fact that property held by him for the production of income may be
required to be used or sold for the purpose of satisfying such liability." Treas. Reg. §
1.212-1(m) (1960).
19. 196 F.2d 646 (8th Cir. 1952). See, e.g., Owens v. Commissioner, 273 F.2d 251
(5th Cir. 1959); Bowers v. Commissioner, 243 F.2d 904 (6th Cir. 1957); Aller v.
United States, 51 Am. Fed. Tax. R. 1341 (S.D. Cal. 1956); McMurty v. United States,
132 F. Supp. 114, 116 (Ct. Cl. 1955) (Baer rule accepted and the relevant factors
necessary to invoke rule stated).
20. In distinguishing Lykes the court said: "The services in that case were relative
to property which the taxpayer had given away, and, as pointed out by the court,
thereby reduced, rather than conserved, the property held by him for income-
producing purposes. The activities of the attorneys in the instant case, on the other
hand, were directed to the conservation and maintenance of property held by their
client for income producing purposes. The facts in the Lykes case are so unlike those
in the case at bar as to rob it of any persuasive force. Lykes made gifts to members
of his family-clearly a family transaction which had nothing to do with the conservation
or maintenance of specific property held by him for income producing purposes."
Baer v. Commissioner, supra note 19, at 652-53.
21. Id. at 651. Speaking of Beer and related cases the court in Dalman v. United
States, 191 F. Supp. 478 (N.D. Cal. 1961), said: "The exception carved out by the
authorities is explicit: a deduction may be taken only when the controversy goes not
to the question of liability but to the manner in which it might be met." Id, at 479.
Another case, Deem v. United States, 209 F. Supp. 369 (D. Colo. 1962), in dis-
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determines the expense characterization from its consequences upon
the taxpayer's income-producing activities, rather than its origin.
Some courts follow neither view but require the taxpayer to capitalize
legal expenditures.22
The Supreme Court in Gilmore said that the legislative history
and prior case law indicate that the family expense restriction (sec-
tion 24(a)(1), now section 262) is a limitation on the scope of the
non-business expense deduction (section 23(a) (2) now section 212
(2)); thus only business expenses, expenses that relate to a profit-
seeking purpose, are within section 23(a) (2). In synthesizing
several previous decisions,2 the Court said:
The principle we derive from these cases is that the characterization, as
"business" or "personal," of the litigation costs of resisting a claim depends
on whether or not the claim arises in connection with the taxpayer's profit-
seeking activities. It does not depend on the consequences that might
result to a taxpayer's income-producing property from a failure to defeat
the claim .... 24
The basic test in determining whether the expense is business or
personal is the origin and character of the claim with respect to
which the expense was incurred.2 The rationale of Baer is unsatis-
factory for it results in uncertainty and inequities, since it depends
on the relative impact of a claim on the taxpayer's income-producing
resources. Because the wife's claims emanated from the marital
relationship, not from income-producing activity, the respondent's
expenditures in resisting these claims are personal and therefore not
deductible under section 23(a) (2).2 The Court in Patrick said
that the principles applicable in Gilmore are equally applicable here.
There is no "significant distinction in the fact that the legal fees ...
were paid for arranging a transfer of stock interests, leasing property
and creating a trust rather than for conducting litigation."2 7 These
matters were incidental to the wife's claims which arose from the
marital dispute. Since the claims arose from the respondent's personal
and family life, the legal expenditures incurred in resolving these
cussing Baer and related cases said: "The conclusion to be drawn from these authorities
is that closeness or remoteness of relationship between the service rendered and
conservation and maintenance of income is the recognized touchstone here." Id. at 372.
22. See, e.g., Harris v. United States, supra note 17, at 240; Shipp v. Commissioner,
supra note 13; Robert L. Wilson, supra note 13.
23. Lykes v. United States, supra note 17; Deputy v. duPont, 308 U.S. 488 (1940);
Kornhauser v. United States, 276 U.S. 145 (1928).
24. United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39, 48 (1963).
25. Ibid.
26. Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting, thought that the Court's
interpretation of § 23(a)(2) of the 1939 Code was unjustifiably narrow. Id. at 52.
27. United States v. Patrick, 372 U.S. 53, 57 (1963).
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claims are personal and not deductible.
The basic premise of deductibility is that the expenditure must be
incurred in the pursuit of taxable income-producing activity; other-
wise the expense is considered personal and not deductible unless
there is an express provision for deductibility, such as in the case of
medical expenses. The Court in deciding Gilmore and Patrick recog-
nized and applied this principle; furthermore the prior split between
Lykes and Baer appears to have been resolved in favor of the Lykes
rationale. Prior to the instant cases, the courts appeared to be look-
ing for a way to sustain the deduction. Thus, the Baer approach was
adopted even though it resulted in more favorable treatment of tax-
payers having income-producing property than of taxpayers
possessing cash. The present decision is desirable because the Gilmore
rule, that origin and character are determinative, is administratively
convenient, dispenses with the need for exhaustive examination of
the character of the taxpayer's assets considered in the light of pos-
sible consequences of marital litigation necessary under Baer, and
terminates taxpayer discrimination. Hereafter, in order for a husband
to deduct marital litigation expenses, the origin and character test of
Gilmore must be satisfied. It is difficult to conceive of a situation
where deduction of attorney's fees emanating from a divorce will be
sustained. Since the Court did not answer the government's con-
tention that the expenditures should be capitalized, it may be possible
for a taxpayer to capitalize these expenditures,2 although it seems
unlikely that this will be sustained.2 A question which remains to be
answered is whether Gilmore is restricted to the divorce situation or
is applicable to the interpretation of section 212 generally. Further-
more, section 1.262-1(7) of the Treasury Regulations (allowing the
wife's deduction for attorney's fees) may also be withdrawn in the
future because the origin of the wife's legal expenditure is personal
even though its purpose was to obtain income.
Torts-Statutory Exemptions of Emergency Vehicles
From Traffic Laws Do Not Relieve Driver From Standard
of Care Imposed by Common Law
Answering an alarm, two fire engines, giving the statutorily re-
quired warning, collided at an intersection, resulting in one death and
28. See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
29. "The phrase 'conservation, or maintenance of property,' severed from its
context, may sound as though it were intended to cover a defense of title. But the
cases indicate that the maintenance and conservation of capital assets to wvhich the
statute refers relates primarily to the protection of the physical property and not to the




various personal injuries to plaintiffs, the occupants of two auto-
mobiles which had yielded to the emergency vehicles by pulling to
the curb. Although the California Vehicle Code expressly exempts
authorized emergency vehicles from its provisions, the statute also
states that this exemption does not relieve the driver from the duty to
drive with due regard for the safety of others.' In a negligence suit
against the city the trial judge instructed the jury that liability for
common law negligence is not within the exemption afforded by this
section2 and the jury rendered its verdict for the plaintiffs. On appeal
to the Supreme Court of California, held, affirmed. Statutory exemp-
tions of emergency vehicles from traffic laws do not relieve the driver
from the duty to exercise the care of a reasonably prudent man under
similar circumstances. Torres v. City of Los Angeles, 22 Cal. Rptr.
866, 372 P.2d 906 (1962).
Many courts have had to solve a statutory construction problem of
whether an express statutory exemption of emergency vehicles from
specific traffic laws also impliedly exempts the driver from exercising
the common law standard of reasonable care under the circumstances.3
In an attempt to alleviate this problem, many states have enacted
specific provisions limiting the scope of the exemption and imposing on
the drivers of emergency vehicles a duty to drive "with due regard"
1. At the time of the accident, June 1, 1958, Cal. Vehicle Code § 454 (1935),
-is amended, stated:
"The driver of an authorized emergency vehicle shall be exempt from those
provisions of this code herein set forth under the following conditions:
"(a) Said exemptions shall apply whenever any said vehicle is being driven in
response to an emergency call or while engaged in rescue operations or when used
in the immediate pursuit of an actual or suspected violator of the law, or when
responding to but not upon returning from a fire alarm.
"(b) Said exemptions shall apply only when the driver of said vehicle sounds a
siren as may be reasonably necessary and the vehicle displays a lighted red lamp
visible from the front as a warning to others. Under the circumstances hereinabove
stated, any said driver shall not be required to observe those regulations contained
in . . . [various sections] of this code, but said exemptions shall not relieve the
driver of any said vehicle from the duty to drive with due regard for the safety
of all persons using the highway nor shall the provisions of this section protect any
such driver from the consequences of an arbitrary exercise of the privileges declared
in this section." This was reenacted, remaining the same, in substance, as CAL.
VEMCLE CODE §§ 21055, 21056.
Compare UNIFORM VEHICLE CODE Act V, art. II, § 25.1 (d): "The foregoing pro-
visions [exemptions from traffic laws under emergencies] shall not relieve the driver
of an authorized emergency vehicle from the duty to drive with due regard for the
safety of all persons, nor shall such provisions protect the driver from the conse-
<quences of his reckless disregard for the safety of others."
2. 372 P.2d 906, at 909 n.2. "The instruction which was given is as follows: 'if
you find that the accident in question was a direct and proximate result of an act
of one or more firemen and that such act was outside the exemption contained in
Section 454 of the Vehicle Code, then you must determine this issue: Was this
act that proximately caused the accident a negligent act under the instructions and
definitions that I have given you?"'
3. See generally, Annots., 19 A.L.R. 459 (1922); 23 A.L.R. 418 (1923).
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for others.4 Courts must interpret these provisions and apply them
in negligence suits involving accidents of emergency vehicles. Stand-
ing in the minority before the instant case, the California court had
adhered to its formulated rule of interpreting the statutory require-
ment of "due regard" to mean that the driver need do no more than
give others an opportunity to yield.5 Thus, where there was an
emergency call and where the statutory warning was given, liability
was found only where there was "an arbitrary exercise of the privi-
leges declared in this section [of the code]."6 Decisions in twelve
states with similar statutory provisions have rejected this antiquated
California rule and have held drivers of emergency vehicles to the
standard of care of a reasonably prudent man under the same or
similar circumstances.7 No recent decision has adopted the former
California rule. These decisions are based both on the intent of the
legislature evidenced in the statute and on public policy.
8
4. See, e.g., UNFoRm VEHIcLE CODE Act V, art. II, § 25.1(d); CAL. VEHICLE CODE
§ 21056; TENN. CODE ANN. § 59-822 (1961).
5. "It is evident that the right of way of fire apparatus over other vehicles is de-
pendent upon 'due regard to the safety of the public' only in so far as such 'due
regard' effects the person required to yield the right of way. Notice to the person
required to yield the right of way is essential, and a reasonable opportunity to stop
or to otherwise yield the right of way [is] necessary in order to charge a person with
the obligation fixed by law to give precedence to the fire apparatus." Balthasar v.
Pacific Elec. Ry., 187 Cal. 302, 311, 202 Pac. 37, 41 (1921).
"This [the Balthasar case's interpretation] is the only reasonable interpretation that
the statute will bear. If the driver of an emergency vehicle is at all times required to
drive with due regard for the safety of the public as all other drivers are required to
do, then all the provisions of these statutes relating to emergency vehicles become
meaningless and no privileges are granted to them. But if his 'due regard' for the
safety of others means that he should, by suitable warning, give others a reasonable
opportunity to yield the right of way, the statutes become workable for the purpose
intended." Lucas v. City of Los Angeles, 10 Cal. 2d 476, 483, 75 P.2d 599, 603
(1938).
6. Cal. Vehicle Code § 454 (1935), as amended (now CAr. VEHICLE CODE § 21056).
7. City of Miami v. Thegpin, 152 Fla. 96, 11 So. 2d 300 (1943); Archer v. Johnson,
90 Ga. App. 418, 83 S.E.2d 314 (1954); Russell v. Nadeat, 139 Me. 286, 29 A.2d
916 (1943); City of Baltimore v. Fire Ins. Salvage Corps, 219 Md. 75, 148 A.2d 444
(1959); City of Kalamazoo v. Priest, 331 Mich. 43, 49 N.W.2d 279 (1951); Johnson
v. Brown, 75 Nev. 437, 345 P.2d 754 (1959); Desmond v. Basch & Greenfield, 94 N.J.L.
52, 108 Atl. 362 (Sup. Ct. 1919); Farrell v. Fire Ins. Salvage Corps., 179 N.Y. Supp.
477 (App. Div. 1919); McDermott v. Irwin, 73 N.E.2d 86 (Ohio 1948); Horsham
Fire Co. v. Fort Washington Fire Co., 383 Pa. 404, 119 A.2d 71 (1956); Roadmann
v. Bellone, 379 Pa. 483, 108 A.2d 754 (1954); Grimmer-Dismukes Co. v. Payton, 22
S.W.2d 544 (Tex. App. 1929); Montalto v. Fond Du Lac County, 276 Wis. 552, 76
N.W.2d 279 (1956). See also Ruth v. Rhodes, 66 Ariz. 129, 185 P.2d 304 (1947);
Henderson v. Watson, 262 S.W.2d 811 (Ky. 1953); Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. Hall
Funeral Home, 68 So. 2d 626 (La. App. 1953).
8. "In holding that operators of authorized emergency vehicles are liable for ordinary
negligence under the statutes mentioned, we do not, of course, mean to state that their
conduct in the operation of such vehicles is measured by exactly the same yardstick as
the actions of the operators of conventional vehicles. The urgency of their missions
demands that they respond to calls with celerity and as expeditiously as is reasonably
possible. . . .However, they are bound to exercise reasonable precautions against the
After describing the facts of the accident, the court in the instant
case discussed the meaning of the relevant provisions of the California
Vehicle Code. To understand the legislative intent expressed in the
statute, the court examined legislative history and prior California
cases and explained the chronological interrelation and reaction be-
tween the state legislature and the courts. The court concluded that
the statute "does not in any manner purport to exempt the employer
[i.e., the municipality or the private fire company] from the liability
due to negligence attributable to the driver's failure to maintain that
standard of care imposed by the common law."9 In reaching this
conclusion, the court repudiated the doctrines and implications of the
earlier California cases.'" To buttress its position, the court, quoting
from the decisions of other states as persuasive authority, emphasized
that negligence and reasonable care are relative to both the situation
and the circumstances and that emergency vehicle drivers must
exercise reasonable precautions against danger." "The question to be
asked is what would a reasonable, prudent emergency driver do under
all of the circumstances, including that of the emergency."' This is
the new California test of negligence for emergency vehicles, a test
currently used in most states.
The negligence test used in this case is the product of good reason
and is a logical interpretation of the statute. That the legislature in-
tended to impose on emergency vehicle drivers performing their
emergency function a degree of care which requires more than merely
giving the requisite warning seems clear on the face of the statute.' 3
extraordinary dangers of the situation that the proper performance of their duties
compels them to create. When dealing with the operation of emergency vehicles, it is
particularly appropriate to recognize that negligence and reasonable care are relative
terms and their application depends upon the situation of the parties and the degree
of care and vigilance which circumstances reasonably impose. Negligence and reason-
able care derive their only significance from a factual background, and that back-
ground must contain evidence of circumstances which justify a legitimate inference
that in the exercise of reasonable care and prudence injury could have been avoided.
... We are dealing here with a situation that involves the operators of two emergency
vehicles, each having all of the privileges granted to such operators and each having
the same obligation to exercise such care and control as an ordinarily careful and
prudent person would exercise under like circumstances." City of Baltimore v. Fire
Ins. Salvage Corps, 219 Md. 75, 82, 148 A.2d 444, 448 (1959). This is also quoted.
in the instant decision, 372 P.2d at 914-15.
9. 372 P.2d at 913.
10. Id. at 913 (where the court overruled the doctrine in the Balthasar and Lucas
cases cited note 4 supra).
11. See, e.g., notes 6 & 7 supra.
12. 372 P.2d at 916.
13. The Southern California Law Review reached the same conclusion. "It is sub-
mitted that the effect of this last-quoted limitation [currently, CAL. VErcLE CODE
§ 21056] upon the exemptions is that, while the driver of an emergency vehicle is not
bound by the traffic rules, under the conditions in (a) and (b) above [see note 1
supra], he must act as a reasonably prudent man under the particular circumstances.
If such is the case, the effect of the exemptions is merely to say that tb' violation
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Although the statute under certain conditions relieves the driver from
the statutory requirements and any negligence per se arising from
violations of them, it does not relieve the driver of general common
law negligence which is not based on the violation of a statute. Public
policy also supports this interpretation. To perform a useful function,
emergency vehicles must arrive at their destination.14 Recklessness
and utter disregard of others who are on the same streets are detri-
mental both to the objective of the vehicle and to the safety of the
public. By the standards of modern civilization with its high regard
for human life, neither the apprehension of a traffic violator nor ex-
tinguishing a garage fire is worth the risk of severe accidental injury
or death of a bystander. A precise analysis should consider such
factors as the congestion of the streets where the vehicle is traveling,
the lives and value of the property endangered by the emergency,
the possible additional harm caused by the vehicle's arrival at a later
moment.15 These and other factors should be weighed rather than
saying that as long as the fire engine sounded its siren and flashed
its red light, there could be no liability for negligence. The importance
of the functions of policemen and firemen to the public's general wel-
fare is a relevant circumstance in measuring their duty to exercise due
care.' 6 But the test of negligence and of this duty should remain
constant-under the circumstances of the emergency what would a
reasonably prudent man do?
per se, the traffic law, by the driver of an authorized emergency vehicle, has no
effect on an issue of negligence; that the question is whether or not, under the
circumstances, he acted as a reasonable man." The Work of the 1937 California
Legislature, 11 So. CAL. L. REv. 1, 187 (1937).
14. This practical point was well expressed in Horsham Fire Co. v. Fort Washington
Fire Co., 383 Pa. 404, 119 A.2d 71, 75 (1956): "The object of a fire truck's journey is
not merely to make a show of rushing to a fire, but actually to get there. If the
driver is to ignore all elements of safety driving at breakneck speed through obviously
imperilling hazards, he may not only kill others en route, but he may frustrate the
whole object of his mission and not get there at alll"
15. See generally Terry, Negligence, 29 HIv. L. REv. 40 (1915). The reason-
ableness of the risk is measured by five factors, all of which are balanced to indicate
whether there was negligence. As applied to the instant case, 1) the magnitude of
the risk was the probability that other people (e.g., plaintiffs) on the street would be
injured; 2) the principal object was the lives and well being of the people on the
street; 3) the collateral object was the extinguishment of the fire, the alleviation of
the emergency; 4) the utility of the risk was the probability that the fire engine could
save the burning property from destruction, and this could not be done unless the
fire engine arrived at the fire; 5) the necessity of the risk was the probability that the
property would be saved and the fire extinguished.
16. See generally 2 STEVENsoN, NEGLIGENCE IN1 TE ATLANTic STATES § 681 (1954).
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